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Abstract
A security protocol is a mechanism designed to allow secure communications
through an insecure medium, even when that medium is controlled by a
hostile attacker.
Historically, approaches to analysis of security protocols have fallen into
two broad categories: model checking and theorem proving. Each has its
strengths, but the weaknesses of each are all too apparent. Model checking
suffers from the problem of being able to check only a finite system; theorem
proving is difficult to automate and often produces no conclusive results.
Schneider’s previous work on rank functions provides a formal approach
to verification of certain properties of a security protocol. In this thesis,
we develop the theory to allow for an arbitrarily large network, and give a
clearly defined decision procedure by which one may either construct a rank
function, proving correctness of the protocol, or show that no rank function
exists. We show how the algorithm may be implemented to give a means
of analysing authentication protocols that avoids the inherent limitations of
both model checking and theorem proving.
We discuss the implications of the absence of a rank function, and the
open question of completeness of the rank function theorem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Careless talk costs lives.
—Second World War security slogan
Taisez-vous! Me´fiez-vous! Les oreilles ennemies vous e´coutent.
—Official notice in France, 1915
We live in an increasingly interconnected world. We have technology at our
fingertips of which our ancestors would hardly have dared to dream. We
can pick up the telephone and dial the number of a friend’s mobile without
knowing even in which country our friend is travelling. We can send the
same email to a hundred people at the touch of a button. We can search the
internet across the whole world for information on any conceivable topic.
The commercial implications of this high degree of connectivity are dra-
matic, to say the least. Goods and services can be easily tracked down and
ordered over the internet, and orders can be processed speedily and automat-
ically. Banks can be electronically instructed to transfer millions of pounds
from one account to another. The administrative costs of advertising, com-
munication, authorisation, and money transfer can be radically reduced. The
rush over the last few years, by commercial institutions and by private indi-
viduals, to ‘get on the net’ to take advantage of these enticing possibilities has
been overwhelming. These days, a company with no web site is no company
at all.
But, of course, the security issues with electronic communication are
rather different from those associated with a manual approach. When we
purchase goods over the counter with a cheque or credit card, the hand-
written signature is the guarantee that the buyer really is who he claims to
be; but hand-written signatures are not possible with an electronic trans-
action. When we post a letter, we seal the envelope to ensure (as best we
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can) that any attempt to read it en route will be detected by the recipient;
but there is no obvious electronic equivalent of gummed paper. When we
receive a telephone call from a friend, we recognise the friend’s voice, and are
satisfied that the call is not a hoax; but all emails look the same.
Electronic equivalents of all of these security measures have been pro-
posed, and are in use. ‘Secure’ web sites, email encryption programs and the
like aim to provide such guarantees electronically. Public reaction to these
features is diverse: some have a rather childlike trust in anything labelled
‘secure’ or ‘encrypted’; some will not enter sensitive information onto web
sites regardless of what level of security has been claimed (but will enter a
PIN into a cash machine without a second thought); some seem completely
unaware even of the existence of the problem. Proponents of security so-
lutions face two problems: not only must their ideas work, but they must
convince a non-technically minded public to trust their products.
Historically, both problems have been difficult to solve. Many seemingly
good security systems have been implemented, some even with ‘proofs’ that
they offer a high level of security, only for it to be discovered later that they
are seriously flawed. This track record has generated a certain distrust, even
in informed circles, of anything but the most rigorous proof of correctness.
This thesis aims to build on existing work to provide a framework for
such rigorous proofs. We prove results strong enough to enable designers
to demonstrate that, given some very reasonable assumptions, their systems
will withstand attacks from even the most powerful adversary.
Chapter 2
Background
Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.
—Sixteenth-century proverb
This chapter is concerned with background material necessary for under-
standing the new research presented in later chapters. It covers all the the-
oretical work on which the thesis is based, as well as providing a useful
overview of the cryptography that underpins the world of secure communi-
cations.
We shall discuss the basic building blocks of cryptography and some of the
underlying mathematics in Section 2.1; then Section 2.2 will deal with the
concept of a security protocol, and how these protocols use cryptographic
methods to provide us with communications that can be both secure and
efficient.
In Section 2.3, we introduce CSP, the process algebra that we shall be
using to model security protocols throughout the thesis. Finally, Section 2.4
covers Schneider’s work on rank functions and how they may be used to
model and to verify security protocols.
2.1 Cryptology
The discipline of cryptography is the study of techniques for ensuring that
sensitive communications are kept private, and for providing guarantees of
the authenticity of the communications.
It is largely based on methods of encrypting data—that is, converting
the data into a form that is unintelligible to anyone who does not possess
the appropriate password (or key). The reverse of encryption—turning an
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encrypted message back into its original form—is called decryption. The
message to be encrypted is called the plaintext, and the resulting encrypted
output is called the ciphertext.
Good encryption techniques never rely on the secrecy of the procedure
used for encryption and decryption, but only on the secrecy of the keys
involved. With some encryption systems, the decryption key will be the
same as the encryption key; with others, it will be different. If encryption
is performed using a key k , then the corresponding decryption key will be
denoted by k−1.
In this thesis, we shall write {m}Ek to denote the result of encrypting a
message m under a key k , and {m}Dk to denote the result of attempting to
decrypt a message m using a key k . Where the encryption and decryption
operations are the same, or where it is clear which is intended, we shall omit
the superscript and write simply {m}k .
The related field of cryptanalysis is the study of ways to defeat crypto-
graphic methods, by, for instance, decrypting without the key, or recovering
the key from a message together with its encryption. The term cryptology
covers both cryptography and cryptanalysis.
For a comprehensive overview of cryptography, the reader should look no
further than [69]. A good introduction can also be found in [66].
2.1.1 Private-key cryptography
Private-key (or symmetric-key, or shared-key) cryptography uses the same
key (and sometimes the same algorithm) for encryption as for decryption.
Thus a private-key cryptosystem has
{{m}Ek }
D
k = m
Anyone knowing this key will be able to encrypt messages, and to decrypt
messages that someone else holding the key has encrypted. It is most often
used when two agents know that they, and only they, hold a particular key;
by encrypting each message under this key, they may be assured that no-one
else can eavesdrop on their conversation.
There are two distinct types of private-key cryptosystem. Block ciphers
take in fixed-size blocks of plaintext and turn them into blocks of ciphertext,
with the same block of plaintext always encrypting to the same ciphertext
when the same key is used; stream ciphers operate bit by bit (or character
by character), with the ciphertext bit that corresponds to a given plaintext
bit depending not just on the key but on the preceding plaintext.
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DES
The Data Encryption Standard, or DES, is the best-known private-key cryp-
tosystem. The algorithm was developed by IBM, and it was originally called
Lucifer. DES has been the official cipher of the United States’ National Se-
curity Agency (NSA) since 1976 [5], although the search is underway for a
new official standard.
It is a block cipher, operating on 64-bit blocks of data. The key is always
56 bits long. There is currently no more feasible way to break DES than
exhaustive search; that is, trying each of the 256 possible keys one by one
until the correct key is found.
Triple-DES
Additional security can be provided by encrypting the plaintext three times
with DES, using a different key each time. This method of encryption is
known as Triple-DES , or 3DES. It is a method commonly used for encrypting
a DES key for transportation.
Its security hinges on the result by Campbell and Weiner [7] showing that
DES is not a group, which is to say that, given two DES keys k1 and k2 and
a plaintext m, there is not in general a third DES key k such that
{m}k = {{m}k1}k2
Were DES to be a group, Triple-DES would give no more security than DES
itself; for the three-key encryption would be equivalent to an encryption
under a single DES key.
AES
DES is starting to look outdated. The keys are too small to be considered
properly secure with the technology currently available, and there is con-
cern that the extensive cryptanalysis to which DES has been subjected may
produce an attack on DES that can be performed faster than exhaustive
search.
The United States of America’s National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) is currently looking for a new block cipher to replace DES.
This new cipher will be known as the Advanced Encryption Standard, or
AES.
The NIST invited proposals in 1997 from the public [45, 46], and accepted
fifteen submissions. In 1999, following much discussion and analysis, the
field was narrowed to five algorithms: MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent and
Twofish.
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An announcement from NIST concerning the selection of the winning
algorithm is expected in late 2000 or early 2001. More details may be found
at http://www.nist.gov/aes.
Twofish
Twofish, developed by Schneier, Kelsey, Whiting, Wagner, Hall and Fergu-
son [70, 71], is one of the finalists under consideration for the AES.
It is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher, accepting keys of any size up to 256
bits. Twofish has been carefully designed to be efficient in speed and memory
requirements on a wide range of hardware, from fast desktop machines down
to smart cards.
RC5 and RC6
The RC6 block cipher is another finalist for selection for the Advanced En-
cryption Standard. Ron Rivest, its creator, originally considered submitting
his RC5 block cipher to NIST as a candidate for the AES, but determined
instead to improve its security and performance. The result was RC6.
Details of RC5 are in [59], and RC6 in [60].
RC4
Ron Rivest in 1987 developed the RC4 cipher [58], which is a stream cipher.
Although the algorithm is officially secret, it has been widely known since
1994. It can operate with any size of key.
RC4 has not been broken. Encryption speed is about ten times that of
DES.
PKZIP
The PKZIP program is probably the most widely used of the publicly avail-
able compression utilities. Although PKZIP is written for machines running
MS-DOS, it has compatible variants that run on Windows, UNIX and many
other operating systems.
PKZIP will allow the user to enter a password when compressing and
decompressing files. If a password is used then the program makes use of a
built-in stream cipher to encrypt the compressed data.
The cipher has an internal state consisting of three 32-bit integers. At
the beginning of the encryption operation, the user-supplied password is
converted into three 32-bit integers, which are used to set the initial internal
state of the cipher. Any two passwords that convert to the same three 32-bit
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integers are equivalent; finding this internal representation of the password
is sufficient to break the cipher.
Biham and Kocher describe a known plaintext attack on the cipher in [3];
that is, they describe an attack that requires the cryptanalyst to know a
small amount of the unencrypted material, as well as the encrypted data, in
order to succeed in breaking the cipher.
With a few hundred bytes of known plaintext, a home computer can
use the attack to find the internal representation of the password within
a few hours. The attack will still succeed, albeit more slowly, with only
thirteen bytes of known plaintext. Since many types of file have fixed headers,
determining the values of some bytes of plaintext may well be a simple matter.
Clearly the PKZIP cipher is unsuited to protecting sensitive data from
prying eyes, and should be avoided. Even against those whose cryptanalytic
skills are minimal or non-existent, the cipher provides a dangerous sense of
security: a plethora of ‘zip crackers’ that implement this attack may be freely
downloaded from the Internet.
One-time pads
Any unconditionally secure encryption system necessarily involves using at
least as much key material as plaintext. The most celebrated such system
is the one-time pad . It relies on the users both having access to the same
massive bank of random bits, generated in advance. These random bits
constitute the key data.
To encrypt, a bit-stream of length n representing the message m to be
encrypted is put alongside the first n bits of the bank of random bits, and
the bitwise exclusive-or (or Vernam encryption) is taken.
Definition 2.1.1. The exclusive-or function is defined as
0⊕ 0 = 0
0⊕ 1 = 1
1⊕ 0 = 1
1⊕ 1 = 0
To compute the value of v = a ⊕ b for natural numbers a and b, represent
each number in binary, padding the smaller number with leading zeros if
necessary, and let vi = ai ⊕ bi , where ai , bi and vi are the ith bits of a, b
and v respectively.
The ith bit of the resulting ciphertext c will be the exclusive-or of the
ith bit of m and the ith bit of the random bank of bits. After encryption,
the n bits from the random bank are discarded, and never reused.
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He who would decrypt the ciphertext must have access to the exact same
bank of random bits. He puts the same n random bits alongside c, and
calculates the bitwise exclusive-or to recover m.
Although a one-time pad is provably secure, it has an obvious limitation.
Encryption of a ten megabyte file requires ten megabytes of key data. Con-
tinued use of the one-time pad cannot be achieved unless there is a secure
means of distributing the random bits; and, of course, if the users had a
permanent and secure means of distributing bits then they would not need
an encryption system at all!
It can be used effectively in certain circumstances, however. It was used
during the Second World War to encrypt messages sent within the Allied
camp. All that is required is that a secure meeting be set up in advance in
order to exchange key data; after that, messages can be transmitted securely
over insecure channels until the parties have run out of key data.
The one-time pad is so called because in its original form it was literally
a pad of paper with random numbers or letters printed on it.
2.1.2 Public-key cryptography
We use the term public-key cryptography for mechanisms where the key e
used for encryption is distinct from the key d used for decryption. The algo-
rithm used, however, will often be the same. With a public-key cryptosystem,
{{m}Ee }
D
d = m
Usually, the decryption key will be private, known only to one agent, but
the encryption key will be publicly available. The advantage of this is that
anyone can send a message m to the agent who knows the decryption key,
since anyone can produce {m}Ee ; but only the intended recipient can recover
the original message, since only he holds d .
Typically, encrypting a large message using a good public-key cryptosys-
tem takes many hundreds of times as long as encrypting the same message
using a good private-key cryptosystem.
RSA
RSA is by far the most well-known and widely used public-key cryptosys-
tem [61]. Its name comes from the initial letters of the surnames of its
creators, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. It underpins thou-
sands of commercial applications and protocols, such as PGP [81], SSL [48]
and S/MIME [65].
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To generate public and private keys, take two large primes p and q . The
modulus is the product n = pq . Now choose any value e < n such that e and
(p− 1)(q − 1) are coprime; that is, such that they have no factor in common
except 1. Then find the unique d < n such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p−1)(q−1)).
The public key is the pair (n, e), and the private key is the pair (n, d).
The security of RSA depends on the infeasibility of discovering d from
n and e. It would be an easy matter to find d if one could split n into its
factors p and q ; thus, if one could find a fast method of factorising large
numbers, one could break RSA.
Encryption involves first splitting the plaintext m up into a sequence 〈mi〉
of values each smaller than n. Then the ciphertext sequence is determined
by
ci = mi
e mod n
The same operation is performed with the private key to decrypt the cipher-
text:
mi = ci
d mod n
because
(mi
e mod n)d mod n = (mi
e)d mod n
= mi
ed mod n
= mi
k(p−1)(q−1)+1 mod n (for some k)
= mimi
k(p−1)(q−1) mod n
= mi mod n (†)
= mi
The justification of † involves an appeal to an equivalence due to Euler
and Fermat, which states that for any integer x ,
xφ(n) ≡ 1 (mod n)
In this equivalence, φ is Euler’s totient function giving the number of positive
integers less than n that are coprime to n. An extension of this, presented
in [61], allows us to conclude that, for every x ,
x (p−1)(q−1) ≡ 1 (mod n)
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ElGamal
The ElGamal cryptosystem [18] is based on the difficulty of constructing
discrete logs in a finite field; that is, given x and b in a finite field F, recovering
the value e, where
x = be
in F. As with the factoring problem, the discrete logarithm problem is
strongly believed to have no polynomial time algorithm to solve it.
ElGamal uses the finite field Zp , for some (large) prime p, as its underlying
field. Generation of a key pair involves choosing x and g , each smaller than
p, and calculating
y = gx mod p
The public key is y , g and p; the secret key is x . The discrete logarithm
problem gives us confidence that it is infeasible to calculate x from the public
key. The values p and g may, in fact, be used for many key pairs for different
agents; only x (and consequently y) need be different for each agent.
To encrypt a message m, choose k at random, ensuring that k and p − 1
are coprime. (Choosing k to be prime is a simple way of achieving this.)
Then calculate
a = gk mod p
b = ykm mod p
The ciphertext is c = 〈a, b〉.
Decryption involves computing
m ≡
gxkm
gxk
(mod p)
≡
ykm
ax
(mod p)
≡
b
ax
(mod p)
A disadvantage of the ElGamal system is that the ciphertext is twice as
long as the plaintext. Where message size is an important factor, ElGamal
is not a good choice of cryptosystem.
2.1.3 Hash functions
Sometimes it is required to construct the ‘digital fingerprint’ of a document
or message: a concise representation of the document that can be used later
to check that the document has not been altered.
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Definition 2.1.2. A hash function converts a message of any size into a
small, fixed-length value called the hash of the message (or the message
digest). A cryptographic hash function H is required to have the following
properties:
• H is a one-way function, which is to say that, given x , it is computa-
tionally infeasible to find a message m such that H (m) = x ;
• H is strongly collision-free, meaning that it is computationally infeasi-
ble to find any two messages m1 6= m2 such that H (m1) = H (m2);
• it is computationally inexpensive to calculate the hash of any given
message.
The output of a hash function is typically around 160 bits, or twenty
bytes. It is remarkable indeed that one can produce a secure fingerprint of
an arbitrarily large document and keep the fingerprint down to such a small
size.
SHA
The Secure Hash Function, or SHA, is a hash function developed by the
NIST and published in 1994 [44]. It can take inputs of up to 264 bits—more
than two million terabytes—and produces a hash of 160 bits.
A flaw in SHA was corrected by the NIST in 1994, the revised algorithm
being known as SHA-1.
MD2, MD4 and MD5
The hash functions MD2, MD4 and MD5 were developed by Ron Rivest [28,
56, 57]. Each function takes an input of any length, and gives a hash of 128
bits.
MD4 has been all but broken [12, 14], and MD5 is in fact a strength-
ened version of MD4 to avoid its weaknesses. Although MD5 has not been
completely and definitively broken, some progress has been made in its crypt-
analysis. MD2 remains secure, but the algorithm is comparatively slow.
2.1.4 Digital signatures
For most public-key cryptosystems, the public key and the secret key are
mutual inverses; in other words, if the public key is e and the corresponding
secret key is d , then
{{m}De }
E
d = m = {{m}
E
d }
D
e
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Suppose Alice, whose secret key is SK (A) and public key is PK (A), wants
to ‘sign’ a message m to prove that it comes from her. With such a cryp-
tosystem, she can now perform the encryption operation using her secret key
to generate {m}SK (A). Anyone who receives this message can understand it,
since the decryption key PK (A) is Alice’s public key; but receipt of {m}SK (A)
also proves that Alice generated the message, since only she holds the key
required to produce the encryption. An encryption using a secret key in this
way is known as a digital signature.
Note that this procedure, given certain assumptions about the unbreak-
ability of the encryption, is much harder to abuse than a traditional hand-
written signature. Often, only the last page of a paper document gets signed,
leaving open the possibility of substituting altered versions of previous pages.
With a digital signature, the entire message is signed, making this impossible.
A digital signature is usually used in combination with a hash function.
Rather than signing an entire message m to produce {m}SK (A), Alice would
calculate the hash H (m) for a previously agreed hash function, and then sign
the hash. Alice would then send the message m along with the signed hash
value {H (m)}SK (A). To verify that the message is authentic, the recipient
calculates H (m) in two separate ways:
• by applying the hash function H to the message m that was sent;
• by using Alice’s public key PK (A) to recover the signed hash value.
If these computations give the same result, then the message is genuine.
No-one can change the message without changing the hash value (since it is
infeasible to find another message with the same hash value), and no-one can
change the hash value sent (since it is signed with Alice’s secret key).
This approach has the advantage of being much faster than signing the
entire message. Public-key operations (such as digital signing) are notori-
ously slow to perform; but this method requires only a hash computation,
which is substantially faster, followed by a digital signing on the much shorter
hash value.
2.1.5 Secret sharing schemes
Suppose Alice and Bob want to place some joint funds in a bank account.
Neither trusts the other; they want to ensure that neither can individually
get at the money, but that both must make a withdrawal together. How can
they achieve their goal?
2.1 Cryptology 13
Instead of each receiving the access code to the account, they might ask
the bank to give them each some information, such that they can combine
their information to produce the code.
A simplistic approach might be to split the code into two pieces, and give
the first half to Alice and the second half to Bob. But this might not satisfy
them; it might be too risky to reveal even half of the access code to either
individual.
A better method would be for the bank to generate a random number n
of the same length as the access code k . Then the bank would send n to
Alice, and the bitwise exclusive-or n ⊕ k to Bob. Neither individually has
any information about the code, but when required they can put their heads
together to recover
k = n ⊕ (n ⊕ k)
and withdraw their money.
This is an example of a secret sharing scheme [21, 72, 4]. A secret sharing
scheme is any system designed to allow several parties to be able to recover
a secret without any individual being able to recover it.
A (m, n)-threshold scheme is the most usual type of secret sharing scheme.
It allows the secret to be shared among n parties such that any m of the
parties can combine their individual pieces (called shadows) to recover the
secret.
2.1.6 Random number generation
All of the cryptographic methods described so far rely on random numbers
for their practical use. If Alice and Bob are to use cryptography then they
must generate private and public keys to use. How are they to do this? How
is Alice to find two large primes for creating her RSA key pair?
If her method of generating random numbers is flawed, an enemy may be
able to predict the keys that she has produced. She must be certain that it
is infeasible to reproduce her random number sequence.
Many compilers have built-in random number generation routines, but
these are almost always severely flawed. They are usually based on such
parameters as the time of day, which might be predicted easily [52]. Such
routines are perfectly adequate for most non-cryptographic purposes such
as controlling events in games, and ‘shuﬄe’ play in music players; but they
should not be used for generating unreproducible sequences of random num-
bers.
Cryptographic pseudo-random number generation uses the cryptographic
methods already described to produce a long, unpredictable sequence from a
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small quantity of random data. If one can generate a genuinely random key
for a stream cipher, one might encrypt a stream of zeros using that key. The
result, if the stream cipher is well chosen, will appear random to anyone not
in possession of the key. However, one would still have to obtain the random
key from elsewhere.
Hardware random number generators have been designed that attempt
to harness the inherent randomness of nature. They might be based on
ambient noise, minute fluctuations in temperature, radioactive decay, or any
of a number of unpredictable and unreproducible events.
2.2 Security protocols
This section seeks to explain what a security protocol is, and to describe the
different types of security protocol and the goals of each type. It gives an
example of an authentication protocol, and demonstrates an attack.
2.2.1 Encryption is not enough
The techniques described in Section 2.1 are very powerful, but need to be
applied with much care. A thoughtless use of cryptographic methods will
lead to a wholly false sense of security. For instance, suppose Bob sends
an instruction to his bank to transfer £1,000 from his account to Charlie’s
account. This might look something like
{{£1000 from Bob to Charlie}SK (Bob)}PK (bank)
The instruction is signed with Bob’s secret key, proving that Bob originated
the message. It is then encrypted with the bank’s public key, ensuring that
no-one who intercepts it can understand it. It seems, prima facie, that Bob
has taken all the security measures that could be expected of him. However,
this methodology has a serious problem.
Suppose Charlie can intercept this message. He cannot decrypt it, since
he does not know the bank’s secret key. Nevertheless, he can still store the
entire encrypted message and save it for later. Now, whenever he pleases,
he can copy the whole message out and send it to the bank. Each time, the
bank will decrypt, check the signature, conclude that the message is genuine,
and transfer £1,000 from Bob’s account into Charlie’s account. This type
of attack, where information is stored and retransmitted at a later date, is
known as a replay attack .
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Clearly, the ways in which cryptographic methods are used need as much
careful planning as the cryptographic methods themselves. Security protocols
are designed to meet this need.
2.2.2 What is a security protocol?
A security protocol is a general template for a sequence of communications,
using cryptographic techniques to meet one or more particular security-
related goals. Several different types of security protocol exist.
Authentication
An authentication protocol aims to provide a guarantee to one or more of
the participants that the agents involved in the protocol really are who they
claim to be. Such a protocol will usually depend on the authenticated agent
demonstrating knowledge of a particular piece of information, such as his
secret key, or a password. Logging on to a network by entering a password
involves participation in an authentication protocol.
Authentication of Alice might be achieved by, for instance, generating a
fresh random value—a nonce—and encrypting it under Alice’s public key,
and then requiring Alice to demonstrate knowledge of her secret key by de-
crypting the nonce and sending it back. This is called a nonce challenge.
Several examples of commonly used authentication protocols can be found
in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5.
This thesis is largely concerned with the analysis and verification of au-
thentication protocols.
Key agreement
Since private-key encryption is much faster than public-key encryption, it is
advantageous to use private-key encryption for dealing with lengthy commu-
nications. However, it is unrealistic for each pair of agents who may wish to
communicate with each other to have a private key known only to the two of
them. The solution is often for the two agents to use public-key cryptography
to establish a newly invented private key for use only in that communications
session. Such a key is known as a session key , and a protocol designed to
achieve this is known as a key agreement protocol.
Many protocols found in the literature combine key agreement with au-
thentication. Some examples of such protocols are the Wide-Mouthed Frog
Protocol from [6]; the Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol, presented in [30] and
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fixed in [49]; the Yahalom Protocol of [6]; and the Otway-Rees Protocol,
described in [50].
Simultaneous contract signing
Many types of contract are valid only when signed by both parties involved.
In such a case, each party might be unwilling to sign first.
Suppose Alice and Bob agree that Alice will buy some shares from Bob,
at a fixed price, in a year’s time. If Alice signs the contract first, Bob is in a
very powerful position. He can refuse to sign the contract immediately, and
wait until the year is nearly up before making up his mind. If the share price
has fallen, he will sign, and make a profit; if it has risen, he will refuse to
sign and nullify the contract.
A simultaneous contract signing protocol seeks to provide a solution to
such problems. Its purpose is to guarantee that either both parties sign at
the same time, or neither party signs at all.
For more information, and an example of a protocol designed for simul-
taneous contract signing, see [20].
Bit commitment
Suppose Alice wants to demonstrate to Bob that she has a good system for
picking winners in horse races, in order to persuade Bob to pay her for her
predictions. She will not wish to demonstrate by telling Bob the winning
horse before the race occurs, lest he should use the information without
paying. However, if she waits until after the race, Bob will have no way of
knowing whether she did in fact predict the winning horse, or simply look at
the race results and only claim to have decided in advance.
Alice and Bob need a bit commitment protocol. Such a protocol allows
someone to commit to certain information in advance, without revealing the
contents of the information until a later date. Alice can use the protocol
to make her prediction fixed, so that after the race Bob will know that the
prediction really was made in advance; but the details of the prediction will
be available to Bob only after the race, so that Alice will know that Bob has
not used the information without paying.
Bit commitment protocols are often based on hash functions. In the
situation described above, Alice could type out her predictions, calculate the
hash of the file containing the predictions according to a hash function agreed
upon by Alice and Bob, and send the hash to Bob. After the race, she could
send her file of predictions to Bob and he could verify that the hash correctly
matches the file. If the hash function is wisely chosen, then Alice will not be
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able to cheat, and Bob will learn nothing about the predictions until after
the race.
2.2.3 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
The standard notation for describing a protocol is as follows. The messages
of a protocol run are numbered, and each message specifies an origin, an
intended destination, and message contents. The contents of the message
may consist of nonces, agent identities, keys, and timestamps: these may be
unencrypted, or encrypted under a specified key. A message component may
also be formed by taking a sequence of two or more smaller components;
encryption may be applied to these larger entities.
As an example, we describe the three-message version of the Needham-
Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [47]. This protocol has become a standard
‘benchmark’ protocol for proposed methods of analysis: there is much about
it in the literature, and its strengths and weaknesses are well known. It aims
to achieve mutual authentication—that is, to authenticate each participant
to the other—and to ensure the secrecy of the nonces na and nb used in the
protocol. It assumes that, at the beginning, the public keys of all agents
are known to everyone. (There is a seven-message version of the protocol
involving communications with a trusted server so as to obtain the appro-
priate public keys, but for the purposes of this thesis, we shall consider the
three-message version.)
Message 1. a → b : {a.na}PK (b)
Message 2. b → a : {na.nb}PK (a)
Message 3. a → b : {nb}PK (b)
This description defines a template for the communications between the
two agents using the protocol. The terms a, b, na and nb are all free variables
that will be instantiated with different concrete values each time the protocol
is run. Variables a and b will be filled in with the names of the agents
running the protocol. Variables na and nb will be used as nonces. Each user
is assumed to have a public/secret key pair; the function PK (x ) returns the
public key of the agent given by x and there is a similar function SK for
secret keys.
Note that we choose to use lower case letters for free variables when
specifying protocols, contra much of the literature, reserving capital letters
for concrete identifiers. Publications abound in which capital letters are
used both for the free variables and for the concrete values with which the
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variables are instantiated, leading to confusion about exactly what is meant
by the notation.
In examples requiring concrete identifiers for agents, we shall tend to
call on Alice and Bob. Alice’s identity will be represented by the concrete
value A, and Bob’s by B .
So if Alice—agent A—were starting the protocol with Bob—agent B—the
protocol might become
Message 1. A→ B : {A.NA}PK (B)
Message 2. B → A : {NA.NB}PK (A)
Message 3. A→ B : {NB}PK (B)
In the first message, A uses B ’s public key to encrypt her identity together
with a fresh nonce NA, and sends the result of this encryption to B . This
constitutes a nonce challenge: if the responder really is B , then he should
be able to decrypt the first message and so learn the value of NA. So, B
responds to this challenge by decrypting the first component, choosing a
new nonce NB , encrypting both nonces under A’s public key, and sending
this encryption back to A. This, it would seem, should assure A of the
authenticity of B . It also provides a return nonce challenge to A, who has not
yet been authenticated (since anyone could have generated the first message
of the protocol run). If A is who she claims to be, then she (and only she)
should be able to decrypt the second message and learn the value of NB .
She does this, and also checks that the value of NA returned to her matches
the one she sent out; and finally she encrypts NB under B ’s public key and
sends it back to B . B , when he receives this, checks that the value of NB is
correct—which should presumably convince him that he really is talking to
agent A.
In addition, no-one listening in should have had the appropriate infor-
mation to decrypt any of the messages; and hence NA and NB should now
be secrets known only to A and B . Either of these (or some combination of
them) could now be used to construct a session key for private-key commu-
nications between agents A and B .
2.2.4 Attacking the protocol
At this point, the main problem with security protocols should be noted.
The reader may have observed the somewhat guarded language used when
describing the authentication supposedly achieved using the above protocol.
The argument for its correctness seems convincing, and it is hard to see how
an intruder could find a security loophole. But the protocol is nevertheless
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flawed. The responder is indeed correctly authenticated; the intruder cannot
set up a fake session impersonating the responder. However, the intruder
can impersonate the initiator: he can (in appropriate circumstances) set up
a session with B , convincing agent B that he is talking to A. In addition,
he discovers the value of both nonces used in the protocol run, and so knows
the value of any session key that the agents may construct from the nonces
when they have finished running the protocol. This is a devastating breach
of security.
The following attack—that is, a sequence of communications resulting
in a security breach—on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol was
discovered by Gavin Lowe; for a full account see [33]. The attack consists of
two concurrent runs of the protocol, which we label as α and β. In run α, A
tries to set up a session with C (who is a dishonest intruder, but nonetheless
a valid user of the network, and so may participate in valid sessions). In
run β, C successfully impersonates A to set up a session with B . Agent B
completes the protocol, as responder, incorrectly believing that agent A had
initiated the run.
Message α.1. A→ C : {A.NA}PK (C )
Message β.1. C (A)→ B : {A.NA}PK (B)
Message β.2. B → C (A) : {NA.NB}PK (A)
Message α.2. C → A : {NA.NB}PK (A)
Message α.3. A→ C : {NB}PK (C )
Message β.3. C (A)→ B : {NB}PK (B)
A tries to initiate a session with C , the intruder; and so starts by sending her
identity and a fresh nonce NA, encrypted under C ’s public key. C then starts
a run of the protocol with B , but pretending to be A; he sends A’s identity,
and the same nonce NA, all encrypted under B ’s public key. B responds as
he should, by returning the nonce with a new nonce NB ; but, because he
thinks that he is running the protocol with A, he encrypts the reply under
A’s public key. This works as intended: C cannot decrypt the reply that B
sends him in β.2, because he is not who he claims to be; he does not possess
A’s secret key. However, C is also in the middle of a run of the protocol
with A, who is at this point expecting a reply to her α.1 message. So, even
though C cannot understand the message he has just received, he passes the
whole message on to A as α.2. The protocol now requires A to respond to
the nonce challenge presented her by C ; so A is kind enough to decrypt the
nonces and send NB back to C under C ’s public key! (C , we say, is using
A as an oracle.) This is exactly the information C needs to complete run β
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with B ; he finishes by sending the newly-discovered NB back to B encrypted
under B ’s public key. Both runs of the protocol have now been successfully
completed; A and C commit themselves to a communications session, and,
crucially, B commits himself to a communications session with C , thinking
that he is talking to A.
This attack could have disastrous consequences if the protocol were to be
used in a commercial context. Suppose it were employed for authentication in
an electronic payment transaction system, with the customer playing the part
of initiator, and the shopkeeper as responder. An unscrupulous shopkeeper
could abuse this attack to order goods from a third party, at the customer’s
expense. The customer, A, swipes his card to initiate the protocol with the
shopkeeper, C . The payment goes through as intended; but, simultaneously,
the shopkeeper follows the description of the attack to masquerade as A
ordering goods or services from the unsuspecting B .
The fact that the attack is difficult to spot is of no comfort. If a proposed
protocol is flawed, then we need to know before we put it to any real-world
use where security is important. We need a method of discovering attacks on
proposed protocols, so that loopholes may be corrected at the design stage.
For more accounts of attacks on security protocols, the reader should
consult [9, 33, 40, 34, 35].
2.2.5 More authentication protocols
Distributed Authentication Security Service
The Distributed Authentication Security Service, or DASS, is intended to
provide mutual authentication and key exchange [29]. It makes use of a
trusted server to distribute users’ public keys in steps 1, 2, 4 and 5; these
messages could be omitted if the public keys were already known to the
communicants.
In the standard notation for describing security protocols, the DASS pro-
tocol would be written as follows:
Message 1. a → b : b
Message 2. s → a : {b.PK (b)}SK (s)
Message 3. a → b : {Ta}k .{l .a.pk .sk}SK (a).{{k}PK (b)}sk
Message 4. b → s : a
Message 5. s → b : {a.PK (a)}SK (s)
Message 6. b → a : {Tb}k
In Message 3, the initiator a is required to generate a current timestamp Ta ,
2.2 Security protocols 21
a session key k , and a public and secret key pair pk and sk . The value l
specifies the lifetime of the session key k ; that is, the period of time for
which k should be considered secure.
After reception of Message 3, the responder b obtains the initiator’s pub-
lic key from the server, checks the signature of the second component of
Message 3 using the initiator’s public key, uses pk and his own public key
to decrypt the third component and recover the session key k , and finally
decrypts the timestamp Ta and checks that it is current.
Message 6, in which the responder sends a new timestamp Tb to the
initiator encrypted under the session key k , authenticates the responder to
the initiator. If authentication of the responder is not required, this message
becomes redundant.
ISO Authentication Framework
The purpose of the ISO Authentication Framework (X.509) protocols [27] is
to provide a means for the authentication of messages sent from one agent
to another.
The X.509 protocols make use of certificates; that is, data structures
containing a user’s public key, together with information about when the key
was created and its period of validity, and signed by a trusted authority.
The one-way protocol is described by:
Message 1. a → b : Ca .{Ta .Na .b.m}SK (a)
Agent a’s certificate is Ca ; the recipient can deduce the agent’s public key
from the certificate. The message m can be any message; it is packaged up
with a current timestamp Ta and a nonce Na and signed using the initiator’s
secret key.
On receipt, the responder should recover the public key from the certifi-
cate, check the signature, and check that the timestamp is recent. He may
also wish to check the value Na against a database of old nonce values to
ensure that the message is not a replay of an old one.
The two-way protocol allows for the responder to reply. The first message
is the same as in the one-way protocol.
Message 1. a → b : Ca .{Ta .Na .b.m}SK (a)
Message 2. b → a : {Tb .Nb .a.Na .m ′}SK (b)
In the second message, the responder follows a strategy similar to that em-
ployed by the initiator. However, he does not send his certificate; it is as-
sumed that the initiator knows his public key. Moreover, the responder
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includes the initiator’s nonce Na in the signed component along with his own
nonce Nb , timestamp Tb and message m
′.
If it is required to achieve authentication without using timestamps, the
three-way protocol should be used. In the three-way protocol, the addition
of a third message allows the timestamps to be safely removed.
Message 1. a → b : Ca .{Na .b.m}SK (a)
Message 2. b → a : {Nb .a.Na .m ′}SK (b)
Message 3. a → b : {Nb}SK (a)
The nonces are used here to provide authentication. When the responder
first receives Message 1, he cannot be certain that it is not a replay of an
old message; however, when the initiator signs the nonce that the responder
uses in his reply and sends it back as Message 3, the initiator can be assured
of the authenticity and freshness of the first message.
2.2.6 Assumptions about cryptography
The aim of this thesis is to consider the correctness or otherwise of security
protocols with the underlying cryptographic techniques assumed to be se-
cure. In all that follows, we shall make the following assumptions about the
cryptography.
Assumption 2.2.1. The underlying cryptography is secure; that is, no-one
should be able to recover a plaintext from the ciphertext unless he holds the
appropriate decryption key.
Assumption 2.2.2. The cryptography is perfect [39]; that is, we never have
that {m}k = {m
′}k ′ unless m = m
′ and k = k ′. As a direct consequence,
attempting to decrypt a message using the inverse of key k will suffice to
determine whether or not the message really has been encrypted under k .
Assumption 2.2.3. Random numbers may be freely and perfectly generated
by all agents. These random numbers will always be taken from a large
enough set to be considered unguessable by a hostile intruder.
2.3 CSP
Communicating Sequential Processes, or CSP, is an algebra for describing
processes and their interactions with each other. Our protocol system is
essentially a collection of users interacting over a network controlled by a
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hostile agent, and CSP is an appropriate choice of notation for describing
each component of the system and the way the network is constructed from
these components. As such, we give here a brief introduction to the language.
CSP was developed by Tony Hoare during the early 1980s at the Univer-
sity of Oxford, and his book [26] provides a solid introduction to the subject.
However, since its birth, a much more substantial theory of CSP than pre-
sented in the book has been developed for analysing processes, and some of
the notation has changed. For this reason, the reader is advised to consult
the more recent [68] and [63].
2.3.1 Events
A CSP system functions by engaging in events. These events are regarded as
instantaneous actions; there is a definite order in which events happen, with
no possibility of them occurring simultaneously (although, as we shall see,
more than one process may be involved in any one event). The entire set of
events that may occur in the system is denoted by Σ.
The event x may be a compound event such as c.m, indicating com-
munication of a message m along a channel c. The event may consist of
many parts; in this thesis, we shall make extensive use of events such as
rec.i .j .m, representing reception of a message with source i , destination j
and contents m.
Channels are given explicit types: if channel c has type T then all on
channel c are of the form c.t for some t ∈ T .
2.3.2 Processes
The complete system in a CSP program is a process, usually composed of
two or more smaller processes. These processes can in turn be defined in
terms of other processes, or can be made from still smaller processes.
Definition 2.3.1. The alphabet of a process P , written αP , is defined to be
the set of all the events that are relevant to P . It will certainly contain all the
events in which P may engage, but we may force it to contain more (if, for
instance, we want P to monitor other events and stop them from occurring).
Definition 2.3.2. There is one ‘atomic’ process, denoted as STOP , which
never engages in any event. Other processes are defined in terms of STOP
and the following operators.
Definition 2.3.3. The process x → P first engages in the event x , and then
behaves like the process P ; this arrow is known as the prefix operator.
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The process c!v → P outputs the value v along channel c, and then
behaves as the process P . Process c?x → P(x ) describes a process that
accepts an input of a value x along channel c, and then behaves like P(x ).
Unless explicitly stated, the variable x can range over all values of the type
of channel c, so if c has type T then the first event of this process will be
c.t for some t ∈ T .
Processes may be recursively defined using prefixing: for instance, we
may write
LAZY = wake → eat → sleep → LAZY
which produces a process LAZY that performs wake, eat , sleep in a contin-
uous cycle.
Definition 2.3.4. We can force two processes P and Q to co-operate with
each other on certain actions by combining them in parallel, creating the
process P ‖
A
Q , where A is some set of events. This process allows P and Q
to work independently on events outside the set A, with no synchronisation;
but an event from A may happen only when both P and Q are ready to
engage in it, and, when this is the case, the two processes participate in a
single occurrence of the event.
Definition 2.3.5. A special case of the use of the parallel operator is when
A = ∅; in this case, there is no interaction between P and Q , and the new
process behaves like P and Q running side by side. We call this interleaving,
and write the resulting process as P ||| Q .
Definition 2.3.6. Another special case is when we wish to force P and Q
to synchronise on the whole of their common alphabet. For this, we write
P ‖ Q , which is in fact a shorthand for P ‖
αP∩αQ
Q .
Definition 2.3.7. A slightly more powerful version of the parallel operator
is available in the form of P X‖Y Q , in which P is allowed to engage only in
events in X , Q can perform only events in Y , and they must synchronise on
events in X ∩Y .
Definition 2.3.8. The process P 2 Q can behave like P , or like Q , depend-
ing on what events are initially offered to it. Because it is the environment
rather than the process that determines which course of action is taken, we
call this the external choice operator.
Definition 2.3.9. There is another choice operator to complement external
choice, called internal choice, and written P ⊓ Q , which might behave like
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P , or like Q ; but rather than allowing the environment to determine which
branch is followed in the manner of P 2 Q , the process P ⊓ Q decides
nondeterministically which route is taken. No external control is permissible,
and no guarantee can be made about whether the process will choose to
behave like P or like Q . An implementation may choose randomly between
the two; it may depend on the day of the week or the phase of the moon; it
may entirely disregard one and always behave like the other.
However, since all our work will be concerned with all the behaviours that
a process may exhibit, and never what actions it may choose to refuse to
perform, we shall have no cause to distinguish between external choice and
internal choice. We shall always use external choice in our models.
For each of the parallel, interleaving and external choice operators, there
is an indexed form allowing the operator to work over a larger set of processes
rather than just two operands. They are written
Indexed parallel
n
‖
i=1
(Pi ,Ai)
Indexed interleaving
n
|||
i=1
Pi
Indexed external choice
n
2
i=1
Pi
In the case of the indexed parallel operator, the above is equivalent to
P1 A1‖A2∪···∪An (· · · (Pn−1 An−1‖An Pn) · · · )
In fact, for interleaving and external choice, we shall have cause to gen-
eralise further by allowing indexing over arbitrary sets1:
Indexed interleaving |||
i∈X
Pi
Indexed external choice 2
i∈X
Pi
1Indexing over an infinite set will not cause us problems, because we are working in
the finite traces model.
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2.3.3 Traces
A trace of a process is a finite sequence of events that it may perform. Thus,
since STOP never performs any events, its only trace is the empty sequence:
traces(STOP) = {〈〉}
For our process LAZY above, its traces are
traces(LAZY ) = {〈〉, 〈wake〉, 〈wake, eat〉,
〈wake, eat , sleep〉,
〈wake, eat , sleep,wake〉, . . .}
Note that if a process may execute a trace tr then it must be able to
execute any initial segment of tr—that is, a process is always prefix-closed.
In fact, the formal definition of a process in the traces model is that it may
be any subset α of Σ (which will act as the alphabet of the process), together
with any prefix-closed non-empty set of finite sequences of members of α
(which will be the traces).
The concatenation of two traces t1 and t2 is defined as for general se-
quences, and written as t1 a t2.
The projection operator pulls out from a trace just those events that lie
in a given set.
Definition 2.3.10. The projection of trace tr onto a set R is written as
tr ↾ R, and is defined as
〈〉 ↾ R = 〈〉
(〈x 〉a tr) ↾ R =
{
〈x 〉a (tr ↾ R) (x ∈ R)
tr ↾ R (x /∈ R)
2.3.4 Refinement
All our work will be grounded in the finite traces model of CSP: if, for two
processes P and Q , we have that traces(P) = traces(Q), then we shall regard
P and Q as indistinguishable. More advanced models concern themselves not
only with what a process might do but also with what it might refuse to do:
some processes, within these models, decide nondeterministically whether or
not to allow certain events to happen. However, for our work on security
protocols, all our specifications will be requirements that particular undesir-
able states should not obtain; not that desirable actions are guaranteed to
occur. If we were concerned with the latter, then we would need to check
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that our system could never refuse to do something good, and we would need
to employ a ‘higher’ model; but since we want simply to outlaw bad events,
it will suffice to check that those bad events do not appear in the traces of
the system. All work in this thesis will be taken to be in the finite traces
model.
What do we mean when we say that a program meets a certain spec-
ification? Certainly we are not looking for equality between the program
and the specification, for the programmer will often have made decisions left
open by the one drawing up the specification. The program may be more
restrictive than the specification in terms of the actions it permits; it may not
be less. In other words, anything the program allows must also be allowed
by the specification. In our language of traces, then, a program P meets a
specification Q if and only if
traces(P) ⊆ traces(Q)
which says that the specification can do all that the program can do, and
possibly more. This idea is very important in CSP and in analysing systems.
Definition 2.3.11. If, for processes P and Q , we have that traces(P) ⊇
traces(Q) then we say that Q refines P (or that P is refined by Q) and we
write
P ⊑ Q
If we want to emphasise that we are working in the traces model, then
we do so by writing
P ⊑T Q
The process STOP never does anything, and hence can do no wrong; thus
it refines every process. For any process P ,
P ⊑ STOP
In addition, STOP is the strictest possible specification. Since it will not
allow the implementation to engage in any events, only STOP itself can
meet the specification:
STOP ⊑ P ⇒ P = STOP
2.3.5 Meeting trace specifications
A trace specification is a predicate on traces. Sometimes we wish to ask
whether every trace of a given process satisfies a trace specification.
Definition 2.3.12. If, for a process P and trace predicate W , we have that
W (tr) holds whenever tr ∈ traces(P), then we write P satW .
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2.4 Rank functions
In this section, we describe how in [67] Schneider uses CSP to model a net-
work running an authentication protocol. We state the central theorem
proved in [67], and show how Schneider uses this result to prove that the
protocol correctly authenticates both participants.
2.4.1 Modelling the network
For any given protocol, there will be a (possibly infinite) set of all atoms that
could ever appear in a message of the protocol. This set will encompass all
the user identities, nonces and keys, and could be extended to include any
other types of atom used in protocols (for instance, timestamps). From this
set we may construct the message space, usually denoted byM, which is the
space of all messages that can be generated from these atoms.
We shall write U for the set of user identities on the network, and N for
the set of nonces that may be used in protocol runs. In addition, K is the
set of all encryption keys. We use A to denote the set of all atoms.
Definition 2.4.1. The atoms are defined as
K = {PK (U ), SK (U ), SH (U , J ) | U , J ∈ U ∪ {S}}
A = U ∪ N ∪ K
where S is the trusted server.
Definition 2.4.2. The message space, denoted by M, is the smallest set
that satisfies
m ∈ A ⇒ m ∈M
{m1, . . . ,mn} ⊆ M⇒ m1.m2. . . . .mn ∈M (concatenation)
m ∈M ∧ k ∈ K ⇒ {m}k ∈M (encryption)
Here, m1.m2. . . . .mn , representing concatenation, is a shorthand for sequence
construction. We define m1.m2 to be mkseq(m1)amkseq(m2), where
mkseq(m) = 〈m〉 (m an atom or an encryption)
mkseq(m) = m (m a concatenation)
As such, concatenation inherits all the usual properties of sequences, such as
associativity.
A message is any member of the set M.
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The network considered in [67] consists of two honest agents A and B
and one dishonest enemy. The behaviours of agents A and B are described
as CSP processes USERA and USERB respectively. These user processes
will vary according to the protocol under consideration; they will consist of
communication along channels trans, representing transmission of a message,
and rec, representing reception. The type of each of these channels is U .U .M,
with the first value specifying the source of the message, the second specifying
its intended destination, and the third representing the message itself; so that
the event
trans.A.B .m
represents the transmission of message m from agent A to agent B . An
example of such processes representing the roˆles of a protocol is given in
Section 2.4.5.
The enemy is described by a CSP process that effectively operates as a
communications centre for the entire network, in the style of the Dolev-Yao
model [15]. All users communicate via the enemy, who may
• pass messages on normally (but take note of the contents of the message
in the process);
• intercept messages and fail to deliver them;
• construct and deliver spurious messages purporting to come from any-
one he pleases.
In this last case, he may send any message that he has already seen or initially
knew, or that he can produce using only messages that he has seen or initially
knew. For instance, if he has observed NA and NB as separate messages,
then he may construct NA.NB from them and deliver this concatenation. We
define a ‘generates’ relation ⊢, writing S ⊢ m to denote that the enemy may
construct message m if he possesses every message in the set S .
Definition 2.4.3. If m and n are messages, k is a key, and k−1 is the inverse
of k , then ⊢ is the smallest relation that satisfies
{m, n} ⊢ m.n
{m.n} ⊢ m
{m.n} ⊢ n
{m, k} ⊢ {m}k
{{m}k , k
−1} ⊢ m
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and also satisfies
m ∈ S ⇒ S ⊢ m
S ⊇ T ∧ T ⊢ m ⇒ S ⊢ m
Note that we do not enforce a closure condition; that is, when S ⊢ v for
every v ∈ T , and S ∪ T ⊢ m, we do not insist that S ⊢ m.
The enemy (already in possession of a set of messages S ) is then described
by the recursive definition:
ENEMY (S ) = 2
S⊢m
ENEMY (S ∪ {m})
2
trans?i?j ?m → ENEMY (S ∪ {m})
2
2
m∈S
rec!i !j !m → ENEMY (S )
Here the enemy can learn any message m that he can generate from the set S
of messages that he already knows; or receive any message m transmitted by
any agent i to any other agent j along a trans channel, and then act as the
enemy with that additional message; or pass any message m that he knows
to any agent i , masquerading as any agent j , along its rec channel, remaining
with the same knowledge S .
The whole network is then
NET =
((
|||
J∈U
USERJ
)
||| SERV ER
)
‖ ENEMY
In the context of [67], we have U = {A,B}; so in fact
NET = (USERA ||| USERA) ‖ ENEMY
We use INIT to denote the set of messages (usually atoms) available to
the enemy right from the start.
2.4.2 Authentication
For an authentication protocol to be correct, we usually require that a user B
should not finish running the protocol believing that he has been running
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with a user A unless A also believes that she has been running the protocol
with B . (For a discussion of different forms of authentication, see [67].)
Conditions such as this can easily be expressed as trace specifications
on NET, requiring that no event from a set T has occurred unless another
event from a set R has previously occurred; in such a specification, the set T
would contain a message or messages indicating that the responder has fin-
ished the protocol believing that A is the other party, and set R would contain
a message or messages that would appear whenever A attempts to start the
protocol with B .
A trace of a process may be viewed as a record of the sequence of events
it performs during an execution. Then P sat S if every trace associated with
P satisfies the predicate S .
Definition 2.4.4. We define the trace specification R precedes T as
P sat R precedes T ⇔
∀ tr ∈ traces(P) • (tr ↾ R = 〈〉 ⇒ tr ↾ T = 〈〉)
and note that, since all processes are prefix-closed, this guarantees that any
occurrence of t ∈ T in a trace will be preceded by an occurrence of some
r ∈ R.
2.4.3 What is a rank function?
Definition 2.4.5. A rank function, as defined in [67], is a function
ρ :M→ Z
from the message space to the set of integers. In addition, we define
Mρ− = {m ∈M | ρ(m) 6 0}
Mρ+ = {m ∈M | ρ(m) > 0}
If a rank function is understood, we shall write justM− orM+. In addition,
we shall lift ρ to events concerned with the communication of messages along
channels in the obvious way: ρ(c.m) = ρ(m).
The point of a rank function will be to partition the message space into
those messages that the enemy might be able to get hold of, and those mes-
sages that will certainly remain out of his grasp. Anything with positive
rank will be something that the enemy might get his hands on; anything of
non-positive rank will be unavailable to him.
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Our approach will be to construct our message space so that authentica-
tion will correspond to certain messages being kept secret from the enemy.
We shall be looking to find a rank function that correctly assigns a posi-
tive rank to everything that the enemy may acquire, but that still manages
to give a non-positive rank to the messages corresponding to our notion of
authentication.
In addition, we shall have cause to ensure that our rank function allows for
any sleight of hand that the enemy may wish to perform. This, in particular,
means that we must assign positive rank to anything that the enemy:
• can construct from what he already has;
• can persuade an agent to transmit on the network by feeding him with
messages already in his possession;
• has in his possession from the start.
2.4.4 Schneider’s central rank function theorem
For a process P to maintain the rank with respect to a rank function ρ, we
mean that it will never transmit any message m with ρ(m) 6 0 unless it has
previously received a message m ′ with ρ(m) 6 0. Essentially, this means that
the process will never give out anything secret unless it has already received
a secret message.
Definition 2.4.6. We say that P maintains ρ if
P sat rec.U .U .Mρ− precedes trans.U .U .Mρ−
Theorem 2.4.7 (Rank function theorem from [67]). If, for sets R and T,
there is a rank function ρ :M→ Z satisfying
1. ∀m ∈ INIT • ρ(m) > 0
2. ∀ S ⊆M,m ∈M • ((∀m ′ ∈ S • ρ(m ′) > 0) ∧ S ⊢ m)⇒ ρ(m) > 0
3. ∀ t ∈ T • ρ(t) 6 0
4. ∀ J ∈ U • USERJ ‖
R
STOP maintains ρ
then NET sat R precedes T.
The proof is omitted; the interested reader is advised to consult [67].
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2.4.5 Example
Let us consider the three-message version of Lowe’s fix [34] for the Needham-
Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [47], obtained by inserting the responder’s
identity into the second message of the protocol:
Message 1. a → b : {a.na}PK (b)
Message 2. b → a : {na.nb.b}PK (a)
Message 3. a → b : {nb}PK (b)
In order to verify that the protocol correctly authenticates the initiator
on a small network with two honest agents A and B , we wish to ensure B
can never receive Message 3 of the protocol from A unless A has started the
protocol with B . We define
USERA = trans.A!i !{A.NA}PK (i)
→ rec.A.i?{NA.x .i}PK (A)
→ trans.A!i !{x}PK (i)
→ STOP
and
USERB = rec.B .A?{A.y}PK (B)
→ trans.B .A!{y .NB .B}PK (A)
→ rec.B .A?{y}PK (B)
→ STOP
In these process descriptions, the variables x and y will be taken to range
over the set N of all nonces, which is a way of saying that the agents are
willing to accept any incoming nonce at the appropriate point in the protocol.
Variable i will range over the set U of agent identities; agent A is willing to
run the protocol with any agent.
We state the required authentication property by specifying sets R and
T as follows:
R = {trans.A.B .{A.NA}PK (B)}
T = {rec.B .A.{NB}PK (B)}
A suitable rank function for this protocol on this network is given below.
ρ(u) = 1
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ρ(N ) =
1 N 6= NB0 N = NB
ρ(PK (u)) = 1
ρ(SK (u)) =
0 u = A or B1 otherwise
ρ({m}PK (u)) =
1 u = A,m ∈ N .NB .Bρ(m) otherwise
ρ({m}SK (u)) =
0 u = A,m ∈ {N .NB .B}PK (a)ρ(m) otherwise
ρ(m1.m2) = min{ρ(m1), ρ(m2)}
The proof that this rank function satisfies the required conditions is here
omitted, but may be found in [67].
The theorem now tells us that NET sat R precedes T ; that is, that B
cannot finish the protocol believing that he is communicating with A unless
A starts the protocol with B .
Chapter 3
Developments
. . . rank me with whom you will . . . ; let me be full, let me be empty;
let me have all things, let me have nothing.
—Methodist Service Book
I like a woman who enjoys pulling rank.
—James Bond, GoldenEye
In this chapter, we present new results that build on Schneider’s theory
in various ways, constructing from it a vastly more powerful and practical
method of analysing security protocols.
3.1 Restricting the rank function to {0,1}
As may be seen from the statement of the theorem, the rank function is in
fact used only to partition the message space. The actual value of ρ(m) for
any given m will not be of interest—we shall care only whether ρ(m) > 0
or ρ(m) 6 0.
Because of this, we may redefine rank functions as
ρ :M→ {0, 1}
restricting the range to just two values. This does not affect the validity of
the rank function theorem. For if there is a function ρ :M→ Z that satisfies
the conditions of the theorem, then the function ρ′ :M→ {0, 1} defined as
ρ′(m) = 0 whenever ρ(m) 6 0
ρ′(m) = 1 whenever ρ(m) > 0
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must also meet the requirements. And if there is no function ρ : M → Z
that fits the conditions then clearly there can be no ρ : M → {0, 1} that
works.
We also wish to include the possibility of a trusted server participating
in the protocol. The process SERVER that will describe the actions of this
server will need to maintain the rank as well as the processes controlling the
honest agents; we shall need to add a condition to this effect.
We thus include the server in the definition of NET:
NET =
((
|||
J∈U
USERJ
)
||| SERV ER
)
‖ ENEMY
and the theorem then becomes:
Theorem 3.1.1 (Rank function theorem revised). If, for sets R and T,
there exists a rank function ρ :M→ {0, 1} satisfying
1. ∀m ∈ INIT • ρ(m) = 1
2. ∀ S ⊆M,m ∈M • ((∀m ′ ∈ S • ρ(m ′) = 1) ∧ S ⊢ m)⇒ ρ(m) = 1
3. ∀ t ∈ T • ρ(t) = 0
4. ∀ J ∈ U • USERJ ‖
R
STOP maintains ρ
5. SERVER ‖
R
STOP maintains ρ
then NET sat R precedes T.
In the event that no server is involved in a protocol, then we shall have
that SERVER = STOP ; in which case this last condition will hold trivially.
Thus existence of a rank function on {0, 1} is a necessary and sufficient
condition for existence of a rank function on Z. We may concentrate only on
binary rank functions, assured that establishing existence or otherwise with
this restricted codomain will carry over to Z.
3.2 Multiple concurrent runs
So far, the theory can prove only that a small system running the protocol is
secure. Although the intruder is fully general and can perform any sequence
of actions that he could ever wish to perform, the other players are too
restricted. Amay engage in only one run of the protocol, and that as initiator;
B , similarly, is allowed only one run, and this must be as responder, with A
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as initiator. No other user ever takes part in a protocol run (though the
enemy can simulate such runs associated with other user names).
It is not inconceivable that there would be attacks that rely on there being
more than two honest agents present, or on one or more agents engaging in
more than one run of the protocol. These runs will not necessarily follow
on one after the other; they may be run concurrently. We must, therefore,
refine our model to allow for an arbitrary number of users each taking part
in an arbitrary number of concurrent runs of the protocol, as initiator or
responder, and communicating with any other agents they may choose.
All we insist on is that the honest agents must act in accordance with the
rules of the protocol. Anything that constitutes a valid attempt to run the
protocol as the designer intended will be allowed; but even in our fully general
model, only the intruder will be allowed complete freedom of expression.
Our formal assumptions about protocols covered in this thesis are listed
below.
Assumption 3.2.1. The sequence of messages passed in a protocol run is
determined entirely by the identities of the agents involved and the choices of
nonces, timestamps and session keys that the agents and server make. The
protocol is essentially a template containing free variables representing the
initiator’s identity, the responder’s identity and any nonces, timestamps and
session keys.
Implicit in this is that when an agent receives a new nonce, he must be
willing to accept any value for the nonce. He may not, for instance, check
that the other party’s nonce (if any) differs from his nonce (if any), or keep a
history of nonces that he has seen and check that an incoming nonce is one
that he has not seen before.
Assumption 3.2.2. The protocol is intended to involve only two agents—
the initiator and the responder—and possibly a trusted server.
Assumption 3.2.3. An agent will never accept a value of one type when
he is expecting a value of a different type. Even when he cannot decrypt the
message he is receiving, he will still refuse it if the message does not have the
exact form that he is expecting it to have.
Assumption 3.2.3 seems particularly unreasonable in the case of messages
that the receiver cannot understand. How can he be expected to check the
types of the values inside the encryption if he cannot decrypt it? However,
we shall demonstrate in Chapter 6 that a simple method of tagging each field
with its intended type cheaply prevents an intruder from taking advantage
of any type manipulation. We shall prove, in that chapter, that any proof
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of correctness that relies on Assumption 3.2.3 will still hold true when the
assumption is dropped, provided that the type tagging scheme is used in the
implementation.
3.2.1 The old model
In the model presented in [67], the two agents A and B run together in
parallel with the enemy. The users’ alphabets are pairwise disjoint, so they
are in fact interleaved; and then this large process is joined in parallel with
the enemy:
NET = (USERA ||| USERB) ‖ ENEMY
3.2.2 The new players
Let us suppose that we have an infinite1 set U of all users, and that for each
user U ∈ U we have an infinite set of nonces N IU that U may use when
acting as initiator (but he will choose each nonce at most once); and an
infinite set of nonces NRU that he will use (again, at most once each) when
playing responder. All these nonce sets are disjoint.
(Depending on which protocol we are considering, we may find that an
agent does not need to choose a nonce when acting as initiator, or possibly
when acting as responder. This will not affect the analysis: N I or NR will
be used in this case as an indexing set to produce an infinite interleaving of
identical components. If a protocol requires the initiator or the responder
to choose more than one nonce, then the model will have to be altered; but
the alterations will be trivial and will not affect the essence of the discussion
that follows.)
How will a general user U act? He may act as many times as he wishes—
once for each nonce in N IU—as initiator, each time communicating with an
user of his choice; and, concurrently, as many times as he wishes—once for
each nonce in NRU—as responder, each time communicating with any user
who chooses to contact him. So, assuming we have a process U IJ (ni) that
describes a general user U acting as initiator, communicating with user J
and using nonce ni , and similarly for URJ (nr), we shall find that
U =
(
|||
ni∈N I
U
2
J∈U
U IJ (ni)
)
|||
(
|||
nr∈NR
U
2
J∈U
URJ (nr)
)
As we shall see, although we look for a secure run specifically in the case
that A initiates a run with B , the behaviours of A and B are no different
1Since we are working in the finite traces model, all our infinite sets will be countable.
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from the behaviour of the other agents: the above description covers A and B .
Thus, our entire network of users will be simply
U = |||
U∈U
((
|||
ni∈N I
U
2
J∈U
U IJ (ni)
)
|||
(
|||
nr∈NR
U
2
J∈U
URJ (nr)
))
3.2.3 The new server
The server may possibly want an infinite set NS of nonces with which to
play. Again, providing such a set cannot cause any problem: we shall in any
case need an infinite set for the indexed parallel operator so as to ensure that
we allow for arbitrarily many server operations. (We could, if no nonces are
needed, use Z; but NS will work just as well.)
Suppose that we have some CSP process SERV (ns) that describes how
the trusted server should act when using server nonce ns (if appropriate).
We then define
SERVER = |||
ns∈NS
SERV (ns)
If the server is not required to generate a nonce, then SERV (ns) will be
independent of ns ; if no server is required at all, then SERV (ns) = STOP
and so also SERVER = STOP .
3.2.4 The new network
Our new network is, therefore,
NET = (U ||| SERVER) ‖ ENEMY
3.2.5 Analysing the new network
But how are we to analyse this large network? How can we hope to find
a rank function ρ, and then show that each user or server process, suitably
restricted, maintains the rank?
Let us consider the case of the following protocol (suggested by Peter
Ryan):
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → s : {a.nb}SH (s,b)
Message 3. s → a : {nb.b}SH (s,a)
Message 4. a → b : nb
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In this protocol, each key SH (s , u) is a symmetric key shared between the
server and user u. Only the agent acting as responder needs to choose a
nonce, and we are hoping to authenticate the initiator. (The analysis would
not be more difficult if the initiator also chose a nonce, but it would be longer
and somewhat repetitive.) Since all the users are identical, we may simply
check for correct authentication in a particular run of the protocol involving A
and B , and a particular nonce NB ∈ N
R
B . If authentication cannot be faked
in this run, then (since this run is arbitrarily chosen) it cannot be faked in
any run.
We are therefore required to check that NET sat R precedes T for
suitable R and T . We want to know that if B completes the protocol as
responder using nonce NB then A really did attempt to initiate the protocol
with B . Thus, following [67], we might set
R = {trans.A.B.A}
and
T = {rec.B.A.NB}
so that B cannot receive the appropriate fourth message of the protocol
unless A has sent out the first message. However, we take this opportunity to
improve on the model somewhat. To make the coding less protocol-specific
(and hence easier to modify for analysing other protocols), we introduce
pseudo-messages initgoU ,J at the start of the protocol and respdoneJ ,U ,NJ
at the end. The former will be sent to indicate that user U has attempted
to initiate a protocol run with J ; and the latter to inform us that J has
successfully completed the protocol as responder, using nonce NJ , and (as
far as he is aware) with U as initiator—and it will be noted that the form of
these messages will not need to change if the protocol changes. Now, as long
as we ensure that our initiator process U IJ starts with an appropriate initgo
and that our responder process URJ (n) finishes with a correct respdone, we
may set
R = {trans.A.B.initgoA,B}
and
T = {trans.B.A.respdoneB,A,NB}
We shall, of course, need to augment the message spaceM to include all these
pseudo-messages. In addition, the enemy must never be allowed to generate
this pseudo-message—but this is automatic, since for every message m in T
we have ρ(m) = 0.
The form of the pseudo-messages given above will not provide any guar-
antee that runs of A initiating with B are in one-to-one correspondence with
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runs of B responding to A; a rank function proof would here show simply
that if B finishes the protocol as responder, believing that he was talking to
A, then A has started the protocol with B at least once in the past. To allow
for checking of one-to-one correspondence, we would need to establish that
A had started a protocol run during which he believed that the nonce in use
was NB . This could be done by changing the form of the initgo messages to
the form initgoU ,J ,N and setting
R = {trans.A.B.initgoA,B,NB}
The appropriate method is not to rush straight in looking for a rank
function. We can drastically reduce the size of the components on which we
need to find a rank function by some careful CSP manipulation. We first
note that if we define
I = |||
U∈U
 |||
ni∈N I
U
2
J∈U
U IJ (ni)

and
R = |||
U∈U
 |||
nr∈NR
U
2
J∈U
URJ (nr)

then clearly
U = I ||| R
Furthermore, we can separate BR from the others by defining
R0 = |||
U∈U\{B}
 |||
nr∈NR
U
2
J∈U
URJ (nr)

so that
U = I ||| R0 |||
 |||
nr∈NR
B
2
J∈U
BRJ (nr)

Finally, we split off the case where agent B responds using his nonce NB , by
writing
BR0 = |||
nr∈NR
B
nr 6=NB
2
J∈U
BRJ (nr)
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so that we have
U = I ||| R0 ||| BR0 |||
(
2
J∈U
BRJ (NB)
)
and hence
NET =
(
I ||| R0 ||| BR0 |||
(
2
J∈U
BRJ (NB)
)
||| SERVER
)
‖ ENEMY
Now, since we are working exclusively in the traces model, choice distributes
over interleaving and parallel. We can move this final choice outside every-
thing else, to get
NET = 2
J∈U
((
I ||| R0 ||| BR0 ||| B
R
J (NB) ||| SERVER
)
‖ ENEMY
)
It is a general law of CSP that, for a trace predicate W ,
2
i∈A
Pi satW ⇔ ∀ i ∈ A • Pi satW
—or, in other words, a choice satisfies a trace predicate if and only if each
branch of the choice satisfies the predicate. So we need to show that
∀ J ∈ U •((
I ||| R0 ||| BR0 ||| B
R
J (NB) ||| SERVER
)
‖ ENEMY
)
sat R precedes T
If J 6= A then the above proposition holds trivially. Agent B never
communicates with agent A using nonce NB , so will never engage in the
event trans.B.A.respdoneB,A,NB , satisfying the predicate vacuously. We need
check, therefore, only that((
I ||| R0 ||| BR0 ||| B
R
J (NB) ||| SERVER
)
‖ ENEMY
)
sat R precedes T
Here we use rank functions. We need to find a rank function ρ with the
property that(
I ||| R0 ||| BR0 ||| B
R
A (NB ) ||| SERVER
)
maintains ρ
in order to show that the protocol is properly secure. We start by noting
that if
∀ i ∈ A • Pi maintains ρ
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then
|||
i∈A
Pi maintains ρ
For if the whole interleaving does not maintain the rank, it must be sending
out something of rank zero without having accepted anything of rank zero.
This must be because some component Pj of the interleaving has sent out
something of rank zero; and if the entire interleaving has not taken in any-
thing of rank zero, then nor has Pj ; and so Pj does not maintain the rank
either. Thus, we may unpack the interleaved components and check that
they individually maintain the rank. We check that
• I
• R0
• BR0
• BRA (NB)
• SERVER
all maintain the rank. But these first three, and the last, are all interleavings
that can be further split; so, in fact, we need check only that the following
processes maintain the rank:
• U IJ (ni) for arbitrary U ∈ U , J ∈ U , ni ∈ N
I
U
• URJ (nr) for arbitrary U ∈ U \ {B}, J ∈ U , nr ∈ N
R
U
• BRJ (nr) for arbitrary J ∈ U , nr ∈ N
R
B \ {NB}
• BRA (NB)
• SERV (ns) for arbitrary ns ∈ NS
If these checks all succeed, then we shall have proved that the protocol satis-
fies initiator authentication even when agents are allowed to engage in mul-
tiple concurrent runs of the protocol.
It should be noted exactly what we have achieved here. We have reduced
the somewhat tricky problem of verifying a protocol running on an arbitrarily
large network with multiple concurrent runs to the problem of verifying the
protocol on a system with only a small number of runs. For to find a rank
function suitable to prove correctness on the unbounded network, we now
need to find a rank function only for the network where each of the four
processes listed above engages in at most one run. This is a significant
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U IJ (ni) = trans.U.J.initgoU,J
→ trans.U.J !U
→ rec.S.U?{nr.J}SH (S,U)
→ trans.U.J !nr
→ STOP
Figure 3.1: Process describing the initiator in Ryan’s Protocol
reduction; but we still, so far, have an arbitrary number of users and nonces
to deal with.
For consideration of Ryan’s Protocol, these four smaller processes may be
defined as in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Finding a rank function ρ such that
each of these processes maintains ρ would provide a proof that Ryan’s Pro-
tocol correctly authenticates the initiator of the protocol. In Chapter 7, we
shall see how the RankAnalyser program can be used to do this automatically
for us.
3.3 The minimal 1-set rank function ρ0
We have not yet tackled the issue of exactly how to find a rank function
when we have decided on the message space and user processes. We need to
partition the message space somehow; but since we are looking for a rank
function rather than the rank function, we have some latitude in how to
proceed with the search. One might be forgiven for thinking that this looks
like more of an art than a science!
In addition, a fruitless trial-and-error search for a rank function can never
provide convincing evidence that no rank function exists (unless, of course,
the search helps us to find an attack on the protocol). We might form a
strong suspicion—but no more—that there is none to be found.
Let us define the function ρ0 (informally at first) to be the function that
gives a rank of one to everything that must have rank one, and zero to
everything else. For we recall that to be a suitable rank function we require
that
• anything generable from messages of rank one should also have rank
one;
• the user (and server) processes should not transmit messages of rank
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URJ (nr) = rec.U.J?J
→ trans.U.S!{J.nr}SH (S,U)
→ rec.U.J?nr
→ trans.U.J.respdoneU,J,nr
→ STOP
BRJ (nr) = rec.B.J?J
→ trans.B .S !{J .nr}SH (S ,B)
→ rec.B .J?nr
→ trans.B .J .respdoneB ,J ,nr
→ STOP
BRA (NB ) = rec.A.B?A
→ trans.B .S !{A.NB}SH (S ,B)
→ rec.B .A?NB
→ trans.B .A!respdoneB ,A,NB
→ STOP
Figure 3.2: Processes describing the responder in Ryan’s Protocol
SERV (ns) = rec.S?J?{U .nr}SH (S ,J )
→ trans.S .U {nr .J}SH (S ,U )
Figure 3.3: Process describing the trusted server in Ryan’s Protocol
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zero unless they have received a message of rank zero;
• everything in the enemy’s initial knowledge should have rank one;
• anything in T should have rank zero.
The first three conditions provide us with everything that must have rank
one: if a message is in the enemy’s initial knowledge, or is generable from
other messages of rank one, or can be given out by a user or server process
that has received only messages of rank one, then that message must itself
have rank one. Otherwise, it may have rank zero without risk of causing the
function to fail on any of these three conditions. The fourth condition then
becomes the crucial one: do the first three statements force the messages
in T to have rank one? If not, then ρ0 is a rank function. If ρ0(t) = 1 for
some t ∈ T , however, then we may be certain that there is no rank function;
for ρ0 gives a rank of one only where absolutely necessary.
Definition 3.3.1. We write S → m (read S leads to m) if there is a process
controlling one of the users, or the server, in the CSP description of the
protocol that can transmit message m having taken inputs only from the
message set S .
Definition 3.3.2. We shall write S  m (read S gives m) if S ⊢ m or S →
m.
If {m0} m then we may write the more convenient m0  m, omitting
the braces.
Definition 3.3.3. We further define
S ′ = S ∪ {m | S  m}
Definition 3.3.4. We make the inductive definition
X0 = INIT
Xn+1 = Xn
′
and write
X =
∞⋃
i=0
Xi
Then ρ0 is the characteristic function of the set X .
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This is an inductive definition of the set X of all messages that must have
a rank of one. A set Xi represents the ith approximation to the set X .
If there exists a rank function, then ρ0 will be a rank function. Conversely,
if ρ0 is not a rank function (and the only point at which it may fail is by
assigning rank one to one or more members of T ) then no rank function
exists.
3.4 Reducing the size of the message space
This will not yet be practical for finding and verifying a rank function by
hand, or even mechanically. For in order to enumerate the set X we should
like it to be finite, and it is infinite on two counts:
1. the sets of users and nonces are infinite;
2. there is no bound on the length of messages that can be found in X ,
for m  m.m  m.m.m.m  · · · .
But if we can somehow reduce the set X0 to a finite size, and restrict the
priming operation so that the sequence X0,X1,X2, . . . converges to a finite
set, then we shall be able to construct the limit set X in a finite number of
operations, and so establish in finite time whether a rank function exists.
This is what we set out to achieve in the next two sections.
3.4.1 A convergent formulation of priming
Let us define first what we mean by the fragments of a message.
Definition 3.4.1. The fragments of a message m are those contained in the
set frags(m), defined recursively as:
frags(a) = {a} (a an atom)
frags({m}k) = frags(m) ∪ {k , k
−1, {m}k}
frags(m1 . . .mn) =
( ⋃
16i6n
frags(mi)
)
∪ {mi . . .mj | 1 6 i < j 6 n}
(For this last case, the message should be fully expanded so that n is as large
as possible; that is, so that no mt can be written in the form mt1 .mt2.)
We extend the definition to cover sets of messages:
frags(S ) =
⋃
m∈S
frags(m)
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Let D be the set of all messages, including the initgo and respdone mes-
sages, that could ever appear in a protocol run if no agent (including the
enemy) ever behaves dishonestly. In other words, D is the set of all the
messages that the designer intended ever to appear in a protocol run.
Now consider the subset M0 of M that contains all fragments of all
messages inD . This subset is still infinite, because we have an infinite number
of atoms; but it does not have the problem of arbitrarily large concatenations
and encryptions. If we could reduce the number of atoms to finite, then M0
would be finite.
Now we note that, since T ⊂M0, generating X ∩M0 would be sufficient
to enable us to check whether ρ0 is a rank function. For we are required to
check whether T ∩X = ∅, and this is now equivalent to checking whether T ∩
X ∩M0 = ∅.
But how can we enumerate this set? We write
Z0 = X0
Zn+1 = Zn
′ ∩M0
and
Z =
∞⋃
i=0
Zi
and give the following result:
Theorem 3.4.2. Assuming that INIT ⊆M0, we have that
Z = X ∩M0
This is non-trivial: in the case of X ∩M0, we perform all the primings and
then take a finite subset; whereas in the case of Z , we restrict our attention
to the finite subset after each priming.
Proof. We show by induction that Zi = Xi ∩M0 for every i .
The base case is simple: when i = 0, Zi = INIT = Xi ∩M0. For the
inductive case when i = k + 1, we may assume that the theorem holds for
i 6 k .
It is clear that Zk+1 ⊆ Xk+1 ∩M
0 from the monotonicity of the priming
operator. We are required to show that whenever m ∈ Xk+1 ∩M0, we have
also m ∈ Zk+1.
Suppose, then, that m ∈ Xk+1 ∩M0. If m ∈ Xk ∩M0 then m ∈ Zk by
the inductive hypothesis, and so m ∈ Zk
′ ∩M0 = Zk+1 and we are done. If
not, then m /∈ Xk but Xk  m.
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There are now five subcases to consider according to the manner in which
Xk  m. In each case, we show that m ∈ Zk+1.
1. Xk → m. Then there is a process which outputs m having taken inputs
only from Xk . But a process takes inputs only from the set D of all
messages that can appear in a protocol run, and D ⊆ M0. Thus
Xk ∩ M
0 → m, and, by our inductive hypothesis, Zk → m. Thus
m ∈ Zk+1.
2. Xk ⊢ m by encryption; that is, m = {m∗}key with m
∗ ∈ Xk , key ∈ Xk .
Since m ∈ M0 and M0 is closed under fragmentation, we have that
m∗ ∈ M0 and key ∈ M0. By the inductive hypothesis, they are then
in Xk ∩M0 = Zk , and so Zk  m. Thus m ∈ Zk+1.
3. Xk ⊢ m by concatenation; that is, m = m1.m2 with each mj ∈ Xk .
Since m ∈ M0 and M0 is closed under fragmentation, each mj ∈
Xk ∩M
0 = Zk , and hence Zk  m. Thus m ∈ Zk+1.
4. Xk ⊢ m by decryption; that is, {{m}key , key
−1} ⊆ Xk . Now let j be
the least integer such that ∃m∗ ∈ Xj • {m}key ∈ frags(m
∗). We note
that j 6 k since j = k will suffice if there is nothing smaller.
If j = 0 then m∗ ∈ INIT , and since INIT ⊆ M0 we know by frag-
mentation closure that {{m}key , key
−1} ⊆ M0. In that case, we have
that {{m}key , key
−1} ⊆ Xk ∩M0 = Zk , and so Zk  m. Therefore,
m ∈ Zk+1.
If j > 0 then Xj−1  m
∗ by our choice of j . We split into two subcases:
(a) If m∗ ∈ M0 then by fragmentation closure {m}key and key
−1 are
both inside M0 and, by the inductive hypothesis, in Zk ; and then
Zk  m. Therefore, m ∈ Zk+1.
(b) If m∗ /∈M0 then m∗ is not a protocol message, and so Xj−1 ⊢ m
∗.
Now this cannot be by decryption, deconcatenation or concatena-
tion because in each case this would contradict the choice of j
above; so it is an encryption rule. But then m∗ = {m1}key1
with {m}key ∈ frags(m
∗). It cannot be the case that {m}key ∈
frags(m1), since this would again contradict the choice of j ; and
so m = m1 and key = key1, and m ∈ Zj−1 ⊆ Zk+1.
5. Xk ⊢ m by deconcatenation; that is, a1 . . . ap .m ∈ Xk or m.a1 . . . ap ∈
Xk . These two possibilities are treated in exactly parallel ways; here we
take the former, and write x = a1 . . . ap .m. Following a line of reasoning
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similar to that argued in case 4, we take j as the least integer such that
∃m∗ ∈ Xj • x = frags(m
∗); and we again note that j 6 k .
Still running parallel to case 4, we see that if j = 0 then m∗ ∈ INIT ⊆
M0, and by fragmentation closure x ∈ M0. Thus x ∈ Xk ∩M0 = Zk ,
and so Zk  m, in which case m ∈ Zk+1.
If j > 0 then Xj−1  m
∗ by our choice of j . We split, once more, into
two subcases:
(a) If m∗ ∈ M0 then by fragmentation closure x is inside M0 and,
by the inductive hypothesis, in Zk ; and then Zk  m. Thus
m ∈ Zk+1.
(b) If m∗ /∈ M0 then m∗ is not a protocol message and so Xj−1 ⊢
m∗. This cannot be by decryption, deconcatenation or encryption,
or else the leastness of j is contradicted; and so it must be by
concatenation. So we have a set {x1, x2, . . . , xr} ⊆ Xj−1 being
concatenated to get x1.x2 . . . xr = x .
Now m itself might be a concatenation; so let us split up m as far
as possible, writing m = m1.m2 . . .mg (with possibly g = 1).
We have
x1.x2 . . . xr = a1.a2 . . . ap .m1.m2 . . .mg
and we note that there will be some t , u, v such that
xt = au . . . ap.m1 . . .mv
which is to say that there will be some xt which ‘bridges the
gap’ between a and m. But now since xt ∈ Xj−1 we can also
deconcatenate xt in Xj−1 to get m1 . . .mv ∈ Xj . In addition,
since xt+1 . . . xr = mv+1 . . .mg , then by fragmentation closure we
have that {xt+1, . . . , xr} ⊆ M0. So {m1 . . .mv , xt+1, . . . , xr} ⊆
Xj ∩M0 = Zj ⊆ Zk . And by concatenation within Zk , we have
that m = m1 . . .mv .xt+1 . . . xr ∈ Zk+1.
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This completes the induction. Finally,
Z =
∞⋃
i=0
Zi
=
∞⋃
i=0
(
Xi ∩M
0
)
=
(
∞⋃
i=0
Xi
)
∩M0
= X ∩M0
3.4.2 Reducing the number of agents and nonces
At this point, we apply a subtle renaming to the agents and nonces.
Agents A and B we shall keep as A and B . To those zero or more other
users who are under effective control of the enemy—that is, whose secret
keys and nonces are in INIT—we shall assign names C0, C1, . . . . (There
will usually be at least one of these, because we shall wish to allow the enemy
to use his own identity on the network as an honest agent.) To the remaining
zero or more users whose secret keys and nonces the enemy does not initially
know, we give names D0, D1, . . . . We rename the nonce sets accordingly: C3
will have nonces in N IC3(= {N
I
C3,0
,N IC3,1, . . . }) and N
R
C3
.
We now give some definitions and results that will enable us to reduce
the size of the network much further.
Definition 3.4.3. The normal form of a message m, written N (m), is the
message obtained by applying a permutation on N to the C-indices (that
is, the i in every Ci , N
I
Ci ,j
, NRCi ,j , PK (Ci), SK (Ci), SH (x ,Ci)) within m so
that all the C-indices appear in numerical order (starting from zero), and
similarly with the D-indices; and then, for each k , applying a permutation
on N to the indices of the nonces within N ICk (that is, the j in every N
I
Ck ,j
)
so that these also appear in numerical order, and similarly for NRCk , N
I
Dk
and
NRDk .
The examples given in Figure 3.4 should make this clear.
We extend this definition to cover sets in the natural way: the normal
form of a set S is
N (S ) = {N (m) | m ∈ S}
52 Developments
m N (m)
{C3.C5.N IC3,7.N
I
C3,2
}PK (C2) {C0.C1.N
I
C0,0
.N IC0,1}PK (C2)
C1.D0.N
I
D4,1
.C5.N
I
D3,3
C0.D0.N
I
D1,0
.C1.N
I
D2,0
N IC4,1.N
I
C3,2
.NRC3,6.N
I
C5,4
N IC0,0.N
I
C1,0
.NRC1,0.N
I
C2,0
{A.NB}SH (S ,D2) {A.NB}SH (S ,D0)
{C1}PK (C0) {C0}PK (C1)
A.B .S A.B .S
Figure 3.4: The normal form of messages
Definition 3.4.4. We define the relation ∼ on M such that m1 ∼ m2 ⇔
N (m1) = N (m2). We write E (m) = {v | m ∼ v}.
Remark 3.4.5. The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation, and E (m) is the
equivalence class containing m.
Definition 3.4.6. If a set S ⊆M contains only entire equivalence classes—
that is, whenever m ∈ S and m ∼ v then v ∈ S—then it will be said to be
normal-closed .
Proposition 3.4.7. If S is normal-closed then whenever S  m and m ∼ v
we have S  v.
Proof. We may think of the transition from m to N (m) as being the result of
applying a permutation onN to the set of C -indices, and another permutation
on N to the set of D-indices. This is also true of the transition from N (v)
to v ; and since N (m) = N (v), we have permutations on the two index sets
taking m to v .
Since the generation rules and the operation of the protocol treat all
users in exactly the same way, we may replace each element of S with one
from the same equivalence classes by applying the same permutations to this
element—so that if every occurrence of Ci (including N
I
Ci ,p
, NRCi ,q , PK (Ci),
SK (Ci), SH (x ,Ci)) in m becomes Cj in v , then we convert every Ci to Cj
throughout S as well. S is normal-closed, so this new element will be in S
too, and we shall have S  v .
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Definition 3.4.8. The transition from v to N (v) is a permutation of indices.
We shall write this permutation of indices as σv , so that N (v) = σv (v).
The transition from N (v) to v is the inverse of this permutation, and is
written as σv
−1, so σv
−1(N (v)) = v .
For a set S and a permutation of indices σ, we write σ(S ) as a shorthand
for {σ(m) | m ∈ S}.
Corollary 3.4.9. If S is normal-closed then so is S ′.
Proof. Let m ∼ v , with m ∈ S ′. We are required to show that v ∈ S ′.
Either m ∈ S or S  m. But since S is normal-closed, in the former
case v ∈ S and in the latter case S  v . So, either way, v ∈ S ′. Hence S ′ is
normal-closed.
Proposition 3.4.10. For any message m and permutation of indices σ, we
have σ(frags(m)) = frags(σ(m))
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of m. There are three cases
to consider:
1. For the base case, if m is an atom then
σ(frags(m)) = σ({m}) = {σ(m)} = frags(σ(m))
2. If m = {v}k then our inductive hypothesis is that the proposition holds
for v . But then
σ(frags(m)) = σ(frags({v}k))
= σ(frags(v) ∪ {{v}k , k , k
−1})
= σ(frags(v)) ∪ {σ({v}k), σ(k), σ(k
−1)}
= frags(σ(v)) ∪ {{σ(v)}σ(k), σ(k), σ(k)
−1}
= frags({σ(v)}σ(k))
= frags(σ({v}k))
= frags(σ(m))
3. If m = m1 . . .mn (fully expanded so that n is as large as possible) then
our inductive hypothesis is that the proposition holds for each mi . We
show that the proposition holds for m by induction on n. When n = 1
the result is trivial; and when it holds for every concatenation of length
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less than n then
σ(frags(m))
= σ(frags(m1 . . .mn))
= σ
(( ⋃
16i6n
frags(mi)
)
∪ {mi . . .mj | 1 6 i < j 6 n}
)
=
( ⋃
16i6n
σ(frags(mi))
)
∪ {σ(mi . . .mj ) | 1 6 i < j 6 n}
=
( ⋃
16i6n
frags(σ(mi))
)
∪ {σ(mi) . . . σ(mj ) | 1 6 i < j 6 n}
= frags(σ(m1) . . . σ(mn))
= frags(σ(m1 . . .mn))
= frags(σ(m))
Thus, by induction on n, our result holds for every concatenation.
Since the proposition holds in all three cases above, we conclude that it is
true for each m ∈M.
Corollary 3.4.11. If S is normal-closed then so is frags(S ).
Proof. We are required to show that whenever m ∈ frags(S ) and m ∼ v , we
have v ∈ frags(S ).
If m ∈ frags(S ) then m ∈ frags(z ) for some z ∈ S . So σm(m) ∈
σm(frags(z )), and by Proposition 3.4.10, σm(m) ∈ frags(σm(z )).
If m ∼ v , σm(m) = N (m) = N (v) = σv (v) and so σv (v) ∈ frags(σm(z )).
Now, reversing the above process, v ∈ σv−1(frags(σm(z ))). Again, by
Proposition 3.4.10, v ∈ frags(σv−1(σm(z ))).
But since σv
−1 and σm are permutations of the indices, σv
−1(σm(z )) is in
the same equivalence class as z , and by the normal-closure of S we conclude
that σv
−1(σm(z )) ∈ S . Then frags(σv−1(σm(z ))) ⊆ frags(S ), and so v ∈
frags(S ).
Therefore, frags(S ) is normal-closed.
Remark 3.4.12. We note that INIT is normal-closed. Recall that it con-
tains all public keys, all agent identities, and the secret keys and nonces only
of those agents under enemy control.
Remark 3.4.13. So is M0 normal-closed. For M0 = frags(D), and D is
normal-closed as a consequence of Assumption 3.2.1. Corollary 3.4.11 tells
us that frags(D) must be normal-closed as well.
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For any given protocol, M0 will have a finite number of equivalence
classes. For Assumption 3.2.1 tells us that the messages transmitted in a
protocol run are parameterised only by agent identities and nonce choices;
and the normalisation process effectively reduces these to four agent identities
with just one initiating nonce and one responding nonce each.
Corollary 3.4.14. Xi , and hence Zi , are normal-closed for each i.
Proof. The proof is a simple induction on i . In the base case, X0 = INIT ,
which is normal-closed. And whenever Xi is normal-closed, Xi+1 = Xi
′ is
normal-closed by Corollary 3.4.9. So, by induction, Xi is closed for each i .
Zi = Xi ∩M0, which is the intersection of two normal-closed sets; and so Zi
is normal-closed as well.
This has major consequences. Since each Zi is normal-closed, we may
represent each set by just keeping track of which equivalence classes are in
the set. This gives us a finite representation of Zi : we simply store the normal
forms from the equivalence classes that are included in Zi .
When we come to calculate Zi+1 from Zi , we may represent rules corre-
sponding to S  m (with S ⊆ Zi) by treating it as if it were N (S ) N (m).
Although it will not in general be strictly true that N (S ) N (m) whenever
S  m, the normal closure of Zi will ensure that N (S ) ⊆ Zi ⇒ S ⊆ Zi ⇒
Zi  m ⇒ Zi  N (m).
3.5 Conclusion
The results in this chapter give a clear decision procedure by which one may
determine, for a given protocol, whether or not there is a rank function to
prove its correctness:
1. Describe the roˆles of the protocol in CSP, and find appropriate sets R
and T with which to specify correctness.
2. Enumerate the equivalence classes of the set M0.
3. Let Z0 = INIT , representing Z0 by the equivalence classes that it con-
tains.
4. Repeatedly enumerate Zi+1 = Zi
′ ∩M0, representing by equivalence
classes, until the fixed point is reached: Zk+1 = Zk for some k . Declare
Z = Zk .
5. Check, for each t ∈ T , whether t ∈ Z .
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6. If, for every t ∈ T , we have t /∈ Z , then declare the protocol correct,
and stop.
7. If, for some t ∈ T , we have t ∈ Z , then declare that no rank function
exists.
If this procedure results in the conclusion that no rank function exists,
because of some t ∈ T ∩ Z , then an examination of the route by which t
came to be in Z will almost invariably lead to the discovery of an attack on
the protocol.
It makes sense to keep track, during the calculation of Zi+1, of which
messages (more accurately, which equivalence classes) were used to give which
others. For example, when we establish that NA.NB ∈ Zi+1 because NA ∈ Zi
and NB ∈ Zi , one should keep a record of the fact that NA.NB was found
in Zi+1 because {NA,NB} ⊢ NA.NB by concatenation. Afterwards, if desired,
a tree may be constructed, giving a complete derivation of how each message
in Z came to have a rank of one.
Chapter 4
Completeness issues
That is happiness: to be dissolved into something complete and great.
—Willa Cather, My A´ntonia
Wake up! Strengthen what remains and is about to die, for I have
not found your deeds complete in the sight of my God.
—Revelation 3v2, New International Version
I’m not sure how many questions we’ve actually answered today—
we’ve probably posed as many as we’ve set.
—Bob Hall
The question will be asked: what if there is no rank function? We now have
a sure way of constructing a suitable rank function if there is one, and of
proving non-existence if there is not. But can we deduce anything about the
security of the system when no rank function exists?
There are, in fact, two questions involved here. We should note that
the rank function depends not only on the protocol under consideration but
also on the network on which the protocol is to be run. Although we have
concentrated here exclusively on an arbitrarily large network with multiple
concurrent runs (because, for most purposes, we shall want to reject a pro-
tocol that is not secure on this network; and if a protocol is secure in this
case then it will be secure on any more restrictive network), the statement
of the central rank function theorem in Section 2.4.7 does not specify a type
or size of network. We need to consider:
1. whether the rank function theorem is complete in its most general sense:
does every secure combination of a protocol and a network have an
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associated rank function; or can we find a protocol and a network such
that, although the protocol is secure when run on that network, there
is no rank function to demonstrate this?
2. whether the rank function theorem is complete in its most useful sense:
does every protocol that is secure on an arbitrarily large network with
multiple concurrent runs have a rank function; or can we find a pro-
tocol such that, although it is secure on this network, there is no rank
function to prove the fact?
The completeness question will have a significant impact on the related is-
sue of the decidability of the correctness of security protocols; that is, whether
an algorithm exists that will take any protocol as its input, and determine,
in finite time, whether the protocol is correct or not.
We shall discuss general completeness in Section 4.1; completeness on an
arbitrarily large network with multiple concurrent runs in Section 4.2; and
decidability in Section 4.3.
4.1 Completeness on a general network
The analysis of Section 3.2 does not show that if a protocol is secure running
on a specific small network allowing only a few runs of the protocol then
it will be secure on a large network. It shows only that if there is a rank
function for the protocol on the small network then the protocol is secure on
the large network (because the rank function will apply to the large network
as well). No guarantee is given about what will obtain if the protocol is
secure on the small network but no rank function exists.
This gives an obvious approach to attacking general completeness: if we
can construct a protocol that is secure on the small network, but not on the
large network, then there can be no rank function for the protocol on the
small network. If there were, it would apply to the large network as well,
contradicting the insecurity of the protocol on the large network.
Such a protocol is given below. Each user U has two public keys PK1(U )
and PK2(U ), corresponding to secret keys SK1(U ) and SK2(U ). The proto-
col instructs the user to leak one of these secret keys at the end of a run as
initiator. One leaked secret key is not enough to breach security, and, be-
cause the protocol cannot contain nondeterministic choices, we cannot have
a second run in which the second secret key of the same user is leaked. But
we can construct the protocol so that one leaked secret key from each of two
users constitutes a security flaw, by including a redundant message encrypted
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under one public key of each user:
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → a : {{nb.a.b}PK1(a)}PK1(b)
Message 3. b → a : {{nb.a.b}PK1(a)}PK2(a)
Message 4. a → b : nb, SK1(a)
We then have an attack on the third run, after each of A and B has played
initiator, and consequently each has leaked one secret key. By this point,
the intruder will have learned the first secret key of each user, and this will
be sufficient to allow him, in a third run, to impersonate either A or B in
conversation with the other:
Message α.1. A→ C : A
Message α.2. C → A : {{NC .A.C }PK1(A)}PK1(C )
Message α.3. C → A : {{NC .A.C }PK1(A)}PK2(A)
Message α.4. A→ C : NC .SK1(A)
Message β.1. B → A : B
Message β.2. A→ B : {{NA.B .A}PK1(B)}PK1(A)
Message β.3. A→ B : {{NA.B .A}PK1(B)}PK2(B)
Message β.4. B → A : NA.SK1(B)
Message γ.1. C (A)→ B : A
Message γ.2. B → C (A) : {{NB .A.B}PK1(A)}PK1(B)
Message γ.3. B → C (A) : {{NB .A.B}PK1(A)}PK2(A)
Message γ.4. C (A)→ B : NB .SK1(A)
However, although this protocol is fatally flawed when multiple runs are
allowed, it must be secure for the small system that allows only one oc-
currence of an honest agent starting a protocol run as the initiator. For
Message γ.4 ever to appear, the intruder will have to be able to get hold of
nonce NB from one of Message γ.2 and Message γ.3. He will need either to
hold SK1(A), and one of SK2(A) and SK1(B), or to persuade another agent
to decrypt one of these messages for him.
Honest agents decrypt only ever the third message of the protocol, and
will do so only if all the fields of the encryption are appropriately set—which
is to say that only A will decrypt Message γ.3, and then only if she thinks
she is communicating with B . So the intruder cannot use A as an oracle
unless A really is trying to communicate with B , in which case there is no
deception.
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A Message 2 cannot be passed off as a Message 3, because Message 3
is encrypted with two keys from the same agent, and Message 2 is not. (If
the initiator and responder were the same agent, then Message 2 would be
encrypted with two keys from the same user. But the two messages would
still have different forms, since the two keys would be the same in Message 2
but different in Message 3.)
So the intruder will have to have discovered the appropriate keys. He
can never gain access to SK2(A), since it is never transmitted; and he can
get SK1(A) and SK1(B) only when each of A and B has run the protocol
as initiator. In other words, there must be at least two honest attempts to
run the protocol as initiator before any attack can succeed. The protocol is,
therefore, secure on the small system.
This protocol is, of course, comically absurd; such is often the way with
counter-examples. No real-world protocol would contain a message specifi-
cally designed to leak a secret key; in fact, long-term keys (other than public
keys) should never be sent across the network at all. However, the protocol
provides us with a good intuitive understanding as to how and why the rank
function theorem fails to give a general completeness result. It highlights the
fact that the rank functions approach cannot distinguish between an agent
who will engage in just one run, and an agent who will engage in as many
runs as he wishes.
4.2 Completeness on an unbounded network
This question is still open, and needs further consideration. Although it is
not known whether the rank function theorem is complete on an unbounded
network, we have made significant progress in working on the problem.
We have not found the possible non-completeness to be a hindrance when
analysing security protocols. After a discussion in Section 4.2.1 of a suggested
approach to tackling the completeness question, we give in Section 4.2.2 some
practical advice on how to deal with a protocol for which no rank function
exists.
4.2.1 Some directions
If the theorem is not complete in this sense, then it will probably be on
account of the fact that the rank function concept cannot distinguish between
external choice and interleaving: if a process can output either message m1
or message m2 but not both, then we must have ρ(m1) = ρ(m2) = 1—exactly
as if the process could output both message m1 and message m2. So we have
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that
2
i∈A
Pi maintains ρ ⇔ |||
i∈A
Pi maintains ρ
Recall that our general honest agent is defined by
U =
(
|||
n∈N I
U
2
J∈U
U IJ (n)
)
|||
(
|||
n∈NR
U
2
J∈U
URJ (n)
)
where U IJ (n) and U
R
J (n) describe agent U playing the parts of initiator and
responder respectively, using nonce n, believing that he is communicating
with agent J . Now checking that U maintains the rank for a given rank
function ρ is exactly equivalent to checking that
U ′ =
(
|||
n∈N I
U
|||
J∈U
U IJ (n)
)
|||
(
|||
n∈NR
U
|||
J∈U
URJ (n)
)
maintains ρ. In other words, the rank functions approach can succeed only
if the protocol is secure when running on a network in which each agent may
use each nonce with as many agents as he wishes. Usually we would expect
that a user U , having chosen a nonce N , would select a single agent (the ‘2’
in the definition of U ) with whom to use nonce N , and after that to use it
no more; but in fact agent U will be happy to use N in protocol runs with
every agent (the corresponding ‘|||’ in the definition of U ′).
Furthermore, the concept of maintaining the rank cannot distinguish be-
tween engaging in a protocol run once, and engaging in the same protocol
run multiple times. For
P maintains ρ ⇔ |||
i∈Z
P maintains ρ
So our check that U maintains the rank will in fact be equivalent to checking
whether
|||
i∈Z
U ′ maintains ρ
If we find a rank function to show that the protocol is secure running on the
network that we have been considering throughout this thesis, we shall have
succeeded in proving that it is secure even on a network in which agents may
use the same nonce with as many agents as they wish, and even in more than
one run with the same agent.
This gives some insight into how one might find a counter-example to
completeness on the large network. If we could find a protocol that is se-
cure on the arbitrarily large network with multiple concurrent runs that we
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have been considering, but that is insecure if we allow nonces to be used
multiple times, then it would qualify as a counter-example to this type of
completeness. For if it were to have a rank function, we would be able to
demonstrate correctness on the network even allowing for nonce reuse. But
no such counter-example has been constructed.
4.2.2 A pragmatic approach
Although we do not know whether the theorem is complete on an unbounded
network, this has never yet proved to be a practical difficulty. By trying to
construct a rank function, following the procedure outlined in Section 3.3,
much information may be gained from the proof that there is no rank func-
tion. A derivation of the final message results from the proof: one can see
exactly why the respdone message must have a rank of one. It has always
been a simple matter, in our experience, to turn this derivation into an attack
with each ‘S → m’ corresponding to a part of a protocol run. But, of course,
we cannot say with certainty that one will always be able to construct an
attack from this information—because, of course, this can be true only if the
theorem is complete on a large network!
4.3 Decidability
Some properties of programs are undecidable; that is, no algorithm exists
to tell us, for every program, whether it satisfies the property or not. The
classic example of this is termination: we cannot write a program that will
take as its input any other program P and output ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in finite time
according to whether program P will ever finish running.
Since a protocol is, in effect, a type of program, we should not be surprised
to learn that some properties of protocols are undecidable.
Is correctness a decidable property of the sort of authentication protocol
that we have been considering? In other words, is there an algorithm that is
guaranteed to tell us whether a protocol is correct or flawed?
If we take our network to be so restrictive that the system running the
protocol has only a finite number of possible states—by, for instance, forcing
our sets of agents, nonces and keys each to be finite and setting a maximum
number of runs in which any given agent may engage—then correctness will
clearly be decidable, because there will be only a finite set of possible states
of the system and we may check these one by one for security violations.
But since the network in which we are primarily interested is unbounded,
this approach will not work. The number of states is still countable, so
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it would be perfectly feasible to write a program to check the states one
by one and guarantee not to miss any; in this way, we would construct an
algorithm that was certain to find any attack in finite time. But, for a correct
protocol, the algorithm would not terminate. Although it would eventually
identify any flawed protocol, because it would stop after finding the first
state constituting a security breach, it could never identify a correct protocol
because it would perform the state search indefinitely.
It would, in fact, not be difficult to modify Casper [36] (see Section 8.3.3 on
page 144) to produce such a program. Although FDR [22] (Section 8.3.1),
which underpins Casper, cannot handle searching through a countable set
of states, it would be a simple matter to construct an infinite sequence of
Casper scripts with the size of the network increasing monotonically. If the
protocol in question is flawed, then the network will eventually be large
enough to bring the flaw to light. At each stage, a finite-state machine will
be analysed; but the network will grow with no upper bound as we work
through the sequence of scripts. This is obviously an horrendously inefficient
method of discovering attacks, but no matter: we are concerned here only
with the theoretical question of whether it could be done.
What about our algorithm for finding or demonstrating non-existence of a
rank function? Will that qualify as an algorithm for determining the security
or otherwise of any authentication protocol of the class under consideration,
running on an unbounded network? The answer is that it depends crucially
on the completeness question. If the theorem is indeed complete, then non-
existence of a rank function implies a flaw in the protocol. Since the algorithm
always terminates, and always tells us whether a rank function exists, it
would then provide us with a decision procedure for correctness.
Conversely, if it can be shown that the correctness problem for authen-
tication protocols is undecidable—that is, that no algorithm exists for de-
termining correctness or otherwise—then we would have the answer to the
completeness question. If correctness is undecidable, then the rank func-
tions theorem cannot be complete; for if it were, we would have a decision
procedure for correctness, contradicting undecidability.
4.3.1 Cervesato et al. on undecidability
Cervesato, Durgin, Lincoln, Mitchell and Scedrov have developed in [8] a way
of specifying security protocols based on linear logic. They show, by import-
ing standard results from linear logic and applying them to their multiset
rewriting system, that correctness is an undecidable property of the class of
security protocols that they can express. Further restrictions and bounds are
presented by Durgin, Lincoln, Mitchell and Scedrov in [16].
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Their results, however, appear not to apply to the class of protocols that
we have been considering in this thesis. Most of their work is concerned with
secrecy, rather than authentication; and, crucially, their language allows for
a much larger class of protocols than ours. The computation performed by an
agent in our system is restricted to decryption, encryption, equality checks
and nonce generation. In [8, 16] the rules by which the agents determine
which messages to send out are substantially more complicated.
4.3.2 Stoller’s bounds
Scott Stoller has published some interesting results about attacks on security
protocols [74]. He establishes, for a wide range of protocols, a method for
determining an upper bound on the size of network that one need consider
in order to find an attack or prove correctness.
If it could be shown that our class of protocols were a subclass of Stoller’s,
then his result would give us decidability. Alas, it cannot: his class rules out
some protocols that the rank functions approach allows.
• Protocols with forwarded ciphertexts; that is, encrypted components
that the receiver cannot decrypt, but that he must send on to the
server or another agent. As Stoller points out, where such components
are simply forwarded exactly as received, they may be removed from
the protocol without affecting correctness. However, some protocols
require these encryptions to be packaged up inside a further layer of
encryption before being forwarded, or to have the outermost layer of
encryption removed before forwarding; and in this case, the protocol
cannot be modified to remove the problem. Stoller’s results do not
apply to these protocols.
• Protocols that do not satisfy the strand count restriction. Roughly
speaking, Stoller requires that for each roˆle of the protocol there should
be some k such that each regular strand depends on at most k other
regular strands. It seems that most (perhaps all) interesting and prac-
tical protocols do indeed satisfy this restriction, and almost always with
k = 2. For a given n ∈ N and a specified roˆle of a given protocol, it
is decidable whether the roˆle satisfies the strand count restriction with
k = n.
In addition, most of the analysis in [74] is in the context of the shallow ci-
phertext restriction; that is, the assumption that protocols do not contain
nested encryptions. However, the results presented in the paper can be ex-
tended to cover protocols that do not satisfy this restriction. The bound on
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the network size will be larger, but no matter: for decidability we require
only that it be finite.
Although Stoller’s results do not apply directly to the class of protocols
that we have been considering in this thesis, they do demonstrate that cor-
rectness is decidable for a large class of practical protocols.
4.3.3 Lowe’s completeness result
A completeness result for a certain class of protocols has been established by
Gavin Lowe and published in [37]. He demonstrates a fixed and finite bound
on the size of network required to be model checked in order to find an attack
on or prove correctness of protocols in this class. As with Stoller’s result,
this gives an immediate decidability proof for correctness of such protocols.
Again, however, there are protocols that can be analysed using the rank
functions method that do not fall into line with Lowe’s defining criteria for
his class.
• Protocols with non-decryptable components; that is, components that
the receiving party cannot understand because he does not possess
the necessary decryption key. Usually this will correspond to Stoller’s
forwarded ciphertext restriction, but the assumption is not strictly the
same. Lowe requires that any incoming message should be transparent
to the receiver at the point of reception; but Stoller insists simply that
a message that cannot be understood will not be sent on to another
agent.
The only practical difference is that Lowe disallows protocols in which
an agent receives a message encrypted under a session key that he does
not hold, and only later receives the session key in order to decrypt
the first message; whereas Stoller’s assumption does not rule out such
protocols.
• Protocols with no temporary secrets; in other words, any value that is
not intended to remain secret should be sent unencrypted the first time
that it appears. This disallows protocols such as Ryan’s Protocol (see
Section 3.2.5 on page 39):
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → s : {a.nb}SH (s,b)
Message 3. s → a : {nb.b}SH (s,a)
Message 4. a → b : nb
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Nonce nb is not supposed to be a secret; in fact, it is explicitly revealed
in the final message of the protocol. But it is encrypted in its first
appearance, violating the assumption.
• Protocols that do not meet the identities inferable assumption, under
which each encrypted component sent in a protocol run should contain
enough information to identify every agent involved in the run. Many
published protocols have flaws that are due to their failure to comply
with this assumption; for instance, the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key
Protocol (see Section 2.2.3 on page 17):
Message 1. a → b : {a.na}PK (b)
Message 2. b → a : {na.nb}PK (a)
Message 3. a → b : {nb}PK (b)
The encrypted components in Message 2 and Message 3 do not contain
enough information to identify both initiator and responder. The key
used in the encryption in Message 2 is sufficient to identify the initiator,
and the key used in Message 3 similarly specifies the responder; but
only the encryption in Message 1 has enough information to identify
both parties (via the initiator’s explicit identity inside the encryption,
and the fact that the responder’s public key has been used to encrypt).
Note, however, that Lowe’s fix of the protocol still fails to satisfy this
condition. Message 2 has the responder’s identity inserted, as required
by the assumption; but Message 3 still lacks any information with which
to identify the initiator.
• Protocols containing encrypted components that may not be distinct.
For a given run of the protocol, every encrypted component must be
different from every other, so that an agent receiving a component
knows exactly to which message the component belongs, and which
component of that message it is.
It is important to remember that the initiator and the responder may
be one and the same agent; so that the following protocol would not
fit the bill:
Message 1. a → b : {a.b.na}PK (b)
Message 2. b → a : {b.a.na}PK (a)
When a 6= b, the components are distinct, because of the differing
order of the agent identities inside the encryption, and because of the
different keys used. However, if a = b, the two components are the
same.
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4.3.4 Data independence
Roscoe and Broadfoot [64] show how one may harness the power of data inde-
pendence (see Section 8.3.2) to prove correctness on an unbounded network
by model checking a small network.
In this case, however, the unbounded network that they consider differs
from the unbounded network in this thesis. Although Roscoe and Broadfoot
allow agents to engage in an unbounded number of runs of the protocol, they
assume that each agent may be engaged in at most one run at any given
time. Their results do not carry over to the analysis techniques presented in
this thesis.
4.3.5 Inequality tests
It is interesting to note that Stoller, Lowe, and Roscoe and Broadfoot each
require, implicitly or explicitly, that agents should not be able to perform
inequality tests. When a nonce arrives, an agent may check, if he has seen
the nonce before, that it has a particular value, and abort if not; but if he has
not seen the nonce before, he must be willing to accept any value. This rules
out, for example, a version of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
in which the initiator, on receipt of Message 2, checks that NA 6= NB .
This assumption is essentially Assumption 3.2.1 in our model. It is an
important requirement: the justification of the use of the normalisation pro-
cess (see Definition 3.4.3 on page 51) is that we may replace one nonce with
another in the network without destroying any attacks.
It seems that this assumption, or its analogue in corresponding models,
is essential if one wishes to consider an unbounded network.
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Chapter 5
Strand spaces
Let’s all go down the Strand
—Song by Harry Castling
5.1 Introduction
Strand spaces and their associated theory constitute a highly effective model
for analysing security protocols and proving that they satisfy certain prop-
erties. The model was first presented in [76], in which paper the authors
give a proof of correctness of Lowe’s fix of the Needham-Schroeder Public-
Key Protocol discussed in Section 2.4.5 on page 33. They demonstrate that
the techniques are sufficiently powerful to allow for attacks requiring un-
boundedly many concurrent runs of the protocol, thus enabling one to verify
protocols running on an arbitrarily large network.
CSP, as we have seen, allows us to model the individual participants on a
network, and construct a separate process for each, allowing these processes
to attempt to communicate across a hostile medium. In the same way, the
strand space model provides a mechanism for describing these participating
roˆles as individual strands, with linkages to model inter-strand communica-
tion.
In Section 5.2 we shall discuss the basic elements of the strand spaces
model, presenting the related techniques that have been successfully used to
analyse security protocols.
We shall show in Section 5.3, by means of an example taken from [75],
how proofs of correctness may be constructed in the strand spaces model.
The correspondence between process traces and strands, and the simi-
lar approaches to proving results about which messages the enemy may or
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may not learn, make it unsurprising that the link between the rank function
approach and strand spaces is quite strong. We shall conduct a detailed
comparison of the two methodologies in Section 5.4.
5.2 Strand spaces
In this section, we introduce the central components of the strand spaces
model presented in [76, 78, 75, 77], and give the theorems and propositions
that allow us to construct proofs of correctness.
5.2.1 Basic definitions
A strand models the actions of an agent on the network, or an atomic action
performed by the penetrator. (The penetrator in the strand space model
corresponds to the enemy in our CSP model.) A regular strand corresponds
to a trace of a single run of a USERi process; it represents a run of the
protocol from the point of view of one of the agents involved. A penetrator
strand models an atomic action performed by the penetrator; for instance,
concatenating two messages that he knows, or sending a message out over
the network. The techniques available to the penetrator in the strand spaces
model are comparable to those available to the enemy in the rank functions
model.
Definition 5.2.1. We write A to denote the space of messages communicable
across the network, corresponding to M in the rank functions model. An
element t ∈ A is called a term.
Definition 5.2.2. The set of cryptographic keys is denoted by K; this set is
a subset of A.
Definition 5.2.3. The atomic messages that are not keys form the set T.
This set is a subset of A. The sets K and T are disjoint.
Definition 5.2.4. A strand is any sequence of signed terms. Transmission
of a term t is represented by +t , and reception by −t . A general strand is
written as 〈±t1, . . . ,±tn〉.
A strand representing an honest agent models the transmissions and re-
ceptions involving that agent in a single run of the protocol; it corresponds
to a trace of a USERi process.
Definition 5.2.5. The signed terms of a strand are called its nodes. The
kth node of a strand s is denoted by 〈s , k〉.
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5.2.2 Strand spaces and bundles
A collection of strands may be considered as a graph, with two edge types,⇒
and→, representing respectively consecutive operations on the same strand,
and communication between two strands.
Definition 5.2.6. If ni+1 immediately follows ni on the same strand, then
we write ni ⇒ni+1.
Definition 5.2.7. If n1 = +a and n2 = −a for some term a ∈ A then we
write n1→n2.
Definition 5.2.8. A strand space is then a collection of strands considered
as a graph ordered by ⇒∪→.
A bundle in the strand space model corresponds to a trace of the whole
network in the rank functions approach. It is a finite set of strands, ordered
by ⇒∪→, on which certain conditions are imposed to ensure that
• reception events never occur unless the corresponding transmission
event has occurred;
• whenever an agent starts a protocol run, he starts from the beginning
of the protocol;
• there is no backwards causation; that is, there are no loops in the graph.
Definition 5.2.9. If C ⊆ (→∪⇒) is a finite set of edges, and N is the set
of nodes that appear on edges in C, then C will be called a bundle if
• whenever n2 ∈ N and n2 is a negative node, then there exists a unique
n1 ∈ N with n1→n2;
• whenever n2 ∈ N and n1⇒ n2, then n1⇒n2 ∈ C;
• C is acyclic.
5.2.3 Penetrator strands
The analogue of the ⊢ relation in the world of CSP is a type of strand
known as a penetrator strand. A penetrator strand represents a deduction
that the penetrator may make under ⊢, with different types of penetrator
strand corresponding to different types of deduction. In addition, since the
penetrator in the strand spaces model has no local state, there will be a type
of penetrator strand to represent duplicating a term in order to be able to
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use it twice; and since every network message that is transmitted is always
received by another strand, we introduce one final type of penetrator strand
to model hearing and disregarding a message.
Just as our intruder starts by knowing everything in INIT , so the pene-
trator will have some initial knowledge. However, in the strand spaces model,
only the keys known to the penetrator are stated: these keys form the set KP .
In the definition that follows, we see that the penetrator may also, in a
sense, say any message from the set T of atomic (non-key) messages. This
means, effectively, that he is considered to know all agent identities, as we
would expect; but the set T also contains all nonces. The strand spaces
model is more intuitive than the rank functions approach on this count.
Since a nonce is simply a random number, it is of course true to say that the
penetrator knows every nonce in advance. However, since the probability of
the penetrator guessing which nonce an agent has chosen is negligibly small,
we shall wish to rule out attacks in which this occurs. We shall see later how
this is achieved.
Definition 5.2.10. A penetrator strand is one of the following:
M Text message 〈+t〉 for t ∈ T.
F Flushing 〈−x 〉 for x ∈ A.
T Tee 〈−x ,+x ,+x 〉 for x ∈ A.
C Concatenation 〈−x ,−y ,+xy〉 for x , y ∈ A.
S Separation 〈−xy ,+x ,+y〉 for x , y ∈ A.
K Key 〈+k〉 for k ∈ KP .
E Encryption 〈−k ,−x ,+{x}k〉 for x ∈ A, k ∈ K.
D Decryption 〈−{x}k ,−k
−1,+x 〉 for x ∈ A, k ∈ K.
This definition is parameterised by the set T .
Recall from Definition 5.2.9 that for every negative node n2 in a bundle
there must be exactly one positive node n1 such that n1→ n2; that is, every
reception of a message must be matched to exactly one transmission. The
purpose of strands of type F is to allow the penetrator to ‘absorb’ transmis-
sions of messages that he does not wish to use; strands of type T perform
the corresponding roˆle of replicating messages that the penetrator wants to
transmit more than once.
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Recent work on strand spaces in [23, 24] has dropped this requirement of
matched transmissions and receptions, allowing communications to be sent to
zero nodes, one node or many nodes. Consequently, the need for penetrator
strands of types F and T has been abrogated. This slightly simplifies the
notation, but does not alter the expressive power of the language. Here, we
follow the notation of [75] and keep these types of penetrator strand; but this
decision does not affect the analysis.
5.2.4 Regular strands
A regular strand corresponds to a run of the protocol by an honest agent, or
the actions of a trusted server. It will usually be, as is the case in our model,
a specific instantiation of a strand template containing free variables. The
formal definition of a regular strand is very simple.
Definition 5.2.11. A regular strand is any strand that is not a penetrator
strand.
5.2.5 Subterms and ideals
In the rank functions model, we defined the frags operator to allow us to
talk about the subcomponents of a message. The strand spaces equivalent
is the concept of a subterm. The notation t1⊏ t2 will equate roughly to t1 ∈
frags(t2), except that whereas k ∈ frags({m}k), we shall not have k ⊏{m}k
unless k ⊏m.
The ⊏ relation is defined in terms of ideals. Ideals in the strand spaces
model allow us to talk about all messages containing a particular submessage,
when encryption is restricted to a particular set of keys.
Definition 5.2.12. Let k ⊆ K be a set of keys, and I ⊆ A a set of terms.
Then we say that I is a k-ideal of A if
1. hg ∈ I and gh ∈ I whenever h ∈ I and g ∈ A;
2. {h}k ∈ I whenever h ∈ I and k ∈ k.
We write Ik[h] for the smallest k-ideal containing h. Similarly, if S is a set of
terms, then Ik[S ] is the smallest k-ideal that includes S .
Proposition 5.2.13. Ik [S ] =
⋃
x∈S Ik [x ].
Proof. Omitted; see [75].
Definition 5.2.14. We say that h ⊏k m if m ∈ Ik[h]. When h ⊏K m, we drop
the subscript and write simply h⊏m, and say that h is a subterm of m.
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5.2.6 Origination
This subterm relation allows us to talk about the first time that something
is said on a strand. A term originates on a node if it is transmitted by
that node without having been received, even as part of a larger message,
by a previous node on the same strand. It will be uniquely originating if it
originates on exactly one node in the strand space.
Unique origination is a the mechanism alluded to above for modelling the
assumption that nonces and keys cannot be simply guessed by the penetra-
tor: if the penetrator guesses a nonce or a key, then it will not be uniquely
originating. Usually, we shall disallow bundles in which there are nonces or
keys that are not uniquely originating.
Definition 5.2.15. A term t is said to originate on a node n if
• n is a positive node;
• t ⊏ term(n);
• whenever n ′ precedes n on the same strand, t 6⊏ term(n ′).
In addition, t is uniquely originating in a strand space Σ if there is a unique
node n in Σ such that t originates on n.
5.2.7 Honesty
A node is an entry point to a set if it transmits a term without having already
transmitted or received any term in the set.
Definition 5.2.16. If, for a node n of a strand s , and a set I ⊆ A,
• n is a positive node;
• the term of n is in I ;
• no previous node on s has its term in I
then we say that n is an entry point to I .
The idea of an honest set will be important to us. A set is honest relative
to a given bundle if the penetrator can never break into the set except by
pure fluke: either he guesses the right nonce, or he guesses the right key.
Definition 5.2.17. A set I ⊆ A is honest relative to a bundle C if whenever
a node of a penetrator strand s is an entry point to I , then s is a strand of
type M or type K.
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Although honesty is defined for sets in general, it is when the concepts of
an honest set and an ideal are conjoined that they are most powerful. The
main theorem from [75] gives conditions under which an ideal is honest.
Theorem 5.2.18. Suppose
1. C is a bundle over A;
2. S ⊆ T ∪ K;
3. k ⊆ K;
4. K ⊆ S ∪ k−1.
Then Ik[S ] is honest.
Proof. The proof is omitted; it may be found in [75].
5.3 Example: the Otway-Rees Protocol
In this section, we give an overview of how the strand spaces machinery
presented in this chapter may be used to verify security protocols.
In [75], the authors make use of the concept of an honest ideal in a strand
space to prove guarantees about the Otway-Rees Protocol from [50]. Here
we describe the key ideas involved in the proof; for the full details, the reader
should consult [75].
The Otway-Rees Protocol may be described, in standard notation, as
Message 1. a → b : m.a.b.{na.m.a.b}SH (a,s)
Message 2. b → s : m.a.b.{na.m.a.b}SH (a,s).{nb.m.a.b}SH (b,s)
Message 3. s → b : m.{na.k}SH (a,s).{nb.k}SH (b,s)
Message 4. b → a : m.{na.k}SH (a,s)
The aim of the protocol is to provide mutual authentication of a and b,
and to provide them with a fresh symmetric session key k known only to
them and the trusted server s .
In the description, both m and na are nonces chosen by the initiator of
the protocol. The initiator sends nonce m, his identity a and the respon-
der’s identity b to the responder, along with a component encrypted under
a key shared between the initiator and the server. The responder forwards
this component to the server, along with a similar component containing a
nonce nb that he has chosen and encrypted under the key that he shares with
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the server. The server, having checked that each of m, a and b is consistent
throughout Message 2, generates a fresh session key k . He sends this session
key back to the responder, once with the initiator’s nonce na and encrypted
under the key shared between the initiator and the server, and once with the
responder’s nonce nb and encrypted under the key that the responder and
server share. Finally, the responder forwards the former onto the initiator to
reveal k to him, and decrypts the latter to learn k himself.
Honest ideals are used in [75] to prove three guarantees about the Otway-
Rees Protocol.
1. Secrecy. Session keys distributed by the server are never accessible to
the penetrator, unless he possesses the shared key held by one of the
agents for whom the server has generated the key.
2. The initiator’s guarantee. If A has completed the protocol as initiator,
believing that B 6= A was responder, then B has run the protocol as
responder at least as far as Message 2, and the server has also completed
the protocol. Furthermore, A, B and the server agree on the value ofm;
A and the server agree on na and k ; and B and the server agree on nb.
3. The responder’s guarantee. If B has completed the protocol as respon-
der, believing that A 6= B was initiator, then A has started the protocol
as initiator, and the server has also completed the protocol. Further-
more, A, B and the server agree on the value of m; and B and the
server agree on nb and k .
Note that it is not possible to guarantee that at the end of the protocol, the
initiator and responder agree on the session key k . However, the weakness
is not as problematic as one might suppose, since the penetrator will know
neither the session key that A accepts, nor the session key that B holds.
In the next two sections, we shall consider these guarantees, giving an
overview of how each is proved using an honest ideal.
5.3.1 Secrecy
The aim is to prove that server-generated session keys are never revealed to
the penetrator. It is sufficient to show that this is the case when the server
believes that the initiator and responder are A and B respectively.
The procedure is to show that if the server generates session key K
for agents A and B then the penetrator can never break into the set S =
{SH (A, S ), SH (B , S ),K }.
Since the penetrator starts holding none of these keys, he cannot decrypt
messages encrypted under any of these keys. For example, since he does not
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have access to SH (A, S ), it would be safe to allow him to see {K }SH (A,S).
However, since he may hold other keys, {K }j for some key j
−1 /∈ S should
be kept secret from him.
We know how to construct the set of all messages that should be kept
from the penetrator’s grasp. Any message containing a member of S that is
not encrypted under a key whose inverse is in S is out of bounds. If we let
k = (K \ S )−1, then the set of messages to be protected is the ideal Ik[S ].
In [75], k = K \ S ; but since S contains only self-inverse keys, the two
definitions are the same.
Proving that the Otway-Rees Protocol satisfies the secrecy requirement,
therefore, involves demonstrating that, for bundles in an Otway-Rees strand
space in which the penetrator does not guess K (that is, in which K is
uniquely originating), no element of Ik[S ] is ever transmitted.
The honesty of this ideal follows from Theorem 5.2.18. A corollary of
this theorem, stated and proved in [75], allows us to conclude that if there
is a node that qualifies as an entry point for Ik[S ], then it must be a regular
node.
A case analysis shows that a regular node cannot, in fact, be an entry
point for Ik[S ]. Thus, no node is an entry point for Ik[S ] and the secrecy
property holds.
5.3.2 The initiator’s and responder’s guarantees
The first step in proving the authentication goals is to show that any occur-
rence of a message encrypted under SH (x , s), where the penetrator does not
already hold this key, originates on a regular strand.
This is done by setting S = {SH (x , s)} and k = (K \ S )−1 = K \ S and
considering the ideal Ik[S ]. (In [75], the authors have k = K, but it makes no
difference to the argument.)
This ideal is, again, an honest ideal by Theorem 5.2.18. A second corollary
of the theorem in [75] shows that, since the key in S never originates on a
regular node—that is, is never given away by an honest principal or by the
server—terms encrypted under SH (x , s) can originate only on a regular node.
The authentication guarantees can now be proved by appealing to the
form of the messages involved.
In the case of the initiator’s guarantee, one argues that if the initiator
receives Message 4 with the encrypted component as {NA.K }SH (A,S) then this
component must have originated on a regular node; and from the structure
of the messages produced by the participants, this must be a regular node on
a server strand. This is either the first encrypted component or the second
encrypted component of a Message 3; and in the latter case one may derive
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a contradiction regarding the unique origination of NA, so it must be the
former. But then the server must have received a corresponding Message 2,
which also must have originated on a regular node; and so, by arguing back
in this way, one may conclude that the responder ran the protocol with
appropriate parameters at least as far as Message 2.
A similar argument shows that the Otway-Rees Protocol correctly ensures
the validity of the responder’s guarantee.
5.4 The link with rank functions
Having had a taste of how the power of strand spaces may be harnessed
to prove correctness of security protocols, we now consider the connection
between rank functions and strand spaces.
Meadows, in [42], summarises several different approaches to security
protocol analysis, including the strand spaces method and the rank functions
model. She notes that the set of messages of rank of zero is used in a similar
way to that of an honest ideal in a strand space. We here seek to investigate
this issue further, drawing out the nature of the correspondence in detail.
5.4.1 Verifying protocols using strand spaces
It should be noted that each guarantee about the Otway-Rees Protocol was
proved by considering some honest ideal Ik[S ] with the set S containing only
atoms; and in particular that in each case we had k = (K\S )−1. This equality
is no accident.
The intuitive purpose of Theorem 5.2.18 is to determine, given a set S of
atoms that we wish to keep from the penetrator, the larger set of messages
that it is dangerous to let him see, lest he should use a message in the larger
set to deduce the value of one of the atoms in S . In constructing the k-ideal
of S , we find all those messages that must be kept from the penetrator to
ensure that we deny him access to S , assuming that he holds the inverses of
those keys in k but holds no other keys.
Now, if we are attempting to keep everything in S from the penetrator,
but are willing to allow him access to atoms outside S , then we already know
which keys we should expect him to be able to learn, and which keys must
remain secret. Any key k ∈ S will have to be kept from the penetrator, and
so he will not be able to decrypt messages encrypted under k−1; and any key
j /∈ S will be one that the penetrator might learn, so messages encrypted
under j−1 will be visible to him.
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We can use this to state a corollary of Theorem 5.2.18 that gives con-
ditions relating the sets S and k that must be met in order for the ideal
to be honest. The corollary allows us to concentrate solely on finding an
appropriate set S of atoms, and to have a suitable k constructed for us.
Corollary 5.4.1. Suppose
1. C is a bundle over A;
2. S ⊆ T ∪ K.
Then I(K\S)−1 [S ] is honest.
Proof. We let k = (K\S )−1, and now claim that Theorem 5.2.18 applies. The
first two conditions of the theorem are the same as those of the corollary. We
have that K\S ⊆ K, and K is closed under taking inverses, so (K\S )−1 ⊆ K,
and the third condition of Theorem 5.2.18 is satisfied. For the fourth, K =
(K∩ S )∪ (K \ S ) = (K∩ S )∪ ((K \ S )−1)
−1
= (K∩ S )∪ k−1, and so certainly
K ⊆ S ∪ k−1. So all four conditions have been met, and the theorem thus
assures us that I(K\S)−1 [S ] is honest.
The set k = (K \ S )−1 is the smallest set of keys that will satisfy the
conditions of Theorem 5.2.18. The ideal of Corollary 5.4.1 is the smallest
honest ideal that includes the set S . As such, we shall refer to the set
I(K\S)−1 [S ] as theminimal honest ideal of S . We shall often drop the subscript
and write simply I [S ] as a shorthand for I(K\S)−1 [S ].
Remark 5.4.2. Note that in the case that S ⊆ A but S * T ∪ K, Corol-
lary 5.4.1 will not apply. We shall still have cause to consider I [S ], but we
shall have no guarantee that it is an honest set.
Proving a security property of a security protocol in the strand spaces
model will usually involve identifying the set S of crucial atomic secrets,
constructing its minimal honest ideal, and showing, via Theorem 5.2.18 or a
suitable corollary, that the penetrator can never break into the set I [S ].
The approach can be summarised as follows.
1. Identify the set S of atoms that should remain secret.
2. Find the closure of the set S under operations that leave members of
S unprotected; that is, under concatenation with arbitrary messages,
and encryption under inverses of unprotected keys. The resulting set
is I [S ].
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3. Show that the penetrator can never break into the set I [S ], by demon-
strating that the regular strands will not give out messages from I [S ]
unless they have already received a message from I [S ].
4. Conclude from this that the protocol satisfies the specified security
property.
5.4.2 Verifying protocols using rank functions
A proof of correctness in the rank functions model is completed by finding
some rank function ρ on the message space with the properties given in
Theorem 3.1.1 on page 36.
Although any such rank function will suffice, we have in this thesis con-
centrated on the particular minimal 1-set rank function ρ0 that assigns a rank
of one only when required by the conditions of the theorem. The procedure
has been as follows.
1. Identify the set INIT of atoms that the enemy knows from the start.
2. Find the closure of the set INIT under operations that the enemy
can perform; that is, under concatenation, deconcatenation, encryp-
tion using known keys, decryption using known keys, and picking up
messages transmitted by honest agents. The resulting set is X , and ρ0
is the characteristic function of X .
3. Show that the crucial messages in T are not members of X .
4. Conclude from this that the protocol satisfies the specified security
property.
There are two major differences between this procedure and that given for
strand spaces. First, the actions of honest agents are considered earlier than
in the strand spaces model. Closure of the set INIT includes closure under
operations that honest agents may perform on messages. However, in the
strand spaces model, closure of S to form I [S ] does not take the actions of
honest agents into account; regular strands are not considered until the third
step. Second, the two procedures attack the problem from opposite points
of view: whereas the strand spaces approach concentrates on messages that
should remain secret, construction of ρ0 looks specifically for all messages
that must be public.
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5.4.3 Is the kernel of a rank function an honest ideal?
In light of the fact that the strand spaces model characterises all messages
that must remain secret in terms of honest ideals, it is natural to ask whether
anything can be said about the corresponding messages in the world of rank
functions. More specifically, is the kernel ker ρ of a rank function ρ—that is,
the set of messages having a rank of zero—an honest ideal?
The kernel of a general rank function
Recall that the minimal 1-set rank function ρ0 will not in general be the only
rank function that can be found to prove a given protocol correct.
Suppose that we have found some rank function ρ, not necessarily the
minimal 1-set rank function, that proves that our protocol satisfies a par-
ticular security property. What can be said of ker ρ, the kernel of the rank
function ρ?
Proposition 5.4.3. For any rank function ρ that satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 3.1.1 on page 36, ker ρ is an ideal.
Proof. We claim that ker ρ = I [ker ρ].
Let k = (K \ ker ρ)−1. Now I [ker ρ] = Ik[ker ρ], which is defined to be the
smallest k-ideal that includes ker ρ, so a fortiori we have ker ρ ⊆ I [ker ρ].
Suppose that x ∈ I [ker ρ]. We know from Proposition 5.2.13 that
x ∈
⋃
m∈ker ρ
Ik[m]
and so x ∈ Ik[m] for some m with ρ(m) = 0. But Ik[m] is the set formed by
closure of {m} under concatenation with arbitrary messages, and encryption
under keys from k; that is, we can obtain x from m by some finite sequence
of such concatenations and encryptions. Each of these operations preserves
the property of having rank zero:
• If ρ(g) = 0 then ρ(g .h) = 0. For {g .h} ⊢ g , and so if ρ(g .h) = 1 then
the conditions on ρ force ρ(g) = 1, yielding a contradiction.
• If ρ(g) = 0 and ρ(k−1) = 1 then ρ({g}k) = 0. If k ∈ k then k
−1 ∈
k−1 = K \ ker ρ, so k−1 /∈ ker ρ and we do indeed have that ρ(k−1) = 1.
But now {{g}k , k
−1} ⊢ g , so if ρ({g}k) = 1 then the conditions on ρ
would give ρ(g) = 1, again yielding a contradiction.
Thus ρ(x ) = 0, and so x ∈ ker ρ. This completes the proof that ker ρ =
I [ker ρ], and so ker ρ is indeed an ideal.
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Recall from Remark 5.4.2 that, since ker ρ does not contain only atoms,
we shall have no guarantee from Corollary 5.4.1 that I [ker ρ] is an honest set.
However, closer inspection reveals that we may be assured of its honesty by
considering the definition of a rank function.
Before continuing, it will be well to clarify exactly what we mean by
asking whether ker ρ is an honest set. Strictly speaking, the question makes
no sense; for honesty is defined only for sets of terms in a strand space, and
is defined in terms of nodes on strands, and these types have no meaning in
the rank functions model. However, the analogues of these notions are not
far to seek.
The equivalent, in the rank functions world, of a regular strand is a trace
of a process. The process in question will be USERJ for some J ∈ U ,
or else the process SERVER controlling the server; since a regular strand
represents a single run of a protocol, the trace of the process will be a trace
also representing a single run.
The analogue of a penetrator strand is an action performed by the enemy.
Penetrator strands of type C, S, E and D correspond to deductions under ⊢
of concatenation, deconcatenation, encryption and decryption respectively;
type T disappears entirely since the enemy may transmit any message he
knows any number of times; types M and K correspond to the enemy trans-
mitting messages from the set INIT ; the analogue of type F is reception of
a message for which the enemy finds no further use.
Recall that an entry point to a set I is a node that transmits a term from
the set without any preceding node on the same strand having previously
received any term from I . For a regular strand, the rank functions equivalent
is transmission of a message in I by a process representing an honest agent
or the server, when the process has not previously received a message in I
during that run. For a penetrator strand, it is immediately clear that the
strand must be of type C, S, E, D, M or K, because F strands transmit
nothing and T strands transmit terms that they have previously received;
so the analogue will be either an enemy deduction of the form S ⊢ m with
s /∈ I for every s ∈ S but with m ∈ I , or else a transmission of some element
of INIT .
Finally, honesty is defined relative to a given bundle, and a bundle cor-
responds to a trace of the network. But we are interested only in whether
sets are honest relative to every bundle of a particular strand space; or, in
the rank functions model, whether the equivalent property holds for every
possible trace of the network.
This allows us to give the equivalent definition of honesty in the rank
functions model. In the strand spaces model, a set I is honest if whenever
a penetrator node is an entry point to I then it is of type M or of type K.
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We have seen that the type cannot in any case be of type T or type F; so
the definition effectively states that the strand must not be of type C, S, E
or D.
The following definition is analogous to Definition 5.2.17.
Definition 5.4.4. A set S ⊆M is honest if whenever the enemy can trans-
mit an element m ∈ S then m ∈ INIT .
Now the statement that the kernel of a rank function is honest becomes
almost trivial.
Proposition 5.4.5. For any rank function ρ that satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 3.1.1, ker ρ is honest.
Proof. We are required to show that the enemy can never learn any element m
of ker ρ unless m ∈ INIT .
In fact, we know that if m ∈ INIT then the conditions of Theorem 3.1.1
force ρ(m) = 1, so the statement is equivalent to saying that the enemy can
never learn any element of ker ρ.
But this is immediate. The enemy builds on his initial knowledge by
deductions under ⊢, and by learning messages transmitted by honest agents
and the server.
In the case of deductions, he can never break into ker ρ by making a
deduction S ⊢ m from messages of rank one to learn a message of rank zero,
for the conditions of the theorem insist that if S contains only messages of
rank one then so must m have rank one.
In the case of transmissions by honest agents or the server, the enemy
will never be able to use messages of rank one to persuade an honest agent
or server to reveal a message with rank zero; for the condition that each such
process must maintain the rank says exactly that if the process has received
only messages of rank one then it will not transmit a message with a rank of
zero.
The enemy’s knowledge is restricted, then, to messages that have a rank
of one; that is, messages that lie outside ker ρ. Thus, ker ρ is an honest
set.
The rank function, then, is a way of categorising which messages the
enemy may learn. By definition, ker ρ tells us the messages that will be
inaccessible to him. It should be no surprise to learn that ker ρ is always
honest.
However, this is not the end of the matter. Theorem 5.2.18 gives condi-
tions under which an ideal Ik[S ] is honest; but it requires that S be a set of
atoms. The most useful honest ideals are indeed of the form Ik[S ] for some
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set S containing only atoms; and it is instructive to consider whether we can
write ker ρ in this form.
Unfortunately, we cannot. We need look no further than Ryan’s Protocol,
given in Section 3.2.5 on page 39, to see why. Recall that Ryan’s Protocol is
described by
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → s : {a.nb}SH (s,b)
Message 3. s → a : {nb.b}SH (s,a)
Message 4. a → b : nb
Let ρ0 be the minimal 1-set rank function for Ryan’s Protocol, and sup-
pose that ker ρ0 = Ik[S ] for some set S of atoms.
Consider the message {A}SH (S ,B). It is clear that the enemy can never
learn this message, for he does not possess the shared key to perform the
encryption himself, and no message of this form appears anywhere in the
protocol so he will not learn it from an honest agent or from the server. Since
ρ0 is the minimal 1-set rank function, we must have ρ0({A}SH (S ,B)) = 0 and
hence {A}SH (S ,B) ∈ ker ρ0.
But if {A}SH (S ,B) ∈ Ik[S ], and S contains only atoms, then we must have
A ∈ S and SH (S ,B) ∈ k. But if A ∈ S then A ∈ Ik[S ], and so A ∈ ker ρ0.
This is a contradiction, for we have A ∈ INIT and so ρ0(A) = 1. Thus ker ρ0
cannot be written in the form Ik[S ] with S being a set of atoms.
We might ask whether this problem occurs simply because the message
that we have considered is a message that cannot appear as a fragment of a
protocol message; that is, a message outsideM0. Can we rescue the situation
by asking only that ker ρ should agree with some Ik[S ] on elements of M
0?
Can we ensure that
(ker ρ) ∩M0 = Ik[S ] ∩M
0
for some set S containing only atoms?
Again, the answer is no. Let us make a small change to the second
message of Ryan’s Protocol:
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → s : {{a}SH (s,b).nb}SH (s,b)
Message 3. s → a : {nb.b}SH (s,a)
Message 4. a → b : nb
This alteration does not affect the correctness of the protocol. Nor does it
affect the rank of {A}SH (S ,B), for this component never appears except inside
a Message 2 encrypted with SH (S ,B), which key the enemy does not hold.
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However, it does ensure that {A}SH (S ,B) ∈M
0; and, by reasoning similar to
that employed before, we see that we shall have A ∈ ker ρ0 and yet ρ0(A) = 1,
yielding a contradiction.
The kernel of the minimal 1-set rank function
It is perhaps not surprising that the kernel of a general rank function cannot
be written in a convenient form, for there might be any number of rank
functions that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.1.1 for a given security
protocol.
However, we might have held higher hopes for the minimal 1-set rank
function. Since this rank function is in no way arbitrarily chosen, and has a
clear structure, we might reasonably have expected that the link between the
rank functions model and the strand spaces model would be at its strongest
here.
But the argument above shows that this is not the case. Our counter-
example to the general case comes in the form of the minimal 1-set rank
function for a slightly altered version of Ryan’s Protocol.
5.4.4 Rank functions and secrecy specifications
The reason that the kernel of a rank function does not turn out to have the
structure we hoped that it would is that an honest ideal in the strand spaces
model does not serve quite the same purpose as the kernel of a rank function
in the rank functions model.
The kernel of a rank function specifies those messages that the enemy
should never be allowed to see. Recall that when considering an authenti-
cation specification we block agent A from starting a particular run of the
protocol with agent B in order to discover whether the enemy can masquer-
ade as A; so that if the authentication specification is satisfied, the blocked
protocol messages are never learnt by the enemy. The approach is to prove
that if agent A never initiates the run then those messages never appear.
Honest ideals on strand spaces may be used without any necessity for
blocking particular agents from engaging in particular runs. In the proof
of the authentication guarantees for the Otway-Rees Protocol, it is nowhere
claimed that the enemy never learns the messages that agent A generates in
order to initiate the protocol with agent B . In fact, he does learn them; but
not until agent A generates them and transmits them. The approach is not
to prove that the messages never appear, but to prove that when they do
appear they must have originated on a regular strand representing agent A.
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Although we have not explored the possibility in this thesis, the rank
functions model can be used to prove secrecy specifications as well as au-
thentication specifications; and, in this case, the kernel of the rank function
takes on a roˆle much like that of the honest ideal.
Rank functions for secrecy
Where the rank functions theorem applies, it concludes that
NET sat R precedes T
for particular sets R and T ; and the idea is to show that if we stop events
in R from occurring then events in T can never happen. When considering
authentication, we choose R to indicate that a particular agent has started a
given roˆle of a particular run, and T to state that another agent has finished
the complementary roˆle of the same run. For secrecy specifications, we need
not block any agent activity: we wish simply to state that a certain message,
almost always a session key, is never learnt by the enemy. We need, therefore,
to let R = ∅, and choose T to indicate that the enemy has learnt the erstwhile
secret. The statement that
NET sat ∅ precedes T
is just another way of saying that events from T never occur.
The definition of the process representing the enemy needs to be aug-
mented slightly: it should allow the enemy, at any time, to engage in an
event says .x for any message x that he knows. Then we let T = {says .K }
for the key K that we wish to keep secret. As with authentication, we shall
concentrate our attention on one specific run of the protocol. The key K will
be a particular key that we shall expect to be allocated during this specific
run; and, as with authentication, if we can show that the secrecy specification
holds for this run, we shall conclude that it holds in general.
Secrecy of session keys
In this context, with no blocking, we find that we can define a rank function
whose kernel is an honest ideal of the form Ik[S ].
The enemy will still have access to the set INIT representing his initial
knowledge. We shall augment INIT in this case with all possible session
keys and nonces from all runs except for the one run that concerns us. The
remaining atoms—long-term keys, and the secrets from the specific run of
the protocol on which we shall be concentrating—will go to make up the
set S .
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We now define a rank function ρ∗ such that
ρ∗(m) =
{
0 (m ∈ I [S ])
1 (m /∈ I [S ])
If a rank function exists to prove the security specification, ρ∗ will be such
a rank function. For this rank function assigns a rank of zero only when
absolutely necessary: it is the maximal 1-set rank function.
In this case, we have successfully constructed a rank function whose kernel
is a minimal honest ideal of a set of atoms.
Caveat lector
It is not difficult to see that for these secrecy specifications the rank function
theorem is not complete in any sense.
A protocol that uses a nonce and a session key, keeping the session key
secret but revealing the nonce at the end, might not have a rank function to
prove that the session key remains secret. Suppose that, part way through
the protocol, the secrecy of the nonce is crucial to security, and that if the
enemy were to know the value of the nonce at that point then he would be
able to discover the value of the session key; but, later, the nonce has served
its purpose and may be revealed. What rank shall we assign to the nonce?
If the nonce is given a rank of one, then the enemy will be considered to
know the nonce from the start; and he will be able to use his knowledge to
break the protocol. If it is given a rank of zero, we shall find that one of the
USERJ processes fails to maintain the rank when it reveals the nonce at the
end. Either way, we shall not be able to use rank functions to prove that the
protocol satisfies the secrecy specification.
Specifically, secrecy specifications for correct protocols that fail to meet
Lowe’s no temporary secrets requirement detailed on page 65 will often not
be verifiable using rank functions.
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Chapter 6
Type flaw attacks
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone,
‘it means just what I choose it to mean.’
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass
Seal up the mouth of outrage for a while,
Till we can clear these ambiguities.
—Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet
6.1 Introduction
A type flaw attack on a security protocol is an attack in which a field that
was originally intended to have one type is subsequently interpreted as having
another type. For example, consider Lowe’s fix of the Needham-Schroeder
Public-Key Protocol [34]. We discussed the three-message version in Sec-
tion 2.2.4 on page 18; here, we describe the full seven-message fix:
Message 1. a → s : b
Message 2. s → a : {PK (b).b}SK (s)
Message 3. a → b : {na.a}PK (b)
Message 4. b → a : a
Message 5. s → b : {PK (a).a}SK (s)
Message 6. b → a : {na.nb.b}PK (a)
Message 7. a → b : {nb}PK (b)
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Meadows, in [40], describes a type flaw attack on the unmodified version
of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [47]. The adapted version of
the protocol is vulnerable to essentially the same attack:
Message α.3. C (A)→ B : {NC .A}PK (B)
Message α.4. B → S : A
Message α.5. S → B : {PK (A).A}SK (S)
Message α.6. B → C (A) : {NC .NB .B}PK (A)
Message β.3. C (NB .B)→ A : {NC .(NB .B)}PK (A)
Message β.4. A→ C (S ) : NB .B
Message α.7. C (A)→ B : {NB}PK (B).
The attack uses two runs, whose messages are labelled α and β. The intruder
seeks to impersonate A throughout run α. When B issues a nonce challenge
at Message α.6, the intruder replays this message at A, as Message β.3; A
interprets the field NB .B as being an agent’s identity, and so believes this
message came from NB .B . A therefore tries to request NB .B ’s public key, by
sending the ‘identity’ NB .B to the server; this allows the intruder to learn NB ,
and hence respond to the nonce challenge.
In this chapter, we consider a system in which fields are tagged with
some extra information indicating their intended type. One may think of
the tag as a few bits attached to the field, with different bit patterns al-
located to different types. For example, we shall write ‘(nonce,N )’ to rep-
resent a value N tagged in such a way to indicate that it is intended as a
nonce. We shall similarly tag compound messages; for example, we shall
write ‘(pair, ((nonce,N ), (nonce,N ′)))’ to represent a pair of values N and N ′
tagged as nonces; we assume that the tag for a pair contains enough infor-
mation to allow an honest agent to decompose the message correctly (for
example, the tag might contain a representation of the number of bits in
each component), and that concatenations of three or more parts will be
constructed as nested pairings. We shall assume that the tag for an encryp-
tion contains the type of the encrypting key and the type of the body of the
encryption; for example, we shall write ‘{|nonce, nonce|}pubkey’ to represent a
tag indicating an encryption of a pair of nonces with a public key.
We assume that honest agents will tag messages that they create with
their true type; for example, if an agent introduces a nonce, he will tag it as
being a nonce. We assume that when an honest agent receives a message,
he will check that all accessible tags (i.e. those tags not inside an encryption
that this agent cannot decrypt) are as expected. On the other hand, we shall
not assume that the penetrator follows these tagging rules—we shall allow
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the penetrator to place arbitrary tags upon accessible messages (i.e. those
messages not protected by an encryption)—and we shall assume that honest
agents cannot detect such dishonest tagging.
Suppose we were to use this tagging scheme in the attack described above.
The text of Message α.6 would then become (dropping the ‘pair’ tag and the
pairing parentheses for ease of notation):
({|nonce, nonce, agent|}pubkey, {(nonce,NC ), (nonce,NB), (agent,B)}PK (A))
A penetrator could replace the outermost tag with
{|nonce, agent|}pubkey,
but the tag inside the encryption cannot be tampered with. Now A will not
accept this message as an instance of a Message 3, because in such messages
the second field inside the encryption should be tagged as being an agent’s
identity. Hence this tagging scheme would prevent the above attack.
As another example, consider the Woo and Lam Protocol pi1 from [79]:
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → a : nb
Message 3. a → b : {a, b, nb}SH (a,s)
Message 4. b → s : {a, b, {a, b, nb}SH(a,s)}SH (b,s)
Message 5. s → b : {a, b, nb}SH (b,s).
As before, SH (a, s) denotes a key shared between a and s . Note that b
cannot decrypt the message he receives in Message 3, but instead simply
includes it inside Message 4. The following type flaw attack exploits this:
Message 1. C (A)→ B : A
Message 2. B → C (A) : NB
Message 3. C (A)→ B : NB
Message 4. B → C (S ) : {A,B ,NB}SH (B ,S)
Message 5. C (S )→ B : {A,B ,NB}SH (B ,S).
The penetrator replays the nonce NB at B in Message 3, which B accepts as
being of the form
{A,B ,NB}SH (A,S).
B therefore encrypts NB within Message 4. However, this is precisely the
form of message that the penetrator requires to fake Message 5.
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If we were again to adopt the tagging scheme, the nonce in Message 2
would become (nonce,NB). The penetrator cannot replay the nonce in this
form in Message 3, but can retag the nonce with the tag that B is expecting
({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key,NB). Message 4 would then become:
({|agent, agent, {|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key|}shared-key,
{(agent,A), (agent,B), ({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key,NB )}SH (B ,S)).
But this message could not now be replayed as an instance of Message 5, be-
cause B is expecting a message in which the third field inside the encryption
is tagged as being a nonce. The penetrator could change the outermost tag,
to create:
({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key,
{(agent,A), (agent,B), ({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key,NB )}SH (B ,S)),
but the penetrator cannot change the inner tag without access to the appro-
priate key. Again this tagging scheme prevents the attack. Observe that the
type flaw attack is prevented simply by having the participants examine the
tags; they do not need to be able to tell the true types of fields.
In this chapter we prove that in fact this tagging scheme is enough to
prevent all type flaw attacks. The utility of this result to the designers and
implementers of protocols should be obvious.
This result is useful also to protocol analysers. Most protocol analysis
techniques adopt the strong typing abstraction, in which all messages con-
sidered in the analysis are assumed to be well-typed. This corresponds to
Assumption 3.2.3 on page 37, under which all agents can ‘magically’ tell the
true types of messages. Assumption 3.2.3 has been crucial to the analysis
presented in Chapter 3; without it, our methodology would not work. The
result of this chapter presents a way of justifying this apparently unrealistic
abstraction.
More precisely, we show the following:
If a protocol is secure under the strong typing abstraction, then
it is secure under the tagging scheme.
In other words, this tagging scheme implements the strong typing abstrac-
tion. In fact, our approach is to show the following:
If there is an attack upon a protocol under the tagging scheme,
then there is an attack under the tagging scheme such that all
fields are correctly tagged.
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(We make the concept of ‘correctly tagged’ precise in the next section, but
essentially it means that all fields are tagged with a tag that represents their
true type.)
In the next section we describe how we can model protocols using tagged
messages. Our model is based upon the strand spaces model of [78]. We
use the strand spaces framework because it provides a particularly suitable
notation for the kind of reasoning required for the proof. However, the results
are general and may be applied to other approaches to the analysis of security
protocols (in the context of the Dolev-Yao model) such as those in [39, 40,
54, 67].
In Section 6.3 we prove our claim that this tagging scheme prevents all
type flaw attacks. We sum up, and discuss possible implementations for the
tagging scheme, in Section 6.4.
6.2 Modelling protocols
In this section we present the model we shall be using to prove the main
result of this chapter; this model will be based upon the strand spaces model
described at length in Chapter 5. We describe how we model tagged facts1,
and define what it means for a tagged fact to be correctly tagged. We then
give a brief overview of the strand spaces model, showing how we model hon-
est participants and penetrator capabilities. We also explain how breaches
of security, and hence security properties, may be expressed in the strand
spaces model.
6.2.1 Tags and facts
We assume some set Atom of atomic values, partitioned into types Agent ,
Nonce, PublicKey , etc. By partitioning the types in this way, we assume that
each atomic value has a unique true type: for values introduced by an honest
agent, this will be the type that the honest agent intended for the value; the
penetrator, however, will be allowed to tag such values with a different type.
Tags
We assume that there is a tag corresponding to each base type; we shall
adopt obvious names for such tags. We shall also assume tag ‘constructors’
for pairing and encryption.
1In this chapter we use the term ‘fact’ for a message or part of a message, reserving
the word ‘message’ for a complete message of the protocol in question.
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Definition 6.2.1. The types of tags may be defined as follows:
Tag ::= agent | nonce | pubkey | · · · | pair | encTag∗Tag .
We assume that the tag for an encryption includes an indication of the
encryption algorithm (e.g. DES or RSA public key encryption) that is claimed
to have been used to produce the message. We include this algorithm tag
because we want to be able to model the case in which a key is used in
the wrong algorithm. More precisely, we associate algorithms with types
of keys (e.g. associating RSA public key encryption with the type of RSA
public keys) and include the tag for that key type within the encryption
tag. We include also the type of the body (as a sequence of tags) within the
encryption tag. So enc 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 kt will indicate a tag that claims that the
accompanying fact is encrypted with a key of type kt (using the appropriate
algorithm), and in which the body is a sequence of facts with tags t1, . . . , tn ;
we shall abbreviate this tag to {|t1, . . . , tn |}kt .
Tagged facts
We similarly define a type of tagged facts. We represent such tagged facts
as (Tag ,Fact) pairs, in which the tag gives the claimed type of the fact; the
facts themselves are built up from atoms using constructors for pairing and
encryption.
Definition 6.2.2. A tagged fact has the following type:
TaggedFact ::= Tag × Fact
Fact ::= Atom | pair TaggedFact TaggedFact |
encrypt Tag TaggedFact Fact
pair tf 1 tf 2 represents a fact formed by concatenating tagged facts tf 1
and tf 2. For example, a correctly tagged pair of nonces (N 1,N 2) would be
written as (pair, pair (nonce,N 1) (nonce,N 2)). We shall write (tf 1, tf 2) as an
abbreviation for (pair, pair tf 1 tf 2). We shall drop superfluous parentheses
within nested pairing, writing, for example, (tf 1, tf 2, tf 3); we shall drop such
parentheses completely when the pair forms the body of an encryption.
encrypt kt tf k represents tagged fact tf encrypted using key k and al-
gorithm corresponding to kt ; we shall abbreviate this to {tf }ktk , and shall
tend to drop the kt in cases in which it matches the type of k .
Note that although we drop Assumption 3.2.3 in this chapter, we shall
continue to adopt Assumption 2.2.2; that is, we shall still assume that an hon-
est agent can tell whether he has correctly decrypted a message, i.e. whether
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the decrypting key and algorithm he used to decrypt the message correspond
to the encrypting key and algorithm used to create the message. This can
be implemented by including sufficient redundancy within the encryption.
Note also that the type of the body of an encryption is included both
inside and outside the encryption, for example:
({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key,
{(agent,A), (agent,B), (nonce,NB )}SH (B ,S)),
which is a shorthand for
( enc 〈agent, agent, nonce〉 shared-key,
encrypt shared-key
(pair, pair(pair, pair (agent,A) (agent,B))(nonce,NB))
SH (B , S )
) .
We shall often want to talk about the tag or fact components from a
tagged fact, so we define projection functions as follows:
(t , f )1 =̂ t , (t , f )2 =̂ f .
Subfacts
We shall want to talk about the sub-tagged-facts of a tagged fact.
Definition 6.2.3. The subfact relation is defined as the smallest relation
such that:
• tf ⊏ tf ;
• tf ⊏ (t , (tf 1, tf 2)) if tf ⊏ tf 1 or tf ⊏ tf 2;
• tf ⊏ (t , {tf ′}k) if tf ⊏ tf
′.
This is the analogue for tagged facts of the subterm relation in Chapter 5,
in which the relation was defined in terms of ideals.
We shall also want to talk about the sub-untagged-facts of a tagged fact.
We shall write f ⊏ tf if (t , f ) ⊏ tf for some tag t .
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Correct tagging
We now define what it means for a tagged fact to be correctly tagged. We
define this inductively over the structure of tags.
Definition 6.2.4. A well-tagged fact is a fact that satisfies the well-tagged
predicate, defined as follows:
well-tagged(agent, x )⇔ x ∈ Agent
well-tagged(nonce, x )⇔ x ∈ Nonce
. . .
well-tagged(pair, x )⇔ ∃ tf 1, tf 2 : TaggedFact •
x = pair tf 1 tf 2
∧ well-tagged tf 1 ∧ well-tagged tf 2
well-tagged({|ts|}kt , x )⇔ ∃ tf : TaggedFact ; k : Fact •
x = {tf }ktk ∧ well-tagged(tf )
∧ well-tagged(kt , k) ∧ ts = get-tags tf
where get-tags returns the sequence of tags labelling the body of an encryp-
tion:
get-tags(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)) = get-tags tf 1a get-tags tf 2
get-tags(t , f ) = 〈t〉. (t 6= pair)
Note that for an encryption, the tag for the key must match the encryption
algorithm used and also the type of the key used.
It is also useful to characterise when a message is correctly tagged at the
outermost level.
Definition 6.2.5. Tagged facts that are top-level-well-tagged are those that
satisfy the following predicate:
top-level-well-tagged(agent, x )⇔ x ∈ Agent
top-level-well-tagged(nonce, x )⇔ x ∈ Nonce
. . .
top-level-well-tagged(pair, x )⇔ ∃ tf 1, tf 2 : TaggedFact •
x = pair tf 1 tf 2
top-level-well-tagged({|ts|}kt , x )⇔ ∃ tf : TaggedFact ; k : Fact •
x = {tf }ktk ∧ ts = get-tags tf .
As with Definition 6.2.4, for an encryption, the key tag must match the
algorithm used for the encryption, but not necessarily the key used.
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6.2.2 Strand spaces
We shall be using the strand spaces model from [76, 78, 75, 77] as the basis
for our analysis in this chapter. We show here how we adapt the model to
deal with tagged facts.
Definition 6.2.6. A strand represents a sequence of communications by
either an honest agent or the penetrator. Formally, it is a sequence of the
form
〈±tf 1,±tf 2, ...,±tf n〉
where +tf represents the transmission of tagged fact tf and −tf represents
reception of tf . A node is any particular communication ±tf .
Definition 6.2.7. A graph structure is defined on strands by means of two
types of edge:
• If nodes ni and ni+1 are consecutive nodes on the same strand then
we write ni ⇒ ni+1. This represents the chronological sequence of
communications along a strand.
• If node ni = +tf and nj = −tf then we write ni → nj . This captures
communications from one strand to another.
Definition 6.2.8. A bundle represents a particular history of the network.
Formally, if C ⊆ (→ ∪ ⇒) is a finite set of edges, and NC the set of nodes
appearing on any edge in C, then C is a bundle if:
1. whenever n2 ∈ NC and n2 has negative sign, there exists a unique n1
such that n1 → n2 ∈ C;
2. whenever n2 ∈ NC and n1 ⇒ n2, we have n1 ⇒ n2 ∈ C;
3. C is acyclic.
We shall want to be able to talk about when a fact or tagged fact is first
transmitted. If S is a set of tagged facts, then a node n is an entry point to
S if the term of n is +tf for some tf ∈ S , and for each node n ′ previous to
n on the same strand, the term of n ′ is not in S . A tagged fact tf will be
said to originate on a node n if n is an entry point to the set {tf ′ | tf ⊏ tf ′}.
Similarly, an untagged fact f will be said to originate on a node n if n is an
entry point to the set {tf ′ | f ⊏ tf ′}. An untagged fact is uniquely originating
in a bundle C if it originates on a unique node of C.
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6.2.3 Honest strands
We assume that each roˆle in the protocol is defined by a strand template: a
sequence of templates for sent and received tagged facts, defining the opera-
tion of the agent in that roˆle.
The templates for tagged facts will make use of some set Var of variables,
and some set Fn of function identifiers (which will contain functions such as
PK , the public key function).
Definition 6.2.9. A tagged fact template may be defined as follows:
TaggedTemplate ::= Tag × Template
Template ::= Var | apply Fn Var ∗ |
pair TaggedTemplate TaggedTemplate |
encrypt Tag TaggedTemplate Template
The template apply g 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 represents the function g applied to the
variables v1, . . . , vn ; we shall denote this g(v1, . . . , vn).
Definition 6.2.10. A strand template is a finite sequence of tagged fact
templates.
For example, the roˆle played by b in the Woo and Lam Protocol pi1 would
be defined by the following sequence of templates (in which we are adopting
the same notational conventions as earlier):
temp =̂
〈 − (agent, a),
+ (nonce, nb),
− ({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key, x ),
+ ({|agent, agent, {|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key|}shared-key,
{(agent, a), (agent, b), ({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key, x )}SH (b,s)),
− ({|agent, agent, nonce|}shared-key,
{(agent, a), (agent, b), (nonce, nb)}SH (b,s))
〉.
Note that this strand uses five free variables: a, b, s , nb and x ; and also the
function SH . Note also that the encrypted component of the third message,
which b does not decrypt, is represented by a variable x , modelling that b
should accept any value for this component.
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Every strand representing an execution of a particular roˆle can be formed
by instantiating the free variables of the corresponding template, that is, by
substituting the free variables consistently with facts.
For example, in the case of the template above, a typical execution (in
which there has been no interference from the penetrator) may be formed
using the substitution function sub in which:
sub(a) = A
sub(b) = B
sub(s) = S
sub(nb) = NB
sub(x ) = {(agent,A), (agent,B), (nonce,NB)}SH (B ,S).
The execution in the attack described in Section 6.1 may be formed using
the substitution function:
sub(a) = A
sub(b) = B
sub(s) = S
sub(nb) = NB
sub(x ) = NB .
(We argued above that it is not possible to produce penetrator strands to
complete this attack.)
Implicit in the definition of a strand template is the assumption that
when an honest agent first sees a free variable in a message that he receives,
he will accept any value for the variable.
Definition 6.2.11. A substitution is a function:
sub : Var → Fact .
Such a function may be lifted to complete tagged templates as follows:
sub(t , v) = (t , sub(v)) (v ∈ Var)
sub(t , g(v1, . . . , vn)) = (t , g(sub(v1), . . . , sub(vn))) (g ∈ Fn)
where the function application is defined on compound facts as
sub(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)) = (pair, (sub(tf 1), sub(tf 2)))
sub({|ts|}tk , {tf }k) = {|ts|}tk , {sub(tf )}sub(tk ,k)2)
and hence lifted to strand templates by applying sub to each message in turn.
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We shall assume that each strand template is consistently tagged, in the
sense that the same tags are always given to the same variables.
Definition 6.2.12. We define a type environment to be a function:
ψ : (Var → Tag) ∪ (Fn → Tag∗ × Tag)
The idea is:
• for v ∈ Var , ψ(v) gives the tag that v should receive, or, equivalently,
the type with which v should be instantiated;
• for g ∈ Fn, ψ(g) will be a pair of the form
(〈t1, . . . , tn〉, t),
where t1, . . . , tn give the types of the arguments of f , and t gives the
type of the result.
We may then define a tagged template to be well tagged with respect
to ψ as follows.
Definition 6.2.13. A tagged template is well tagged with respect to ψ if it
satisfies
well-taggedψ(t , v)⇔ t = ψ(v), (v ∈ Var)
well-taggedψ(t , g(v1, . . . , vn))⇔ ψ(g) = (〈ψ(v1), . . . , ψ(vn)〉, t), (g ∈ Fn)
well-taggedψ(t , pair tt1 tt2)⇔ t = pair
∧ well-taggedψ(tt1)
∧ well-taggedψ(tt2),
well-taggedψ(t , {tt}
kt
k )⇔ t = {|get-tags(tt)|}kt
∧ well-taggedψ(tt)
∧ well-taggedψ(kt , k),
where get-tags is defined analogously to earlier.
Our assumption about strand templates being consistently tagged can be
captured as follows.
Assumption 6.2.14. For each strand template temp, there is some type
environment ψ such that all the tagged fact templates of temp are well tagged
with respect to ψ.
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One corollary of this assumption is that each variable in a strand template
receives a unique tag.
We shall assume that the functions in Fn are partial, and defined only
when they are applied to arguments of the correct types. For example, if we
have a function PK that is intended to return an agent’s public key, PK (N )
will not be defined for a nonce N . We assume that if the arguments v1, . . . , vn
of a function g have tags t1, . . . , tn , then g(x1, . . . , xn) will be defined only if
(t1, x1), . . . , (tn , xn) are all well tagged.
We assume that the honest agents correctly follow the tagging scheme.
This can be encapsulated in the following assumption.
Assumption 6.2.15. If the tagged fact (t , f ) originates on a regular strand,
then top-level-well-tagged(t , f ).
This assumption has a number of facets.
• If an agent introduces an atomic term for a variable, then he introduces
a value of the expected type.
• An honest agent will tag a fact as being a pair only if it was indeed
created as a pair.
• An honest agent will tag a fact as being an encryption only if it is
indeed created as an encryption; in this case the encryption tag will
include the identity of the algorithm used, and the tags of the body;
however, the key used for the encryption might not be of the expected
type, because the honest agent might have received an ill-tagged key
from the penetrator.
The above discussion has suggested that the bundle under analysis con-
tains honest strands from a single protocol. In fact, this is not necessary:
when we consider bundles containing honest strands from several different
protocols, as done in [77], our results apply equally well.
6.2.4 Penetrator strands
As in Chapter 5, we assume that there is some set of messages that the pen-
etrator can produce himself. In Chapter 5, this is was a set of atomic values;
in contrast, we assume some larger set T that contains some compound facts
as well. We shall say more about this set below. We shall also assume some
set KP of keys that the penetrator has available.
Penetrator strands under the tagging scheme are exactly analogous to
those set out in Definition 5.2.10 in the standard strands model, but with
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the addition of a type of strand R representing manipulation of top-level
tags.
Definition 6.2.16. A penetrator strand is one of the following:
M Text message 〈+(t , x )〉 for x ∈ T , with (t , x ) well-tagged.
F Flushing 〈−tf 〉.
T Tee 〈−tf ,+tf ,+tf 〉.
C Concatenation 〈−tf , −tf ′, +(pair, (tf , tf ′))〉.
S Separation 〈−(pair, (tf , tf ′)), +tf , +tf ′〉
K Key 〈+(tk , k)〉 with well-tagged(tk , k) and k ∈ KP .
E Encryption 〈−(tk , k), −tf , +({|ts|}tk , {tf }tkk )〉, where ts = get-tags(tf ).
D Decryption 〈−(tk ′, k ′), −({|t |}tk , {tf }tkk ), +tf 〉, where the tags tk and tk
′
represent inverse key types, and k ′ is the decrypting key corresponding
to k when they are considered as keys of types tk ′ and tk respectively.
R Retagging 〈−(t , f ),+(t ′, f )〉.
This definition is parameterised by the set T .
Note that the retagging strand applies only to the top level tag, and that
all other strands do not interfere with the tags of their messages. However,
this does not necessarily prevent inner components from being retagged; for
example, one component of a pair may be retagged by separation, retagging
that component, and then concatenation.
Note that when the penetrator produces a fact, it is initially correctly
tagged at the top level:
Lemma 6.2.17. If fact f originates on a penetrator strand, then it does so
with a tag t such that top-level-well-tagged(t , f ).
Proof. The only strands that can be the origin of a fact areM, C, K, and E;
in each case, the fact produced is indeed well-tagged at the top level.
Of course, the above does not prevent the penetrator from changing the
tag after the fact is produced; the following lemma shows that the only place
this retagging may occur is on a retagging strand.
Lemma 6.2.18. Every top-level-ill-tagged fact (t , f ) originates on a strand
of type R.
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Proof. Assumption 6.2.15 tells us that top-level-ill-tagged facts do not origi-
nate on honest strands. An argument similar to that in the previous lemma
rules out all penetrator strands other than R strands.
6.2.5 Security properties and attacks
In this section we consider two typical security properties, namely secrecy
and authentication, and produce generic definitions of each. Our definitions
are obtained by generalizing those given in [78], in which the authors consider
these properties for specific protocols.
The definitions given by Thayer, Guttman and Herzog talk about proper-
ties that should hold of the protocol under the assumption that the penetrator
does not have access to certain sets of keys. For example, the properties one
would expect to hold will depend on whether or not an agent is running the
protocol with either the penetrator or someone whose secret key has been
compromised. Our definition will generalise this to a set Keys , represent-
ing some keys that the penetrator may or may not have; this will be a set
of function templates, for example {SK (a), SK (b)}, representing the secret
keys of the agents a and b. Given a substitution function sub for a particular
strand, each key k ∈ Keys will take the value sub(k); recall that we assume
that the penetrator has access to the set of keys KP ; hence we may say that
the penetrator knows none of the keys as follows:
∀ k ∈ Keys • sub(k) /∈ KP .
Secrecy
We now give a generic definition of secrecy. The definition will say that there
is a breach of security when there is some strand (of some minimal length) in
which certain keys have not been compromised, and the value of a particular
variable v (intended to remain secret) becomes known to the penetrator.
Definition 6.2.19. Let temp be the template for some roˆle; let (t , v) be a
tagged variable of temp; let h be a positive integer; and let Keys be a set
of function templates. We define a failure of secrecy to be where all of the
following hold:
1. There is a strand s = sub(temp) with C-height at least h (i.e. at least
the first h messages of s appear in the bundle C).
2. ∀ k ∈ Keys • sub(k) /∈ KP .
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3. There is a node in C with label +sub(t , v).
This definition is parameterised by temp, v , h and Keys ; in any given proto-
col, one would be interested in knowing whether this property holds for some
particular values of these parameters.
Authentication
We now consider the property of authentication. We consider what it means
for a particular roˆle r2 to be authenticated to another roˆle r1. For authen-
tication to hold, we would expect that whenever there is a strand s1 of r1,
there would be a ‘corresponding’ strand s2 of r2; these strands should agree
upon the identities of the agents involved, and possibly upon the values of
some other variables (e.g. a session key that is established); we capture this
aspect by specifying that the strands should agree on the values of all vari-
ables from some set X . (We are assuming here that these variables are given
the same names in the two different templates; this is not strictly necessary,
but simplifies the notation.)
Definition 6.2.20. Let temp1 and temp2 be templates for two roˆles; let X
be a set of variables occurring in those templates; let h1 and h2 be positive
integers; and let Keys be a set of function templates. We define a failure of
authentication to be where all of the following hold:
1. There is a strand s1 = sub1(temp1) with C-height at least h1.
2. ∀ k ∈ Keys • sub1(k) /∈ KP .
3. There is no strand s2 = sub2(temp2) with C-height at least h2 such
that ∀ x ∈ X • sub1(x ) = sub2(x ).
This definition is parameterised by temp1, temp2, X , h1, h2 and Keys .
6.3 How tagging prevents type flaw attacks
In this section we prove our main result, that if there is an attack upon a
protocol under the tagging scheme, then there is an attack under the tagging
scheme such that all fields are correctly tagged. More precisely, we show
that whenever there is an attack upon a protocol under the tagging scheme,
then we can construct a renaming function φ over tagged facts, such that
uniformly renaming all tagged facts under this function produces an attack
in which all fields are correctly tagged.
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Informally, if an honest agent is willing to accept some ill-tagged fact
(t , f ), then that agent’s behaviour must be essentially independent of f , and
so he should be willing to accept any value in its place; in particular, he
should be willing to accept the tagged fact φ(t , f ) (which will have the tag t)
in place of (t , f ). We proceed as follows:
1. In Section 6.3.1 we define the properties that φ must satisfy, and show
that such a renaming function can always be constructed.
2. In Section 6.3.2 we show that if S is an honest strand, then φ(S )
(renaming all the facts of S by φ) is also an honest strand.
3. In Section 6.3.3 we similarly show that if S is a penetrator strand, then
there are one or two penetrator strands having the same set of nodes
as φ(S ), although possibly with a slightly different strand structure.
4. In Section 6.3.4 we show that given a bundle C, there is a corresponding
bundle C′ in which all terms are well-tagged; this bundle will contain
the same set of terms on its nodes as φ(C), although possibly with a
slightly different strand structure; we also show that a fact is uniquely
originating in C′ if it is uniquely originating in C.
5. Finally, in Section 6.3.5 we show that if there is an attack in C, then
there is similarly an attack in C′.
6.3.1 Defining the renaming function
The following definition captures the required properties of φ.
Definition 6.3.1. Given a bundle C, we define
φ : TaggedFact → TaggedFact
to be a renaming function for C if:
1. φ preserves top-level tags: if φ(t , f ) = (t ′, f ′) then t = t ′.
2. φ returns well-tagged terms: well-tagged(φ(tf )).
3. φ is the identity function over well-tagged terms: if well-tagged(tf ) then
φ(tf ) = tf .
4. φ distributes through concatenations that are top-level-well-tagged:
φ(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)) = (pair, (φ(tf 1), φ(tf 2))).
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5. φ distributes through encryptions that are top-level-well-tagged:
φ({|ts|}tk , {tf }
tk
k ) = ({|ts|}tk , {φ(tf )}
tk
φ(tk ,k)2
), if ts = get-tags(tf ).
6. φ respects inverses of keys: if k and k ′ are inverses of one another,
when considered as keys of types tk and tk ′, then φ(tk , k) and φ(tk ′, k ′)
are also inverses of one another, when considered as keys of types tk
and tk ′.
7. If (t , f ) appears in C, and (t , f ) is top-level-ill-tagged, then φ(t , f ) ∈
T . (Recall that T is the set of messages the penetrator can produce
himself.)
8. When φ is applied to a top-level-ill-tagged fact tf of C, it produces
a fact that is essentially new; that is, a fact that has no subfact in
common with φ(tf ′) for any other fact tf ′ of C:
∀ tf , tf ′ ∈ facts(C) •
¬ top-level-well-tagged(tf ) ∧ f ⊏ φ(tf ) ∧ tf 6⊏ tf ′ ⇒ f 6⊏ φ(tf ′),
where facts(C) is the set of all the facts and subfacts of nodes of C.
Note that condition 8 implies that φ is injective over the facts of C.
We now show that it is always possible to find a renaming function.
Lemma 6.3.2. Given a bundle C there is some renaming function φ for C.
Proof. The following method gives a recipe for constructing a renaming func-
tion φ. We build the definition of φ from the bottom up, defining it over the
subfacts of a fact before the fact itself. Consider, then, a tagged fact (t , f ),
and suppose we have defined φ over all subfacts of f . We use a case analysis
to construct φ(t , f ):
1. If ¬ top-level-well-tagged(t , f ) then pick a new value f ′ from T (for
condition 7) such that well-tagged(t , f ′), and none of the atoms of f ′
has been used previously (for condition 8); define φ(t , f ) = (t , f ′).
One proviso to this concerns keys: we should define φ over pairs of
inverse keys simultaneously. If k1 and k2 are inverses of one an-
other, when considered as keys of types tk1 and tk2, then pick k1′ and
k2′ from T such that: well-tagged(tk1, k1′) and well-tagged(tk2, k2′);
(tk1, k1′) and (tk2, k2′) are inverses; and none of the atoms of k1′
or k2′ has been used previously. Then define φ(tk1, k1) = (tk1, k1′)
and φ(tk2, k2) = (tk2, k2′).
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2. If well-tagged(t , f ) then define φ(t , f ) = (t , f ) (for condition 3).
3. If (t , f ) = (pair, (tf 1, tf 2)) then define φ(t , f ) = (pair, (φ(tf 1), φ(tf 2)))
(for condition 4).
4. If (t , f ) = ({|ts|}tk , {tf }tkk ) with ts = get-tags(tf ) then define φ(t , f ) =
({|ts|}tk , {φ(tf )}
tk
φ(tk ,k)2
) (for condition 5).
The only assumption we need is that T is big enough: we need to assume
that the penetrator has access to sufficient supplies of values that he can
always produce a new value in step 1. In practice, it is reasonable to assume
that he is always able to produce new atomic facts, and use these to create
new compound facts.
6.3.2 Regular strands
In this section we show that if S is a regular strand, then so is φ(S ). By
definition, S must be an instantiation of a strand template temp under some
substitution function sub. Consider the strand S ′ formed by instantiating
temp using the substitution function sub ′ defined by:
sub ′(v) = φ(t , sub(v))2 where t is the unique tag for v in temp.
Note that S ′ is also a regular strand, from our definition. The following
lemma shows that the translation from S to S ′ corresponds to a renaming
under φ, i.e. φ(S ) = S ′.
Lemma 6.3.3. Let temp, φ, sub and sub ′ be as above; then
φ(sub(temp)) = sub ′(temp).
Proof. Let tt be a tagged template in temp. We show that φ(sub(tt)) =
sub ′(tt). Assumption 6.2.14 allows us to proceed by induction over the struc-
ture of tt as follows:
• Case tt is a variable, say tt = (t , v); then:
φ(sub(tt))
= φ(t , sub(v))
= (t , sub ′(v)) (by definition of sub ′)
= sub ′(tt)
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• Case tt is a function application, say
tt = (t , g(v1, . . . , vn)).
For sub(tt) to be defined, we must have that (ti , sub(vi)) is correctly
tagged for 1 6 i 6 n, where in each case ti is the tag for vi in tt . Hence
φ(ti , sub(vi)) = (ti , sub(vi)) for each i . So:
φ(sub(tt))
= φ(t , g(sub(v1), . . . , sub(vn)))
= (t , g(φ(t1, sub(v1))2, . . . , φ(tn , sub(vn))2)) (using above)
= (t , g(sub ′(v1), . . . , sub
′(vn))) (def. of sub
′)
= sub ′(tt).
• Case tt is a pair, say tt = (pair, (tf 1, tf 2)); then:
φ(sub(tt))
= φ(pair, (sub(tf 1), sub(tf 2)))
= (pair, (φ(sub(tf 1)), φ(sub(tf 2)))) (def. 6.3.1 cond. 4)
= (pair, (sub ′(tf 1), sub ′(tf 2))) (ind. hypothesis)
= sub ′(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)).
• Case tt is an encryption, say
tt = ({|t ′|}kt , {(t
′, f ′)}k).
Then:
φ(sub({|t ′|}kt , {(t
′, f ′)}k))
= φ({|t ′|}kt , sub({(t
′, f ′)}sub(k))
= ({|t ′|}kt , {φ(sub(t
′, f ′))}φ((kt ,sub(k))2) (def. 6.3.1 cond. 5)
= ({|t ′|}kt , {sub
′(t ′, f ′)}sub′(kt ,k)2 (ind. hypothesis)
= sub ′(({|t ′|}kt , {(t
′, f ′)}k)).
6.3.3 Penetrator strands
We now show that given the penetrator strands of C and a renaming function
φ, we can construct corresponding strands in a bundle C ′, formed by replacing
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each tagged fact tf in C by φ(tf ). We consider the possible cases one by one,
giving the strand S in C and its corresponding strand S ′ in C ′. In the case
of the R strand, we shall change the strand structure, but we shall keep the
same set of tagged facts.
M Text message
Let S = 〈+(t , x )〉 with x ∈ T and well-tagged(t , x ). Define S ′ =
〈+φ(t , x )〉, which is an M strand because φ(t , x ) = (t , x ) and x ∈ T .
F Flushing
Let S = 〈−tf 〉. Define S ′ = 〈−φ(tf )〉, which is an F strand.
T Tee
Let S = 〈−tf ,+tf ,+tf 〉. Define
S ′ = 〈−φ(tf ),+φ(tf ),+φ(tf )〉,
which is a T strand.
C Concatenation
Let S = 〈−tf 1, −tf 2, +(pair, (tf 1, tf 2))〉. Define
S ′ = 〈−φ(tf 1), −φ(tf 2), +φ(pair, (tf 1, tf 2))〉
which is a valid concatenation strand, because
φ(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)) = (pair, (φ(tf 1), φ(tf 2)))
by condition 4 of Definition 6.3.1.
S Separation
Let S = 〈−(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)), +tf 1, +tf 2〉. Define
S ′ = 〈−φ(pair, (tf 1, tf 2)), +φ(tf 1), +φ(tf 2)〉
which is a valid separation strand, again by condition 4 of Defini-
tion 6.3.1.
K Key
Let S = 〈+(tk , k)〉 with well-tagged(tk , k) and k ∈ KP . Define S ′ =
〈+φ(tk , k)〉 = 〈+(tk , k)〉, which is a K strand.
E Encryption
Let S = 〈−(tk , k), −tf , +({|ts|}tk , {tf }tkk )〉 where ts = get-tags(tf ). De-
fine
S ′ = 〈−φ(tk , k), −φ(tf ), +φ({|ts|}tk , {tf }
tk
k )〉
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which is a valid encryption strand because
φ({|ts|}tk , {tf }
tk
k ) = ({|ts|}tk , {φ(tf )}
tk
φ(tk ,k)2)
by condition 5 of Definition 6.3.1.
D Decryption
Let S = 〈−(tk ′, k ′), −({|ts|}tk , {tf }tkk ), +tf 〉, with k and k
′ inverses of
one another. Define
S ′ = 〈−φ(tk ′, k ′), −φ({|ts|}tk , {tf }
tk
k ), +φ(tf )〉
which is a valid decryption strand, because
φ({|ts|}tk , {tf }
tk
k ) = ({|ts|}tk , {φ(tf )}
tk
φ(tk ,k)2)
by condition 5 of Definition 6.3.1, and φ(tk ′, k ′) and φ(tk , k) are inverses
of one another by condition 6 of Definition 6.3.1.
R Retagging
Let S = 〈−(t1, f ),+(t0, f )〉. We proceed in two stages. We first con-
struct the pair of strands 〈−φ(t1, f )〉, which is a strand of type F, and
〈+φ(t0, f )〉. If ¬ top-level-well-tagged(t0, f ) then this latter strand is
of type M, from condition 7 of Definition 6.3.1, and we are done; see
Figure 6.1 for a depiction of the strands in C and C′.
C C′
−(t1, f )
+(t0, f )
−φ(t1, f )
+φ(t0, f )
R
M
F
Figure 6.1: Replacing R strands (part 1)
Otherwise, top-level-well-tagged(t0, f ), i.e. S retags f with a correct tag.
Let n0 and n0′ be the negative and positive nodes of S respectively.
See Figure 6.2. We show that some earlier R strand, possibly this
one, has initial node labelled with −(t0, f ). If t1 = t0 we are done.
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Otherwise (t1, f ) is top-level-ill-tagged, and so (t1, f ) originated on
another R strand, from Lemma 6.2.18. We proceed similarly with this
R strand: let n1 and n1′ be the two nodes, and let the term on the first
node be −(t2, f ); if t2 = t0 we are done; otherwise (t2, f ) originated
on another R strand. Continuing in this way, we can form a sequence
of earlier and earlier R strands, each retagging f . Because the bundle
is finite, this process must eventually stop, by reaching an R strand
in which the first node, call it nk , has label −(t0, f ). Let n be the
predecessor under → of nk .
nk ′
nkn
n1′
n0′
n1
n0
(t0, f )
(t0, f )
+(t1, f )
+(tk , f )
−(t1, f )
−(t2, f )
R
R
R
Figure 6.2: Replacing R strands (part 2)
We can construct new strands in C ′ as in Figure 6.3. Nodes n0′ and nk
are removed; each of the other negative nodes on the R strands is
replaced by an F strand; each of the other positive nodes on the R
strands is replaced by an M strand (these nodes were ill-tagged in C,
so the corresponding facts in C ′ are elements of T ); if n0′ had a→ suc-
cessor in C then the corresponding node in C ′ becomes the→ successor
of φ(n).
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+φ
+φ
−φ
−φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
(nk ′)
(n)
(n1′)
(n1)
(n0)
(t0, f )
(t1, f )
(t1, f )
(t2, f )
(tk , f )
M
M
F
F
Figure 6.3: Replacing R strands (part 3)
6.3.4 Bundles and unique origination
We have described, above, how the nodes from bundle C are replaced with
nodes in bundle C′. The graph structure of C ′ is mostly the same as that of
C, with each edge of the form +n → −n in C replaced by an edge +φ(n)→
−φ(n) in C ′; the exception concerns R strands, which are dealt with above.
We now consider the question of unique origination. We produce a bun-
dle C′′ with the same honest strands as C ′, but with the property that no term
is non-uniquely originating in the new bundle unless it was non-uniquely orig-
inating in C.
First, note that if fact f0 originates on an honest node in C
′, then f0 origi-
nates on the corresponding honest node in C. There are three circumstances
under which f0 can originate on a penetrator strand in C
′:
1. f0 originates on an M strand corresponding to an occurrence of f0 on
the corresponding M strand in C;
2. f0 originates on a K strand corresponding to an occurrence of f0 on the
corresponding K strand in C;
3. f0 originates on an M strand corresponding to an occurrence of a top-
level-ill-tagged term (t , f ) on an R strand in C, with f0 ⊏ φ(t , f ).
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The first two of these possibilities do not raise any problems for us, for if the
term originates multiple times in C′ in these ways, then f0 originates multiple
times in C. However, the third possibility introduces an origin not present
in C. We produce a new bundle C′′ by replacing the M strands from C ′
appropriately.
Note that if one origin of f0 corresponds to case 3, above, then every origin
of f0 will correspond to case 3, because of condition 8 of Definition 6.3.1.
Suppose there are multiple such origins for f0 in C
′, say k in number. We
form C ′′ by replacing the k such M strands by a single M strand and k − 1
T strands, as illustrated in Figure 6.4 in the case k = 3.
φ(t , f )
φ(t , f )
φ(t , f )
φ(t , f )
φ(t , f )M
T
T
Figure 6.4: Achieving unique origination
The results of the previous four subsections may be summarised in the
following theorem:
Theorem 6.3.4. If C is a bundle (under our tagging scheme) then there is
a renaming function φ and a bundle C′′, such that:
• C′′ contains the tagged facts of C (considered as a set), renamed by φ;
• C′′ contains the same honest strands as C, modulo the above renaming;
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• facts are uniquely originating in C′′ if they were uniquely originating
in C;
• all tagged facts in C′′ are well-tagged.
6.3.5 Attacks
We now show that attacks upon the protocol are preserved by the trans-
formation above. We show that if there is an attack in C, then there is a
corresponding attack in C′′; that is, essentially the same attack will work,
but using well-tagged facts.
Secrecy
Following Definition 6.2.19, suppose there is a failure of secrecy in C as fol-
lows:
1. There is a strand s = sub(temp) with C-height at least h.
2. ∀ k ∈ Keys • sub(k) /∈ KP .
3. There is a node n with label +sub(t , v).
We show that there is a corresponding attack in C′′. Let substitution sub ′ be
defined as in Section 6.3.2:
sub ′(v) = φ(t , sub(v))2
where t is the unique tag for v in temp. Then:
1. There is a strand s ′ = sub ′(temp) = φ(sub(temp)) with C′′-height at
least h, corresponding to s , from the way we have constructed the
honest strands of C′′.
2. ∀ k ∈ Keys • sub ′(k) /∈ KP , because sub ′(k) = sub(k) for such k .
3. The node corresponding to n will have label
+sub ′(t , v) = φ(sub(t , v)).
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Authentication
Following Definition 6.2.20, suppose there is an failure of authentication in C
as follows:
1. There is a strand s1 = sub1(temp1) with C-height at least h1.
2. ∀ k ∈ Keys • sub1(k) /∈ KP .
3. There is no strand s2 = sub2(temp2) with C-height at least h2 such
that ∀ x ∈ X • sub1(x ) = sub2(x ).
We show that there is a corresponding attack in C ′′. Let substitution sub1′
be defined as in Section 6.3.2:
sub1′(v) = φ(t , sub1(v))2
where t is the unique tag for v in temp1. Then:
1. There is a strand
s1′ = sub1′(temp1) = φ(sub1(temp1))
with C′′-height at least h1, corresponding to s1, from the way we have
constructed the honest strands of C′′.
2. ∀ k ∈ Keys • sub1′(k) /∈ KP , because sub1′(k) = sub1(k) for such k .
3. There is no strand s2′ = sub2′(temp2) with C′′-height at least h2 such
that ∀ x ∈ X • sub1′(x ) = sub2′(x ). Suppose there were such an s2′;
then, by the way we have constructed the honest strands in C ′′, s2′
would correspond to some strand s2′′ = sub2′′(temp2) with C-height at
least h2 such that:
∀ v ∈ Var • sub2′(v) = φ(t , sub2′′(v))2
where t is the unique tag for v in temp2. But then we would have for
every x ∈ X :
φ(t , sub1(x ))2 = sub1
′(x )
= sub2′(x )
= φ(t , sub2′′(x ))2
where t is the tag for x in temp1 and temp2. But then by the injectivity
of φ we would have sub1(x ) = sub2′′(x ), contradicting part 3 of the
assumption.
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6.3.6 Example
We now show how the results of this chapter apply to Lowe’s adapted version
of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol, whose seven-message version
was considered in Section 6.1. The two roˆles of this protocol can be defined
by the strand templates:
Init =̂ 〈+ ({|nonce, agent|}public-key, {(nonce, na), (agent, a)}PK (b)),
− ({|nonce, nonce, agent|}public-key,
{(nonce, na), (nonce, nb), (agent, a)}PK (a)),
+ ({|nonce|}public-key, {(nonce, nb)}PK (b))
〉
and
Resp =̂ 〈 − ({|nonce, agent|}public-key, {(nonce, na), (agent, a)}PK (b)),
+ ({|nonce, nonce, agent|}public-key,
{(nonce, na), (nonce, nb), (agent, a)}PK (a)),
− ({|nonce|}public-key, {(nonce, nb)}PK (b))
〉
The analysis of this protocol in [78] establishes a number of properties of
the protocol, under the strong typing abstraction, and under the additional
assumptions that the responder never introduces the same value for nb as
that received for na, and that nonces are uniquely originating.
For example, in Proposition 5.2 of that paper, the following ‘responder’s
guarantee’ is established: in any bundle in which there is a responder’s strand
s1 = sub1(Resp) such that sub1(SK (a)) /∈ KP , there is a corresponding
initiator’s strand s2 = sub2(Init) such that sub1 and sub2 agree on a, b,
na and nb. This means that there is no failure of authentication under our
Definition 6.2.20 (with temp1 = Resp, temp2 = Init , X = {a, b, na, nb},
h1 = 3, h2 = 3 and Keys = {SK (a)} in the notation of that definition).
We may immediately apply the main result of this paper to deduce that
there is still no failure of authentication when the strong typing abstraction
is dropped, provided that the tagging scheme is used when implementing the
protocol.
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6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have shown that all type flaw attacks may be cheaply
prevented by tagging each field with its intended type, and having honest
participants check the tags of incoming messages. Our results generate no
extra work in implementing protocols save adding a few extra bits of infor-
mation into each message of the protocol. In addition, they generate no extra
work in protocol analysis: protocols that have been proved correct under the
strong typing abstraction are automatically proved secure under our tagging
scheme.
We have considered the properties of secrecy and authentication, but
would expect the results to apply for other security properties, such as
anonymity and non-repudiation, that can also be expressed in terms of cor-
respondences between agent strands.
The key idea of the proof of the result was to show that any bundle corre-
sponding to runs of the protocol can be transformed into another bundle in
which all messages are correctly tagged, with equivalent strands of the pro-
tocol agents, and equivalent information available to the penetrator. Hence,
if there is such a bundle corresponding to an attack, then its transformation
corresponds to an essentially similar but well-tagged attack, demonstrating
that the attack is not essentially based on a type flaw. Such a transformation
is possible because of the requirement that protocol agents check all the tags
to which they have access. Ill-tagged messages will not affect the agent’s
behaviour in any essential way, and so might as well be replaced by messages
that do have the correct tags. This is what is achieved by the renaming
function φ.
6.4.1 Implementing the tagging scheme
One possible approach to implementation of the type-tagging scheme is to
follow the structure of the Tag type. We could construct distinct bit pat-
terns for each atomic type, and two more bit patterns to indicate a pair or
encryption. Compound types could then be represented by concatenations
of these basic bit patterns.
However, this would be somewhat inefficient, especially with complex
types. A better approach is to identify all of the different types which are
used in the execution of the protocol, and assign a unique tag number to
each (with each tag number containing the same number of bits, to ensure
unique readability).
Recall the seven-message version of Lowe’s fix of the Needham-Schroeder
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Public-Key Protocol discussed in Section 6.1:
Message 1. a → s : b
Message 2. s → a : {PK (b), b}SK (s)
Message 3. a → b : {na, a}PK (b)
Message 4. b → s : a
Message 5. s → b : {PK (a), a}SK (s)
Message 6. b → a : {na, nb, b}PK (a)
Message 7. a → b : {nb}PK (b).
This uses eight distinct types, and to each of these we could give a different
tag number, representable in three bits:
nonce = 0, {|public, agent|}secret = 4,
agent = 1, {|nonce, agent|}public = 5,
public = 2, {|nonce, nonce, agent|}public = 6,
pair = 3, {|nonce|}public = 7.
These type identifiers would then appear as the initial part of each mes-
sage, and inside pair types and encryption types. Under this approach, the
implementation would become:
Message 1. a → s : (1, b)
Message 2. s → a : (4, {(3, ((2,PK (b)), (1, b)))}SK (s))
Message 3. a → b : (5, {(3, ((0, na), (1, a)))}PK (b))
Message 4. b → s : (1, a)
Message 5. s → b : (4, {(3, ((2,PK (a)), (1, a)))}SK (s))
Message 6. b → a : (6, {(3, (0, na), (3, ((0, nb), (1, a))))}PK (a))
Message 7. a → b : (7, {(0, nb)}PK (b)).
As discussed earlier, we would still need to add information to the pair tag
giving the lengths of the components, and we would need to add redun-
dancy to the body of encryptions so as to implement the perfect encryption
assumption.
6.4.2 Choosing a tagging scheme
It is important to realise that the results presented here do not depend for
their validity on the exact type structure given in this chapter.
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The central theorem guarantees that using the tagging scheme will pre-
vent attacks that rely on type confusion between two types that have distinct
tags. Different tagging schemes distinguish different types, resulting in dif-
ferent guarantees about what type flaw attacks will be prevented. So, for
instance, if we used a tagging scheme of
Tag ::= atom | pair | encTag∗Tag
then we would prevent all attacks involving passing off atoms as encryptions
or pairs, but not attacks in which a nonce is used in place of an agent’s
identity.
Furthermore, since the penetrator can always manipulate top-level tags
and tags that are not protected by an encryption, such tags provide no useful
guarantees and may be safely omitted. Thus in practice protocol implemen-
tations need only tag messages within encryptions, resulting in even less of
a tagging overhead.
We believe that the tagging scheme could be simplified further, by com-
bining the tags inside each encrypted component into a single component
number ; proving this formally is the subject of future work. In fact, using
component numbers in this way provides more protection than simply tag-
ging fields with their types, because it would prevent the penetrator replaying
one component in the place of another with the same type, for example, re-
playing the encrypted component from a Message 3 of the Woo and Lam
Protocol as a Message 5. The advantages of not allowing one component to
be replayed in the place of another are well understood; see, for example,
Principle 10 of [1]. Note that, of course, including a message number within
each encrypted component is not enough: different components within the
same message require different component numbers.
We anticipate that the work in this chapter will be of much use to protocol
analysers using model checkers, who often use techniques that will not detect
type flaw attacks. In such situations, it is a simple matter to decide which
tagging scheme to use: the tagging scheme used in the implementation of
the protocol should match the typing scheme in the model. In this way,
the model checker tests for attacks that do not rely on type flaws, and the
tagging scheme guarantees that the result may be extended to cover all type
confusion attacks not considered by the model checking.
The result presented in this chapter justifies the approach taken in Chap-
ter 3, in which we relied on the assumption that agents would accept incoming
messages only if they were of the correct type. The proof of Theorem 3.4.2 on
page 48 would fall apart without this assumption; but we have now proved
that a protocol proved correct under the assumptions of Chapter 3 will re-
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main correct when the message typing assumption is dropped, provided that
the tagging scheme is used in the implementation.
Chapter 7
Theory into practice: the
RankAnalyser program
An ounce of practice is worth a pound of precept.
—Sixteenth-century proverb
We look at the attainable; we look at the practical, and we have
too much English good sense to be drawn away by those sanguine
delineations of what might possibly be attained in Utopia
—W. E. Gladstone, House of Commons, 1884
Obviously on paper it’s a very good game. Do you think, in theory,
it’ll be one?
—Andrew Giddley
Tool support for analysis of security protocols has seen massive growth in
the last few years. Programs such as Casper (see Section 8.3.3) and The
NRL Protocol Analyzer (Section 8.4.2) have made the development of cor-
rect protocols a realistic aim, and have vastly increased confidence in claims
(and proofs) of correctness in academic literature. They have been of great
assistance in weeding out protocols that had long been thought secure but
had flaws.
The aim of such programs varies from case to case. Some are designed,
at least primarily, to prove correctness for protocols; some are intended for
discovering attacks. The level of automation varies considerably, with attack-
finding tools generally stronger in this area than protocol verification tools.
The extent to which human ingenuity is necessary to encode the protocol
into a suitable form, and then to interpret the results of the analysis, differs
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from one program to the next. Finally, the class of protocols that can be
successfully analysed by a given program is a considerable variable.
In this chapter, we introduce RankAnalyser , a tool developed by the
author of this thesis, designed to allow for automated analysis of a wide range
of protocols and requiring little human effort or skill to operate. It will find
attacks, and it will verify correct protocols. We believe that RankAnalyser
performs strongly in all areas considered above, and that it will prove of
considerable benefit to those wishing to engage in protocol analysis.
7.1 Introduction
RankAnalyser is a 32-bit program designed to run under Microsoft Windows
95/98/NT/2000 on an Intel i386 or better processor.
The program is fairly quick to operate. On a 450MHz Pentium II, it takes
only a few seconds to complete the analysis of each of the examples in this
chapter.
7.2 How the program works
The RankAnalyser program is an implementation of the rank functions ap-
proach to analysis of authentication protocols discussed in Chapter 3, and as
such is designed to analyse authentication protocols running on an arbitrarily
large network in the presence of a Dolev-Yao-style intruder.
The first step is for RankAnalyser to parse the input provided, in order
to convert the protocol into a suitable internal representation. During this
step, the protocol is divided into two parts (or three if a trusted server is
involved), each part representing the protocol from the viewpoint of one of
the participants. Pseudo-messages are added to the beginning and end of
the protocol to indicate successful commencement and termination of a run
of the protocol.
Second, a finite representation ofM0 by equivalence classes, as discussed
in Section 3.4, is generated. Those equivalence classes consisting of messages
in INIT are marked as being included in Z0(= INIT ).
Third, all ⊢-rules are encoded: every rule of the form S ⊢ m with S ⊆M0
and m ∈ M0 is represented by a rule stating that whenever E (s) ⊆ Zi for
every s ∈ S , then E (m) ⊆ Zi+1.
Fourth, the rules representing S → m are similarly encoded.
Fifth, the program calculates Z by iteratively constructing Zi+1 from Zi
until the fixed point is reached.
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Finally, a list of all messages in normal form is generated. For each
message m in normal form, it is stated whether m ∈ Z or m /∈ Z ; in the case
that m ∈ Z , a derivation is given; that is, the rule by which RankAnalyser
determined that m ∈ Z is stated. By considering the status of the various
pseudo-messages, one may conclude either that the characteristic function
of Z is a rank function proving correctness of the protocol, or that no such
rank function exists.
7.2.1 Input
The protocol is input in a notation very close to the standard protocol no-
tation in the literature. Protocols always involve the participation of two
honest agents A and B , and optionally a server S . Agent A is always as-
sumed to be initiator and agent B is assumed to be responder. The server S ,
when present, is a trusted third party.
Each line, as in the standard notation, contains enough information to
specify who is sending the message, who is supposed to receive it, and the
contents of the message. The sender is given first, followed by the receiver,
and then the contents of the message, with spaces used to separate the three
parts of the line. Thus
A B Na
specifies that user A should send nonce NA to agent B .
Formal specification
A general line of a protocol specification for input into the RankAnalyser
tool is
<sender> <receiver> <message> [<n] [>m]
Each of <sender> and <receiver> is one of the three characters A, B, and
S, denoting initiator of the protocol, responder, and server respectively. The
sender of the first message should always be the initiator, and hence A.
A <message> can be an atom; it can be the concatenation of two mes-
sages; it can be the encryption of a message under a key.
Concatenation of two messages is represented by juxtaposition with an
intermediate period; thus when we concatenate A and B we get A.B. Since
concatenation is assumed to be associative, any parentheses should be omit-
ted.
Encryption of a message m under a key k is written as E(m : k).
An atom must be one of the following:
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A B S
Na Nb Ns
pka pkb pks
ska skb sks
Ksa Ksb Kab
The first row contains the agent and server identities, each of which is treated
as a publicly known constant. The second row lists the available nonces: the
first appearance in the specification of nonce Na should be in a message
sent by A, and it represents a fresh and unpredictable nonce chosen for this
protocol run by the initiator; similarly for Nb and Ns. The third and fourth
rows contain long-term public and private keys for each agent, assumed to be
respectively publicly known and known only to the corresponding agent. The
final row contains long-term symmetric shared keys for each pair of agents
involved in the protocol, known only to the two agents in question. (So
SH (S ,A) will correspond to Ksa in RankAnalyser , and PK (B) will be pkb.)
It is important to realise that although the set of atoms that may be
used in a protocol specification is finite, this in no way reduces the number
of possible atoms involved in network messages to finiteness. For instance,
the key pkb in the specification will represent the public key of the responder
in a protocol run; but since the number of network users who could play
responder is infinite, pkb will cover an infinite set of public keys.
Each agent is indeed restricted to one long-term shared key with each
other agent, one long-term public key and one long-term secret key. Addi-
tionally, the initiator, responder and server roˆles can involve choosing only
one fresh nonce each per protocol run. These restrictions are merely a result
of the simplified specification language in this version of the tool, and could
easily be lifted: the underlying algorithm will cope with protocols requiring
any fixed number of keys per agent and nonces per protocol run. Future
versions of RankAnalyser will be able to analyse such protocols.
We shall now consider the optional [<n] and [>m] tags at the end of the
general specification line.
Forwarded components
A protocol specification in the standard notation is, in fact, two or three
specifications: one for each participating honest agent, and possibly one for
the trusted server. This contraction of three specifications onto one intro-
duces some ambiguities in certain cases where the latitude for what values
may be transmitted by the sender does not correspond exactly to the range
of values that will be accepted by the receiver.
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This problem occurs when agents are required to accept message compo-
nents that they cannot understand (because they do not have the required
decryption key), but still need to forward those components to another agent
who will indeed understand the contents. Consider the following fragment of
a possible protocol, described in standard notation:
Message 1. a → b : {na}SH (s,a)
Message 2. b → s : {na}SH (s,a)
Agent a chooses a nonce na and sends it to b, encrypted under symmetric
key SH (s , a), a long-term key shared between agent a and the server s .
Now b cannot hope to understand this message, or even verify that it is
of the correct form, since he does not hold key SH (s , a); but he may still
forward the message to s . Since s holds key SH (s , a), he can decrypt the
message and learn the value of na.
This fragment of standard notation leaves many questions unanswered. It
is immediately clear what messages will be sent if the protocol runs with no
interference from outside; but if the intruder intercepts the first transmission
and alters it, what should then happen? The usual interpretation of the
notation would suggest that agent b should accept messages only of the
correct form. However, since he cannot decrypt the message he receives, this
is wildly unrealistic. To him, the message will be no more and no less than a
bitstream; we cannot expect him to do more than to pass on what he hears
in the hope that it is a correct message.
The only reasonable understanding of the fragment is to instruct the
participants as follows:
• Agent a should construct a message of the correct form, selecting a
fresh nonce and using the correct key, and pass this to b.
• Agent b should simply accept any message in place of {na}SH (s,a), and
pass it on to S .
• Server s should accept a message only of the correct form, encrypted
under the correct key. He should attempt to decrypt the message to
learn the value of na, and should cry halt if the message appears not
to be of the right form.
The inherent asymmetry here—the fact that b is not required (or able) to
check the messages, whereas a and s are—needs careful handling. We shall
need to be able to identify such cases in our protocol notation.
As such, we introduce the ‘>’ (read store) and ‘<’ (read retrieve) sym-
bols. The former indicates an encrypted component that the receiver cannot
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understand, but should simply remember for later use. The latter is used
to mark the corresponding case where the sender is not constructing an en-
crypted component from subcomponents that he knows, but is replaying an
encrypted component that he has not understood. In each case, the symbol
should be followed by a natural number. The number is used simply to pair
each store with its corresponding one or more retrieves; think of it as a free
variable.
These symbols may be used only for encrypted components. Atoms can
always be understood completely; concatenations can always be understood
enough to be split. A concatenation of two or more encrypted components
neither of which can be understood by the receiver may be dealt with using
multiple store commands.
In Message 1 of the example fragment above, b receives a component
that he cannot understand; he should store it for later. But as far as a is
concerned, the message is perfectly perspicuous; agent a simply sends it in
the usual fashion. Message 1 requires a store but no retrieve.
Message 2 involves agent b forwarding what he stored in the previous
message: we should use a corresponding retrieve. The server, however, can
understand what is being sent to him: no store is needed in Message 2.
The specification for the fragment would thus be written
A B E(Na : Ksa) >1
B S E(Na : Ksa) <1
Type-checking assumptions
The RankAnalyser program assumes throughout that the implementation
advice of Chapter 6 will be heeded; that is, RankAnalyser does not consider
type flaw attacks because it assumes that they will be prevented by use of
type tagging. Agents will accept messages only of the expected type.
This applies even to encrypted components that the receiving agent can-
not decrypt. For message components involving a store, the receiver of the
component will accept it only if the type is correct. Thus in Message 1 of
the above fragment, B will be treated within RankAnalyser as if he should
confirm that the message he has received is indeed a nonce encrypted under
a shared key. Of course, in practice, B would not be able to ‘look inside’
the encryption to check its contents; but the treatment of such messages is
justified because, in the light of the results presented in Chapter 6, a type-
tagging implementation will prevent an intruder from profiting by sending
anything other than a correctly typed message.
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7.3 Case studies
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of RankAnalyser , and to explain more
fully how to program the tool to analyse a protocol and how to interpret the
results, we give three case studies.
7.3.1 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
We first met this protocol in Section 2.2.3 on page 17. As noted there, the
Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol has become the ‘benchmark’ proto-
col for methods of analysis, owing to its conciseness, its wonderfully plausible
arguments for correctness and the surprising simplicity of the attack.
In standard notation, the protocol is written:
Message 1. a → b : {a.na}PK (b)
Message 2. b → a : {na.nb}PK (a)
Message 3. a → b : {nb}PK (b)
Very little work is needed to convert this into a suitable form for Rank-
Analyser to accept. All that is required is a slight change of the notation:
A B E(A.Na : pkb)
B A E(Na.Nb : pka)
A B E(Nb : pkb)
This text is simply typed into the ‘Protocol description’ box of RankAnalyser ,
and the ‘Analyse protocol’ button clicked. In its current form, RankAnalyser
automatically checks for authentication of each of initiator and responder.
These checks are independent, so that if one is analysing a protocol designed
to authenticate only one party, one may simply ignore the conclusions reached
about authentication failure of the other.
Running this protocol through RankAnalyser results in the output shown
in Figure 7.1.
The RankAnalyser program has attempted to find a rank function for
the protocol by constructing ρ0. We have already seen in Section 2.2.4 on
page 18 that this protocol is flawed, so it is no surprise that the attempt has
failed. The output amounts to a proof that no rank function exists.
Each line of the output relates to a message in M0, and gives the value
of ρ0 on that message. Recall that ρ0 assigns a rank of one to a message m if
and only if m could not conceivably have rank zero. RankAnalyser will have
flagged a message as having a rank of one, then, only if it has determined a
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Figure 7.1: The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
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sequence of  rules that culminate in S  m for some set S of messages
each of whose members has a rank of one.
For such messages, we can obtain a derivation; that is, we can examine
the sequence of rules that RankAnalyser has found.
If the message m is in INIT , then the derivation is trivial: membership
of INIT is sufficient grounds to have a rank of one.
An entry that relates to a message m that is not in INIT , but does have
a rank of one, may be ‘opened’ by clicking on the ‘+’ symbol at the left-hand
side of the line. This m will have rank one in virtue of a S  m rule with
all members of S having rank one; after clicking on the ‘+’, the messages in
the set S will be revealed. If these are not themselves members of INIT then
they will have ‘+’ icons as well.
In Figure 7.1, the crucial entry for considering authentication of the ini-
tiator has been highlighted, and the whole tree beneath this entry has been
opened up so that we can see the full derivation of this message. Recall that ρ0
will be a suitable rank function for the protocol if and only if ρ0(t) = 0 when-
ever t ∈ T (see Section 3.3 on page 44). The highlighted line shows how ρ0
acts on the respdone pseudo-message that lives inside the singleton set T
(see Section 3.2.5 on page 39). If this message is listed as having rank zero,
then the protocol correctly authenticates the initiator, because ρ0 qualifies as
a suitable rank function; otherwise, the message is assigned rank one by ρ0,
and so no rank function exists.
Note that this entry represents agent B completing the protocol as re-
sponder using nonce NRB ,3. Recall that we aim to check for correct authenti-
cation in the specific case that agent A initiates the protocol, with agent B
responding using a particular nonce. Currently, nonce NRB ,3 is designated
as this particular nonce in RankAnalyser , with nonce N IA,3 playing the cor-
responding roˆle in checking for authentication of the responder. The ‘3’ is
a consequence of the fact that RankAnalyser at present allows the proto-
col participants, including the server, to generate only one nonce each per
protocol run; and so no index greater than 2 can appear in any normalised
message. The next index of 3 is naturally chosen for these ‘special’ nonces.
This choice of an index of 3 is inefficient when, as is usually the case,
we do not have Na, Nb and Ns all appearing in the same message in the
RankAnalyser protocol description, because in such cases the greatest nonce
index in normalised messages will be strictly less than 2, and we would be
able to reduce the index of the ‘special’ nonces still further. Future work will
allow the protocol participants to generate more than one nonce per protocol
run; when we introduce this capability, we shall optimise the ‘special’ index
selection process to remove this inefficiency.
We can see, at the top level, that the respdone pseudo-message has rank
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one because B , acting as responder and using nonce NRB ,3, and believing that
A is the initiator and is using nonce N IA,0, transmits the message to indi-
cate completion of the protocol after reception of the corresponding respgo
pseudo-message and reception of the corresponding Message 1 and Message 3
of the protocol. (Agent B will also have sent out Message 2 after receiving
Message 1 and before receiving Message 3, but only receptions and the final
transmission are of concern to us in the ‘→’ rule that this top level of the
tree represents.)
But how did the Message 1 and the Message 3 come to have a rank of
one? We can continue to walk the tree to find out.
• The Message 1 was transmitted by agent A acting as initiator in a
different run of the protocol; in fact, in a previous run of the protocol
with A believing she was talking to B . The run in question is one in
which A, using nonce N IA,0, tried to initiate the protocol with B , and
was ready to accept B ’s use of nonce N IA,0 in reply. (Remember that A
will accept any nonce at all in reply from B , including the one she has
sent out.)
This does not square with the usual formulation of the attack, as pre-
sented in Section 2.2.4, in which A starts the protocol with C , the
enemy. The explanation for this will become clear shortly; for now,
note that agent A has used nonce N IA,0 to initiate the protocol with
agent B in a previous run, and yet appears later to use this same
nonce in initiating the protocol with C .
In the usual attack, the intruder picks up message {A.N IA,0}PK (B) via
message {A.N IA,0}PK (C ), decrypting and re-encrypting to get the re-
quired result. Because RankAnalyser spots that {A.N IA,0}PK (B) can be
derived directly, it chooses this route. The ‘attack’ that we shall pro-
duce will require a small amount of manipulation in order to convert it
into the more familiar version.
• The Message 3—the nonce NRB ,3 encrypted under PK (B)—comes to
light in the same way that it does in the standard attack. The intruder
picks up the nonce, encrypted under his own public key, after a session
with A. In this session with A, the intruder uses a Message 2 that he
has picked up from B—eight lines down from the highlighted line in
the output—and gets A to decrypt the Message 2 for him.
Putting all this together, it is not difficult to turn the lines of the deriva-
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tion into the following ‘attack’:
Message α.1. A→ B : {A.N IA,0}PK (B)
Message β.1. C (A)→ B : {A.N IA,0}PK (B)
Message β.2. B → C (A) : {N IA,0.N
R
B ,3}PK (A)
Message γ.2. C → A : {N IA,0.N
R
B ,3}PK (A)
Message γ.3. A→ C : {NRB ,3}PK (C )
Message β.3. C (A)→ B : {NRB ,3}PK (B)
Two points arising from this deserve consideration.
1. Message γ.1 is missing, as are Message α.2 and Message α.3. This may
look strange, but there is a good reason that these messages do not
have corresponding lines in the derivation. In each case, the message
involves a transmission that plays no part in the attack. Of course, it
is a simple matter to write the lines in.
2. In Message α.1, agent A initiates the protocol with agent B using
nonce N IA,0. In the (missing) Message γ.1, agent A uses this same
nonce to initiate the protocol with the enemy, agent C . This type of
behaviour is usually outlawed: agents should not reuse nonces.
This highlights the potential weakness of the rank functions approach
discussed in Section 4.2.1. If agent A may send the nonce to either
agent B or agent C , then each resulting Message 1 must have a rank
of one, and the effect is the same as if he could send the nonce to both.
RankAnalyser has chosen the derivation that starts with the nonce
being sent to agent B because this derivation is shorter: it requires no
decryption and re-encryption steps. It is immediately clear, however,
that we may remove this nonce reuse by reinstating Message γ.1 in
place of Message α.1, resulting in the more usual formulation of the
attack as given in Section 2.2.4. In general, when RankAnalyser gives
a derivation involving a message being sent to both an honest agent
and the enemy, we shall wish to remove the message sent to the honest
agent, and, if necessary, replace it with a message faked by the enemy.
The fixed version
Implementing Lowe’s fix of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol (see
Section 2.4.5 on page 33) necessitates nothing more than a small change in
the second line of the input:
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A B E(A.Na : pkb)
B A E(Na.Nb.B : pka)
A B E(Nb : pkb)
This time, when we run RankAnalyser , we get the output shown in Fig-
ure 7.2. The highlighted entry shows that the pseudo-message this time has
Figure 7.2: Lowe’s fix for Needham-Schroeder
a rank of zero. Thus, ρ0 qualifies as a good rank function for the fixed version
of the protocol, proving that it correctly authenticates the initiator.
7.3.2 Ryan’s Protocol
Ryan’s Protocol was presented in Section 3.2.5 on page 39, where we con-
sidered how a rank function could be constructed or shown not to exist. We
shall see how RankAnalyser copes with this protocol.
In the usual notation for security protocols, Ryan’s Protocol would be
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expressed as
Message 1. a → b : a
Message 2. b → s : {a.nb}SH (s,b)
Message 3. s → a : {nb.b}SH (s,a)
Message 4. a → b : nb
Recall that the protocol’s purpose is to authenticate the initiator. Ryan’s
Protocol does not aim to authenticate the responder.
Again, translation into RankAnalyser ’s native format is a simple matter.
The protocol becomes
A B A
B S E(A.Nb : Ksb)
S A E(Nb.B : Ksa)
A B Nb
When we enter this into RankAnalyser and start the analysis, we get the
result given in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Ryan’s Protocol
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Again, the vital line has been highlighted. As can be seen, the relevant
pseudo-message has rank zero, demonstrating that the protocol correctly
authenticates the initiator.
A modified version of Ryan’s Protocol
Note what happens if we swap the order of components inside the encryption
in the third line:
A B A
B S E(A.Nb : Ksb)
S A E(B.Nb : Ksa)
A B Nb
The similarity between the second message and the third message is, perhaps
unsurprisingly, a point of weakness.
This time, running RankAnalyser on the protocol results in failure to
discover a rank function, as depicted in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Ryan’s Protocol with altered third message
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Let us construct the attack by working from the bottom of the deriva-
tion tree upwards. We see that agent B , acting as the responder and using
nonce NRB ,3, after starting a run of the protocol believing that agent A is
initiator, is willing to give out the message {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B). So far, then, we
have:
Message α.1. C (A)→ B : A
Message α.2. B → C (S ) : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Then B starts a run as initiator, attempting to start a session with A
acting as responder. First, he sends out his own identity as Message 1 of
this second run (although this is missing from the derivation because it is
not needed). Then, after receipt of {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B), he gives out the value
of NRB ,3 as Message 4. Our attack so far runs
Message α.1. C (A)→ B : A
Message α.2. B → C (S ) : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Message β.1. B → C (A) : B
Message β.3. C (S )→ B : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Message β.4. B → C (A) : NRB ,3
This nonce is exactly what the intruder requires in order to complete
run α. He sends the nonce back to B as the fourth and final message of
the protocol, convincing agent B that he has been talking to A. The attack
becomes
Message α.1. C (A)→ B : A
Message α.2. B → C (S ) : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Message β.1. B → C (A) : B
Message β.3. C (S )→ B : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Message β.4. B → C (A) : NRB ,3
Message α.4. C (A)→ B : NRB ,3
Although this is indeed a valid attack on the protocol, it would take a
lucky intruder (or an implementation requiring mutual authentication) to get
it to work. After Message α.2, the intruder would have to wait and hope for
agent B to start a protocol run with agent A.
The attack becomes more realistic if the messages are reordered so that
the intruder waits for agent B to act before engaging in any dubious be-
136 Theory into practice: the RankAnalyser program
haviour:
Message β.1. B → C (A) : B
Message α.1. C (A)→ B : A
Message α.2. B → C (S ) : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Message β.3. C (S )→ B : {A.NRB ,3}SH (S ,B)
Message β.4. B → C (A) : NRB ,3
Message α.4. C (A)→ B : NRB ,3
This attack has one pleasing aspect worth noting: it at no point requires
any action on the part of the server.
7.3.3 The Perrig-Song Protocol: a variation
The following protocol was proposed by Adrian Perrig and Dawn Song in [55].
Its intention is to provide mutual authentication by means of a shared key.
Message 1. a → b : a.na
Message 2. b → a : {na.nb.b}SH (a,b)
Message 3. a → b : nb
The protocol correctly authenticates both participants.
The Perrig-Song Protocol was discovered by the authors of [55] using their
Automatic Protocol Generator program, which suggested that this protocol
was the simplest possible for correct mutual authentication.
However, during the writing of the paper, the authors tested their pro-
gram’s claim by attempting to simplify the protocol further. It was suggested
that the agent identity in the second message was redundant because the
participants could be inferred from the encryption key. This gave rise to the
following protocol:
Message 1. a → b : a.na
Message 2. b → a : {na.nb}SH (a,b)
Message 3. a → b : nb
The idea is that anyone other than b will not be able to produce Message 2
because it requires him to know SH (a, b) to perform the encryption, and so
the responder should be correctly authenticated; and that since only a can
decrypt the message to recover the value of nb in order to send Message 3,
the protocol should similarly ensure the authenticity of the initiator.
We may feed this into RankAnalyser by writing simply:
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A B A.Na
B A E(Na.Nb : Kab)
A B Nb
The weakness of the protocol is that the encryption in Message 2 does
not identify who is initiator and who is responder. Although the use of
key SH (A,B) is enough to identify which two agents are involved in the
protocol run, it does not tell us whether A is talking to B , or B to A. This
allows the intruder to fool B into accepting B ’s own Message 2, originally
intended for A, as a Message 2 supposedly sent from A to B . The output
from RankAnalyser allows us to construct an attack:
Message α.1. B → C (A) : B ,N
Message β.1. C (A)→ B : A,N
Message β.2. B → C (A) : {N .NB}SH (A,B)
Message α.2. C (A)→ B : {N .NB}SH (A,B)
Message α.3. B → C (A) : NB
Message β.3. C (A)→ B : NB
Thus both sides of the authentication fail. As soon as any agent attempts
to talk to any other, the intruder can fake the responder side of the protocol
run, simultaneously reversing the roˆles and masquerading as initiator in a
second run.
7.4 Future developments
There is much scope for improving RankAnalyser , in terms of its power,
its flexibility and its ease of use. We shall discuss specific plans for further
developments to RankAnalyser in Section 9.2.2.
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Chapter 8
Other approaches to protocol
analysis
And now for something completely different.
—Monty Python’s Flying Circus
How many things I can do without!
—Socrates
In this chapter, we discuss the general methodologies that have been devel-
oped and used to analyse security protocols.
We identify two broad categories into which analysis techniques have
tended to fall—theorem proving and model checking—and consider the fea-
tures common to techniques in each class. We note that the rank functions
approach presented in this thesis, in common with a few other methods,
straddles the gap between these two classes.
We give an overview of many of the specific techniques that have been
proposed for security protocol analysis, comparing ours with each.
8.1 Introduction
Many approaches to the analysis of security protocols have been proposed
and used, with varying degrees of success. Historically, these approaches have
tended to fall into two distinct categories: theorem proving and model check-
ing. These approaches have rather different strengths and rather different
weaknesses.
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8.1.1 Theorem proving
The original Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [47] was ‘proved’ cor-
rect by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in [6]. This resulted in some embar-
rassment later when it was discovered by Lowe that their proof was flawed,
and that the protocol was subject to a simple attack [33]! (The proof pre-
sented in [6] was, in fact, formally sound; but a potentially unreasonable
assumption made about the operation and implementation of the protocol
had been rather obscured by the complexities of the logic. See Section 8.2.1
for more details.)
Hand-generated proofs are notoriously difficult to produce, and even more
difficult to verify in full. To this end, many tools for theorem proving have
been developed to assist in the generation of formal proofs of mathematical
propositions. These programs allow mathematical statements to be entered
and proved step by step, with the user directing the proof at each stage.
(These tools are more properly called proof checkers, since they simply verify
each step rather than constructing the proof automatically, but the term
theorem prover is in common usage.)
Since a system running a security protocol can be specified precisely,
and precise formulations of correctness defined, the statement that a given
protocol is secure in a given sense can be expressed in precise mathematical
terms. This statement can be loaded into a theorem prover, and the search
for a proof can be conducted.
However, there are two major restrictions on this approach to security
protocol analysis. In the first place, theorem proving is of limited use in
finding attacks on protocols. Although the repeated attempt and failure to
prove a proposition may result in a suspicion that the proposition is false,
and will sometimes give an insight into how to demonstrate its falsity, it
will often end simply in defeat. Theorem provers are much better suited to
demonstrating the correctness of protocols than they are to finding attacks
on flawed protocols.
Second, the process of proof generation is somewhat hit-and-miss. A
theorem prover requires the user to find the right path through the proof,
which takes intelligence, intuition and practice. Although the tool ensures
that spurious proofs are not generated, there is no guarantee that a proof
will be generated at all.
Various general-purpose theorem provers have been used to assist ver-
ification of security protocols, and some specialised theorem provers have
been developed to deal exclusively with security protocols. The current pro-
tocol analysis techniques that fall into the category of theorem proving are
discussed in Section 8.2.
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8.1.2 Model checking
Model checking essentially involves building a model of a system and checking
that each possible state that the model can reach satisfies a certain property.
In the world of security protocols, this means designing a model of a general
system running a security protocol in adverse conditions, and testing for
states in which there is a security violation.
Model checking has proved highly successful as a means for finding attacks
on security protocols. Most of the attacks in the literature were discovered
either by inspection or by use of model checking.
However, as a method of verifying the correctness of a security protocol,
model checking has a severe limitation. Since the model checker performs an
exhaustive search of every possible state of the model until it finds a violation
of the specification or runs out of states, this process will never terminate for
an infinite-state model that meets the specification. Since we shall usually
require a protocol to be secure with an arbitrarily large number of agents
engaged in an arbitrarily large number of concurrent runs of the protocol, we
cannot capture the full generality of the protocol with a finite-state model.
Model checking in its native form, then, is much better suited to finding
attacks on protocols than to proving protocols correct.
Various ways of reducing an infinite network to a finite network have been
suggested; these are discussed more fully in Section 8.3.
8.2 Techniques for theorem proving
8.2.1 BAN logic
Burrows, Abadi and Needham presented in [6] the first formal language that
could be used to describe the assumptions underlying authentication proto-
cols and to state the goals of the protocols. Their logic, known as BAN logic,
is designed to allow one to state the beliefs of the agents participating in
a protocol run, and to use inference rules to derive statements about their
beliefs at the end of the protocol run.
Much criticism has been levelled at BAN logic, partly because it has
been used to prove protocols correct that have turned out to have flaws.
These problems do not result from any unsoundness of the logic, but from a
lack of clarity about the assumptions that should be made when analysing
a protocol. For instance, a proof is presented in [6] of the correctness of
the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol; and, as we have seen in Sec-
tion 2.2.4, there is a simple attack on this protocol. The discrepancy is
explained by the fact that Burrows, Abadi and Needham assume that honest
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agents will never communicate with a dishonest intruder, and the first step
of Lowe’s attack involves an honest agent A starting the protocol with the
intruder C .
Despite the controversy surrounding BAN logic, its development was one
of the most important steps in gaining an understanding of how security
protocols should be analysed. BAN logic has provided the motivation and
the foundation for much of the subsequent literature on security protocols.
8.2.2 Strand spaces
The strand spaces model of [76, 78, 75, 77] is one of the more powerful theories
aimed at proving correctness of security protocols.
A comprehensive introduction to the strand spaces model, and a com-
parison with the rank functions model presented in this thesis, is given in
Chapter 5.
8.2.3 Paulson’s Induction
Isabelle [53], a versatile general-purpose proof tool, has been successfully
used by its creator, Larry Paulson, to analyse and verify security protocols.
Paulson constructs, in Isabelle’s native language, an inductive specification
of a network running a particular protocol, and establishes results about the
protocol using Isabelle’s capabilities for theorem proving [54].
Although a comprehensive proof of correctness of a protocol would be ex-
tremely laborious to complete from scratch, Paulson defines various functions
and operators that are independent of the protocol under consideration, and
proves results that may be reused in other analyses. The effort involved in
analysing a protocol is significantly reduced if one has these generic protocol
lemmas at one’s disposal.
However, the work required is still substantial. Paulson states that a
new protocol takes ‘several days’ effort’ to analyse, and that considering the
effects of a change to an already analysed protocol takes ‘a few hours’.
8.2.4 PVS
The Proof Verification System [51], or PVS, is a theorem prover powerful
enough to deal with virtually any branch of mathematics. Dutertre and
Schneider have defined the traces semantics theory of CSP within PVS, and
proved all of the standard lemmas and theorems of CSP within the theorem
prover [17]. They allow for the specification of a security protocol running
on a hostile network as a combination of CSP processes, and show that
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the statements about security properties of the protocol can be entered as
theorems, and an attempt may be made to prove these statements within
PVS. Evans and Schneider have further shown in [19] how the PVS model
may be extended to incorporate time-dependent properties.
Since the full range of proof techniques is available to the user, there is
no need to restrict the network to a finite number of states. It is entirely
possible to construct fully general proofs of correctness of security protocols
within PVS.
However, the theorems are not easy to prove. Although PVS ensures the
correctness of proofs that can be constructed, it is often difficult to make
progress in proving that the protocol meets the security specification.
8.3 Techniques for model checking
8.3.1 FDR
The Failures-Divergences Refinement Checker [22], or FDR, is a general-
purpose model checker developed by Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd. It has
been used extensively to analyse security protocols, with many attacks having
been discovered and published as a result [40, 34, 35, 38, 62, 25].
FDR is based on a machine-readable form of CSP. It is possible to use
CSP to specify a protocol, a network and a general intruder, in much the
same way as was done in Section 2.4, and use the traces model of FDR to
check whether the combined system meets a given specification.
If the system does not meet the specification, then a trace of the system
is output that is not a trace of the specification. This corresponds to an
attack on the protocol. In fact, if the system has been carefully coded,
then FDR’s breadth-first search will ensure that the trace corresponds to
a minimal length attack. It is then an easy matter to modify the system
appropriately to attempt to defeat the attack.
Although FDR has proved its worth in finding attacks, it suffers, as do
all model checkers, from being able to explore only finite-state models. A
reasonable level of confidence in a protocol may be gained by analysis of an
appropriate size of system, but a fully general proof of correctness cannot be
obtained by FDR alone.
8.3.2 Data independence
Bill Roscoe and Ranko Lazic´ have produced some interesting work on data
independence in [31, 32] and in Chapter 15 of [63].
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Broadly speaking, a process P , parameterised by a data type T , is said to
be data independent with respect to T if the operation of P does not depend
in any way on T . The results that Roscoe and Lazic´ present give conditions
under which the abstract data type T may be replaced with a small, concrete
data type T ′ without affecting the whether P has particular properties.
Roscoe and Broadfoot [64] have used these results to extend the power of
FDR analysis of security protocols to deal with networks allowing multiple
sequential runs of protocols, with infinite sets of nonces available to the
agents. This goes some way toward being able to analyse protocols running
on arbitrary networks using FDR, but it is not a complete solution, since
although multiple sequential runs are covered, multiple concurrent runs are
not. Any attack in which the intruder relies on being able to manipulate
concurrent runs of the protocol will not be discovered using this technique.
8.3.3 Casper
Gavin Lowe has developed a specialist tool, Casper [36], for converting pro-
tocols written in a language very close to standard protocol notation into a
script that may be run in FDR. It allows much flexibility over the specifica-
tion of the roˆles of the protocol, the specifications against which the protocol
is to be tested, the number of agents on the network, the number of nonces
available and the number of sequential or concurrent runs allowed.
The tool has proved of great value in simplifying the tricky task of coding
protocols into FDR. It has enabled those with little experience of FDR to use
it to analyse protocols with ease and efficiency. It can handle a wide range
of protocols, since it has been constantly developed and expanded each time
a protocol has emerged that the program could not previously deal with.
However, it does not solve completely the inherent limitation of model
checking. It incorporates much of the data independence work into its script
generation, but arbitrary numbers of concurrent runs of a protocol are still
outside the scope of its analysis.
8.3.4 Lowe’s completeness results
Lowe has also published results in [37] that establish, for certain protocols,
an upper bound on the size of the network that needs to be model checked in
order to prove correctness on an unbounded network. This work, in conjunc-
tion with Casper, provides a guaranteed method of either finding an attack
or verifying the protocol; but the class of protocols for which his result holds
is at present somewhat restricted.
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Section 4.3.3 contains more information on the assumptions about pro-
tocols that Lowe makes in order to prove his reduction.
8.3.5 Murϕ
A general-purpose model checker calledMurϕ [13] has been successfully used
by Mitchell, Mitchell and Stern to analyse security protocols [43].
There are important differences between FDR and Murϕ. Whereas FDR
is a process-based model checker with CSP as its underlying algebra, there
is no such thing as a process in Murϕ. The input language describes a finite-
state system by means of rules that govern the transitions from state to state,
and the syntax is reminiscent of Pascal.
The component parts—the rule sets—of the system described in Murϕ
communicate by means of shared variables. There is no explicit synchroni-
sation: the rule sets are combined by simply taking the union of the sets of
rules. This gives a construction similar to the ||| (interleaving) operator of
CSP.
However, as with FDR, formulating a specification of a protocol, together
with a general intruder, is complex and prone to error. Considerable experi-
ence with Murϕ is almost essential for such an undertaking.
In addition, Murϕ is limited, as is FDR, to the checking of finite-state
machines; and so a Murϕ verification can never provide watertight proof
of correctness of a protocol. The state space increases very rapidly as the
number of network agents increases. In [43], the agents are not allowed to
engage in more than one run of the protocol; again, the state space would
explode if this were relaxed.
8.3.6 Brutus
The Brutus model checker is a special-purpose tool for analysing security
protocols. It was first presented in [10], although the program was unnamed
in that paper.
Because the tool is designed specifically for the analysis of security proto-
cols, encoding a protocol into the appropriate language is easier than it is with
a general-purpose model checker, in part because the intruder model stays
the same regardless of the protocol, and does not need to be programmed
each time. However, the encoding process still seems to be somewhat tricky.
Brutus suffers from the problem of state space explosion in much the
same way that the other model checkers do. The number of agents and the
number of concurrent runs of the protocol must be severely limited if the
analysis is to be completed in a realistic amount of time. Because only a
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finite number of states can be checked, a full proof of correctness cannot be
obtained using Brutus.
8.4 Hybrid techniques
There have been some attempts in the field of protocol analysis to com-
bine the automatic nature of model checking with the generality of theorem
proving.
8.4.1 Athena
The strand spaces model, as we have seen, provides a good theoretical basis
for reasoning about security protocols. A tool called Athena [73], developed
at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, has recently emerged, aimed at
providing a mechanism for automatic protocol analysis within the strand
space model. It combines various techniques to attempt to allow for auto-
matic verification with no bounds on the size of the network.
Athena uses backward search from an insecure state, starting with only
a small network, dynamically increasing the size of the network where nec-
essary. Its state space exploration is symbolic, allowing it in some cases to
compress infinite classes of states onto a single state. In addition, lemmas
can be proved and used to discard certain classes of unreachable states.
Whenever Athena terminates, it will provide either an attack on the pro-
tocol, or a guarantee that the protocol is correct. The problem is that the
program might never terminate. In this case, termination can be forced by
imposing a bound on the size of the network, but this obviously destroys any
hope of a proof of correctness on an unbounded network.
8.4.2 The NRL Protocol Analyzer
As suggested by the name, the NRL Protocol Analyzer [41], developed by the
United States’ Naval Research Laboratory, is a specialised tool for analysing
security protocols. It does not fall neatly into the category of model checker
or of theorem prover, but attempts to bridge the gap, retaining some of the
automation of model checking whilst allowing the full generality of theorem
proving.
The user of the Analyzer provides a description of the protocol, and spec-
ifies an insecure state—that is, a state of the system in which the security
specification of the protocol has been violated. The Analyzer uses this infor-
mation to generate a description of every possible state that can immediately
8.4 Hybrid techniques 147
precede this insecure state, every state that can immediately precede that
one, and so on. By working backwards, the user hopes to find a path to a
valid initial state. The reverse of this path will correspond to an attack on
the protocol.
The program allows an arbitrarily large number of concurrent runs of the
protocol, and so the number of states will be infinite. The Analyzer therefore
provides various mechanisms to allow the user to reduce the state space to a
finite size. The two most important of these are:
• Inductive proofs. The user can state and prove lemmas regarding
the unreachability of certain infinite sets of states.
• Subset queries. If, for example, the Analyzer produces the descrip-
tion of a state in which the enemy has learnt two words W and V , the
user might suspect that the state in which the enemy has learnt V is
unreachable. The user can then instruct the Analyzer to consider how
the state where the enemy has learnt V may be reached.
This must be used with care. If the state in which the enemy has learnt
bothW and V is unreachable, but the state in which he has learnt only
V can be reached, then a subset query might generate a false attack.
The ability to search an infinite number of states makes it possible to use
the NRL Protocol Analyzer to verify security protocols in their full gener-
ality. However, in consequence, the tool is not fully automatic; it requires
substantial human direction to complete a proof. In addition, the possibility
of producing false attacks via subset queries means that any putative attack
must be checked manually.
For a detailed comparison of Casper and the NRL Protocol Analyzer,
see [40].
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Now all has been heard; here is the conclusion of the matter.
—Ecclesiastes 12v11, New International Version
We’ve got to sit down and have a think about where we stand.
—Roy McFarland
In this thesis, we have developed and extensively analysed a fresh approach
to the difficult problem of automatically verifying authentication protocols
on an unbounded network.
9.1 Summary of the thesis
In Chapter 2, we introduced the theoretical background material that un-
derpins the approach to protocol analysis presented in the thesis. As well as
giving an overview of cryptographic primitives and their associated theory,
we considered Schneider’s original work on rank functions [67], the work that
forms the foundation on which the new research in this thesis is built.
Chapter 3 was concerned with presenting and proving our new results to
develop Schneider’s work in various ways. Schneider shows how an integer-
valued rank function may be used to demonstrate the security of an authenti-
cation protocol running on a small network; we extended this to demonstrate
that the existence of a binary rank function suffices to prove security of an
authentication protocol even on an arbitrarily large network, and we fur-
ther developed a decision procedure that would either construct such a rank
function for a given protocol or else show that no such rank function existed.
The question of the completeness or otherwise of the rank function the-
orem, and the link with the issue of decidability of correctness of authenti-
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cation protocols, were discussed in Chapter 4. We demonstrated the non-
completeness of the rank function theorem on a general network, by means
of constructing a counter-example; and we made significant progress to-
wards answering the completeness question for the large network considered
throughout the thesis.
We introduced the theory of strand spaces in Chapter 5. We considered
the strong links between the strand spaces model of protocol analysis and
the rank functions approach, engaging in a detailed comparison of the two
methodologies to draw out the similarities and differences.
In Chapter 6, we analysed at length the problem of type flaw attacks
on security protocols. Such attacks are difficult to spot, and most methods
of analysis leave them unconsidered with little or no justification. However,
in this chapter we presented a simple and inexpensive method of protocol
implementation that guarantees to prevent all type flaw attacks. By using
the results proved here, one can make use of analysis techniques (such as
RankAnalyser) that assume that no type flaw attacks are possible, and then
implement the verified protocol according to the guidelines given here so as
to ensure that type flaw attacks will not creep in to spoil the party.
The subject of Chapter 7 was the RankAnalyser program, designed to
facilitate automatic analysis of authentication protocols by means of the
algorithm developed in Chapter 3. We described the tool in detail, showing
how to specify a protocol, how to initiate the analysis and how to interpret
the results. We demonstrated how the information output as the result of a
proof of non-existence of a rank function can (at least usually, and perhaps
always) be converted into an attack on the protocol.
Chapter 8 consisted of a wide-ranging summary of other approaches to
protocol analysis. We largely separated them into the broad categories of
techniques for model checking and techniques for theorem proving, noting
that some approaches, including RankAnalyser , are hybrids, containing ele-
ments of each category.
Appendix A discusses the new and tricky concept of quantum cryptog-
raphy, describing the underlying theoretical physics, and giving a means by
which the physical phenomena may be used to share secret information with
perfect security against a passive eavesdropper regardless of the computing
power available to him.
9.2 Future work
There are some areas of the theoretical model that we should like to undertake
to develop further. These we shall set out in Section 9.2.1.
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However, much of the work to be done in extending this thesis is con-
cerned with extending the RankAnalyser program into a more flexible tool
for protocol analysis. We shall discuss these issues in Section 9.2.2.
9.2.1 Theoretical enhancements
Although the theoretical model developed in this thesis has enabled us to
analyse many protocols with success, and to prove correctness with a rigour
and a generality that is often lacking in formal analyses presented in the
literature, there are issues that deserve further attention.
The question of whether the rank function theorem is complete concerning
protocols running on unbounded networks, discussed in Section 4.2, is still
open. We should like to study this question in more detail, and hope to make
further progress towards a definitive answer.
The model presented in Chapter 3 is highly useful, but could be extended.
We plan to consider revising the theoretical model to include the following
features.
• The atoms allowed are at present limited to keys, nonces and agent
identities; but they could include timestamps, session keys and con-
stants.
• Operations on messages are currently restricted to encryption and con-
catenation; the operations could be extended to include addition of
constants, Vernam encryption and hash functions.
• The assumptions about cryptography could be relaxed. We might, for
instance, allow for attacks that take advantage of the weakness inher-
ent in low-exponent RSA [11], as done in [25]; we could also model
commutativity of cryptosystems. Such considerations would most nat-
urally be included by extending the ⊢ relation to allow the enemy to
make deductions that take advantage of the relevant properties.
9.2.2 Improvements to RankAnalyser
We believe that RankAnalyser represents a step forward in automated pro-
tocol analysis. Its strengths in its
• automated approach,
• ease of use,
• fairly straightforward results,
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• good coverage of protocols
take it beyond the level of being an inconsequential addition to the ever-
growing ranks of protocol analysis tools. It is a highly useful tool in its
current form.
However, we intend to make significant improvements to RankAnalyser
to increase its flexibility and intuitive feel. There are various areas of future
work under consideration.
More atoms. Currently, RankAnalyser is restricted to the analysis of pro-
tocols in which no agent generates more than one fresh nonce in each
run, and no agent has more than one long-term key pair, or more than
one key shared with each other agent.
This is a limitation of the specification language rather than an inher-
ent restriction in the underlying algorithm. We plan to enhance the
language to allow for multiple fresh nonces per protocol run, and as
many key pairs and shared keys as necessary.
Different authentication types. The program in its present form consid-
ers only a strong form of authentication: it requires that the protocol
should be considered flawed whenever one party A believes she has
successfully run the protocol k times with another agent B , unless B
really has attempted to run the protocol k times with A.
We plan to allow for other forms of authentication. For instance, a
weaker formulation would be that the protocol should be considered
flawed whenever one party A believes she has successfully run the pro-
tocol k > 0 times with another agent B , unless B really has attempted
to run the protocol at least once with A.
We shall also cover different specifications on agreement about nonces
used during protocol runs. At the moment, RankAnalyser considers it
a flaw if, at the end of the protocol run, the agents do not agree on
which nonces were chosen.
More basic types. RankAnalyser in its existing form deals only with mes-
sages constructed from public and private keys, shared keys, nonces,
and agent identities.
Future work will develop the tool to allow for other basic types of atom,
such as timestamps; the theoretical model will have to be extended
before this can be done.
In addition, handling of session keys is a topic with which we intend
to deal more fully. Currently it is possible to use the server nonce Ns
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to emulate a server-generated session key provided that the key is not
required to be used for encryption as part of the protocol itself; but this
matter will be dealt with properly in a future version of RankAnalyser .
Greater control over initial knowledge. The current version of the pro-
gram assumes that initially public keys are all publicly known, secret
keys and shared keys are known only to the agents for whom they
were intended, and nonces are never guessable by other agents or the
intruder.
Up-and-coming versions of RankAnalyser will allow the user to relax
these assumptions, providing a way to model compromised keys and
poorly chosen nonces.
Automatic generation of attacks. It has always been the case in our ex-
perience that it is an easy task to convert the output fromRankAnalyser
into an attack in the standard notation.
However, we hope to be able to automate this process. As made clear
in Section 4.2.2, we cannot be certain that this will always be possible;
but we intend to implement the process automatically for all cases in
which such conversion can be done.
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Appendix A
A few light remarks
Send forth your light and your truth, let them guide me.
—Psalm 43v3, New International Version
Over the course of the last few years, a technology has emerged that could
change the world of cryptography dramatically. The possibilities of quantum
cryptography, if its everyday use becomes a practical reality, are limitless.
Quantum cryptography differs radically from other cryptographic sys-
tems in that its security is based on physical laws. Rather than relying on
the relative hardness of differing computational problems, and speculations
about NP-completeness for factorisation and the like, quantum cryptography
harnesses the natural properties of photons to guarantee its unbreakability.
With this technology, passive eavesdropping becomes an impossibility.
Computing power is not an issue here; no matter what technology the enemy
has at his disposal, he cannot listen in on communications without being
detected.
A.1 Photons and polarisation
As photons (particles of light) travel through space, they also vibrate. The
direction of this vibration will be in a straight line contained in the plane
orthogonal to the direction of travel; the direction of the vibration is called
the polarisation of the photon. A light source in which all the photons are
polarised in the same direction is called polarised light. It is a simple matter
to arrange for a photon to be fired with any chosen polarisation.
Suppose a photon has been fired towards an agent, and he wishes to
determine its polarisation. His first step is to choose a direction in which
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to attempt to measure the polarisation. He could pick horizontal, vertical,
slanting leftward at forty-five degrees, slanting to the right, or any direction
at all.
Having chosen a direction, he sets a light filter in place. Depending on
how close the polarisation of the photon is to the polarisation of the filter,
the photon may or may not successfully travel through the filter to the other
side.
Now, at this point, a strange phenomenon occurs. If the photon has been
polarised in the same direction as the filter, then it will pass through, as
we would expect; and if the directions are orthogonal then the photon will
not be able to pass, again as we would expect. But if the polarisations are
somewhere in between, then the continued journey of the photon will be
down to chance. When the polarisations are close, the photon has a high
probability of getting through; when they are almost orthogonal, it has a low
probability of making it; when they are at forty-five degrees, the probability
is exactly one half.
If the photon does successfully pass through the filter, it switches its po-
larisation to match the filter. A consequence of this is that the act of reading
the polarisation with the filter incorrectly set will either block the photon
or change its polarisation. This is crucial to quantum cryptography: no-one
can ‘listen in’ on the photon without risking destroying its polarisation.
A.2 Quantum cryptography
These bizarre effects may be used to send a secret shared key to another party,
and the probability of successfully detecting eavesdropping can be made as
close to 1 as desired. The following procedure gives a way of generating a
random bit string shared between the two parties. This bit string could then
be used as a shared key for a symmetric algorithm, or it could be used as a
one-time pad.
A.2.1 The sender
Agent A generates a random string of bits. In addition, she chooses randomly
for each bit whether to encode it using a horizontal or vertical polarisation, or
a polarisation slanting at forty-five degrees. If the former, then she represents
a 0 with a ⇆ polarisation and a 1 with a ⇆ polarisation; if the latter, then
0 becomes ⇆ and 1 is ⇆.
Having done this, she fires off the polarised photons one by one.
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A.2.2 The receiver
Agent B has no way of knowing, for each photon, whether it has been po-
larised using 〈 ⇆ ,⇆〉 or 〈
⇆ , ⇆〉. He makes a random guess for each photon,
and attempts to measure it with filter set to ⇆ or
⇆ . If he guesses correctly,
then his reading of the bit as 0 or 1, according to whether the photon passes
his filter, will be correct; if he guesses incorrectly then it will be randomly
determined.
A.2.3 Putting it all together
Agents A and B now talk to each other over an insecure but unspoofable
channel—that is, a channel that provides authentication and integrity, but
need not provide any confidentiality—and A reveals to B what polarisation
pair she chose for each bit; that is, she reveals whether the bit was polarised
with polarisation pair 〈 ⇆ ,⇆〉 or with polarisation pair 〈
⇆ , ⇆〉, but not
which of the pair was used. Now both A and B discard all the bits for which
B did not guess correctly. Those remaining—half of them, on average—will
be ones that B was able to read and understand.
They can repeat this process for as long as they wish until they have
enough random bits to make up the shared key or one-time pad.
A.2.4 Detecting an eavesdropper
How can they be sure that no-one has intercepted the photons and decoded
them en route? Suppose that an enemy agent does so. He will have changed
the polarisation of some of the photons that he has read, so he will have to
retransmit the photons to B . But since, at the moment of interception, he
will not know the polarisation pairs chosen by A, he will not know which bits
he has correctly read and which have been randomly determined. He does
not know what polarisations to set on the photons that he sends out. He can
guess, of course; but he will not be able to guess correctly every time, and
in consequence B will not receive the correct bits. At the end, A and B will
not agree on the bit string.
How will they know that they do not agree? They can simply check,
over the insecure channel, that they agree on some randomly selected bits.
Eavesdropping will randomly change the bits that the enemy agent misreads,
making half of them wrong; since he will misread half of them, one in four
of the bits sent out will be changed. Checking for agreement between A
and B on a random bit will thus succeed with probability three quarters in
the presence of enemy interference. By checking n bits, they can reduce the
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probability of eavesdropping going undetected to
(
3
4
)n
. Having made these
checks, they each discard the bits they have used for the verification and use
the remaining bits for the shared key or one-time pad.
A.3 The real world
Quantum cryptography is not yet a fully realised technology. Whilst the
theory is well understood, practical implementations are some way off. Ex-
periments have been conducted successfully over considerable distances, but
the complexities of transmitting and receiving individual photons on a large
scale are still hindering quantum cryptography from becoming a part of ev-
eryday life.
Whatever the future of quantum cryptography, the need for authentica-
tion protocols will not be diminished. Although the techniques presented in
this chapter provide a means for secure communications between two sta-
tions, they do not address the problems associated with authenticating the
agents who are present at the stations. Where active interference from a third
party is a possibility, authentication must be by means of demonstration of
possession of some secret information, whether it be a secret cryptographic
key or a retinal image. Quantum cryptography provides no way round this.
For a more comprehensive overview of the topic, the reader is advised to
consult [2] or [80].
List of Notation
This list describes all the notation used in the thesis, grouped according to
the area of the theory into which the notation falls. In many cases, the detail
given is sufficient to interpret the notation; but where there is not enough
room for a full explanation here, a page reference is given to the appropriate
definition in the thesis.
Logic
V ∧W Conjunction: logical and of propositions V and W
V ∨W Disjunction: logical or
¬ V Negation: logical not
V ⇒W Implication: W ∨ ¬ V
V ⇔W Mutual implication: (V ⇒W ) ∧ (W ⇒ V )
∀ x • P(x ) For every x , P(x ) holds
∃ x • P(x ) There exists an x such that P(x ) holds
∀ x : T • P(x ) For every x of type T , P(x ) holds
∃ x : T • P(x ) There exists an x of type T such that P(x ) holds
Arithmetic
a ⊕ b Vernam encryption: bitwise exclusive-or of a and b
[page 7]
a mod n The remainder on dividing a by n
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a ≡ b (mod n) a ≡ b (mod n) ⇔ a mod n = b mod n
an The result of raising a to the nth power: a0 = 1; an+1 =
a · an
Zp The finite field with p elements (p a prime)
Sets
m ∈ S Membership: element m is in set S
{m1, . . . ,mn} The set containing elements m1 through to mn
{m | P(m)} The set containing every m such that P(m) holds
A ∪ B Union: x ∈ A ∪ B ⇔ x ∈ A ∨ x ∈ B
A ∩ B Intersection: x ∈ A ∩ B ⇔ x ∈ A ∧ x ∈ B
A \ B Set minus: x ∈ A \ B ⇔ x ∈ A ∧ x /∈ B
S ⊆ T Inclusion: x ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ T
S ⊂ T Strict inclusion: S ⊆ T ∧ S 6= T
∅ The empty set: ∀ x • x /∈ ∅
N The natural numbers: N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}
Z The integers: Z = {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}
min(S ) The unique n ∈ S ⊂ Z such that ∀ k ∈ S • n 6 k
max(S ) The unique n ∈ S ⊂ Z such that ∀ k ∈ S • n > k
ker f The kernel of a function: ker f = {x | f (x ) = 0}
Sequences
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 The sequence with elements m1 through to mn
〈〉 The empty sequence
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Traces
traces(P) The traces of process P
tr a tr ′ Concatenation of traces tr and tr ′
tr ↾ R Projection of trace tr onto a set R of events [page 26]
P satW Every trace of P satisfies the trace specification W ; that
is, ∀ tr ∈ traces(P) •W (tr) [page 27]
R precedes T If P sat R precedes T then every trace of P that con-
tains an event in T also contains a preceding event in R
[page 31]
Events
Σ The set of all events
c.m Message m transmitted along channel c
c!m Message m output along channel c
c?m Message m input along channel c
Processes
STOP The process that does nothing: traces(STOP) = ∅
αP The alphabet of the process P
a → P Prefixing [page 23]
P ‖
R
Q Parallel [page 24]
P ‖ Q Parallel: P ‖ Q = P ‖
αP∩αQ
Q [page 24]
P X ‖Y Q Parallel [page 24]
P ||| Q Interleaving [page 24]
P 2 Q External choice [page 24]
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P ⊓ Q Internal choice [page 24]
P ⊑ Q Refinement: traces(Q) ⊆ traces(P) [page 27]
Rank functions
ρ A general rank function
ρ0 The minimal 1-set rank function [page 46]
P maintains ρ The process P will not transmit a message m with
ρ(m) = 0 unless it has previously input a message m ′
with ρ(m ′) = 0 [page 32]
Messages
U The set of all user identities
N The set of all nonces
K The set of all cryptographic keys
A The set of all atomic messages
M The space of messages
Mρ+ {m ∈M | ρ(m) > 0}
Mρ− {m ∈M | ρ(m) 6 0}
M0 The set of all fragments of all messages that can ever
appear in a protocol run
INIT The set of messages initially known to the intruder
S ⊢ m Message m is generated by set S [page 29]
S → m The set S leads to the message m [page 46]
S  m S  m ⇔ S ⊢ m ∨ S → m
S ′ Priming: S ′ = S ∪ {m | S  m}
N (m) The normal form of message m [page 51]
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m ∼ v m ∼ v ⇔ N (m) = N (v)
frags(m) The set of fragments of a message m [page 47]
Protocols
A→ B : m Agent A sends a message m to agent B
m1.m2 Concatenation of m1 and m2
{m}k Encryption of message m under key k
PK (u) Public (asymmetric) key of agent u
SK (u) Secret (asymmetric) key of agent u
SH (u, j ) Private (symmetric) key shared between agents u and j
k−1 The inverse of key k
Strand spaces
K The set of all cryptographic keys
T The set of all atomic messages that are not keys
KP The set of keys originally known to the penetrator
A The set of all terms; that is, all messages
+t Transmission of term t
−t Reception of term t
〈±t1, . . . ,±tn〉 A general strand
〈s , k〉 The kth node of strand s
ni ⇒ni+1 Node ni immediately precedes node ni+1 on the same
strand
n1→n2 Communication: n1 = +a and n2 = −a for some a ∈ A
Σ A general strand space [page 71]
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C A general bundle [page 71]
Ik [h] The smallest k-ideal that contains h (for h ∈ A) [page 73]
Ik [S ] The smallest k-ideal that includes S (for S ⊆ A) [page 73]
I [S ] I [S ] = I(K\S)−1 [S ]; called the minimal honest ideal of S
if S ⊆ T ∪ K
h ⊏m Subterm: m ∈ IK[h]
Type flaws
agent Type tag indicating an agent identity
nonce Type tag indicating a nonce
public Type tag indicating an agent’s public key
secret Type tag indicating an agent’s public key
{|nonce|}public Type tag indicating a nonce encrypted under a public
key
sub A general substitution function [page 99]
ψ A general type environment [page 100]
φ A general type environment [page 105]
RankAnalyser
E(m : k) Encryption of message m under key k
A.B Concatenation of A and B
pka The public key of agent A
Ksa The key shared between agent A and the server S
Na A nonce generated by agent A
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When it’s all said and done, that’s the moment when the talking has
to stop.
—Jimmy Hill
